Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
________________
204 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
concerete example. When a jar is shattered to pieces by the stroke of a club, it is replaced by potsherds. There is a change in the material cause, viz., the clay-substance. It was previously of the shape of the jar and upon the destruction of the jar it assumes the shape of potsherds. The clay continues as a substance despite the change of shapes. Shapes are but passing phases and their appearance and disappearance do not affect the identity of the causal substance in which they occur. The disappearance of the previous phase does not imply that the cause ceases to exist—which is the position of the Buddhist fluxist. The appearance of the subsequent phase is construed as the disappearance of the previous phase. So post-non-existence is nothing but the immediate subsequent phase, just as pre-non-existence has been found to be identical with the immediate previous phase. The immediate previous phase qua pre-non-existence is the cause of the subsequent phase qua post-non-existence. And though post-nonexistence as identical with the subsequent phase does not and cannot persist through the endless course of time and ceases to exist on the appearance of a third phase, still the cessation of post-non-existence would not entail the resurrection of the defunct negatum. This will be evident from a consideration of the relative character of cause and effect. The emergence of effect is possible only on the disappearance of the antecedent phase of the cause and so there is opposition between effect and cause. It is the effect which is hostile to the cause provided the cause and effect are understood as passing phases. But the cause even as the phase is not hostile to the effect, as emergence of the cause is not in any way dependent upon the cessation of the effect. The cause, on the other hand, is conducive to the emergence of the effect. Since the emergence of the cause is not identical with the cessation of the effect, though the emergence of the effect is identical with the cessation of the cause, the cessation of the effect would not entail the re-emergence of the defunct cause. But what about the dictum that post-non-existence is endless ? The dictum can be justified by the same line of argument as applied in the case of pre-non-existence. Though the particular non-existence as identical with a phase of the causal substance cannot continue in future, the post-non-existence of the first non-existence and that of the second and third and so on to infinity will continue unhampered. And the infinite chain of post-non-existences in future will each