Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 318

An Analysis of 'syāt' in Syādvāda 301
possibilities, what kind of possibilities are they ? In this connection four alternatives stand out prominently : (a) possible events, both specific and otherwise, (b) possible courses of events. (c) possible kinds of individuals and (d) possible individuals or particulars. Out of these, in the context of Syadvada, the first two are ruled out simply because they are basically technical possibilities. Although they are explainable in terms of nomological possibilties, to the extent to which they are at heart etiological or causal possibilities and to the extent to which Jainas are talking about physical objects independently of causal chain in the context of Syādvada, these possibilities are out of question. The basic issue the Syadvada is concerned with is to describe a thing vis-a-vis the features it has and these are given alongwith other features the thing comes to have in course of time, either simultaneously or in succession. This issue is different from the issue of the explanation of the either emergence of a thing or the features. It is in this context that etiological possibilities will figure. More importantly, however, we should understand that every genuine characterization of a thing consists in giving a determinate value of determinables; and for this determinables need not at all be conceived as causally enchained possibles. But what about the last two ? In some text it is argued that the expression syāt' is envisaged to bring forward the possiblities in the sense of such objects as a ghata.18 But an object may be considered as a kind of individual or as an individual or a particular. Now, out of these the former is ruled out at least so far as the contention of some texts is concerned. The reason for this is that same text adds that such an entity, which is potentially beset with many dharmas, must be the one that is existent. But this view does not seem to be uniformly borne out by all scholars or Jaina philosophers would not have an objection, it seems, to the acceptance of the kind of individuals. In this case, however, the possibilities that would figure in our consideration would not be existential possibilties but nomological possibilties although they are explicable in terms of conceptual possibilities. But the issue being of the description of a thing absolute concepual possibilities are out of questions, as such statements would be descriptively impotent and irrelevant. The conceptual possibilities would figure on the level of explanation and justification of descriptive statements. But that is quite different a story.
Even then a question may be posed that can we not say that
18. Vinaladāsa: Saptabhangitarāngini, p. 16. 19. Op cit.