Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 209

192 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
Buddhist believe in the multiplicity of consciousness-units ? Moreover, the relation of content and consciousness cannot be regarded as one of real identity, as the difference of content from consciousness is felt in experience. So not only identity but also difference are equally felt facts and as this is not compatible with real identity, the relation is held to be one of illusory identity by the Vedāntist, since identity-cum-difference is according to him a contradiction in terms. And illusory identity of different contents thus cannot split up the identity of consciousness.
The Vedāntist would thus successfully deny the reality of non-existence, as the absurdities alleged are not regarded as absurdities, but as a true estimate of things. The Vedāntist also banks upon the failure of the opponent to prove the reality of difference and other types of non-existence which are the presupposition of plurality. But this is not his only resource. He maintains that there is no proof in support of the reality of non-existence. If perception were competent to envisage non-existence, there would be no occasion for taking note of existence. For one existent there is an infinite number of non-existents pitted against it. For instance a pen is one entity, but the number of not-pens is practically infinite. If one were to perceive the non-existence of not-pens in order to perceive a pen, there would be no occasion for the realization of the latter perception, as the percipient would be occupied for all his life with the perception of the non-existence of not-pens, whose number is admittedly unlimited. It might be contended against this argument that the mode of perception as observed does not lead to any such consequence. The non-existence of a thing is perceived only when the negatum in question is recalled. So only those things are cognized to be non-existent, which are recalled by the percipient on the occasion. As he does not recall all the possible things that are non-existent on the occasion of perceiving the non-existence of a particular fact, but only the negatum whose non-existence is the object of perception, the charge of infinite number of perceptions of non-existence falls to the ground. But the Vedāntist would not accept the explanation, which makes perception dependent upon memory. Morever, perception, dependent upon memory, would not give a novel experience.
The Vaiseșika, who believes in the perception of non-existence, would assert this amounts to a refusal to face the evidence of the psychology of perception as a whole. There are cases of perception which are independent of the services of memory, no doubt. But the