Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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210 Anekāntavāda and Syādväda
existence is a determinate characteristic having reference to a definite context. But is there any necessity for this assertion ? Does not the factuality of the pen carry the assurance of existence by itself? The answer is simple. The proposition in question may be viewed as analytical and synthetical according to our intellectual equipment and psyshological interest. If perfect knowledge were possible, the assertion would be redundant for such a person, as nothing is unknown to such an omniscient person; but philosophical enquiry is instituted only for the benefit of persons who are aspirant for perfect knowledge, but have not reached the level. A perfect man, who knows all things and each thing as possessed of characteristics which follow from the very nature of each, will regard all assertions as analytical. But the consummation is not the possession of imperfect human beings like us, for whom the growth of knowledge is a slow process proceeding by stages, and for such each stage is a discovery attained after a laborious investigation of the nature of reality. It is not necessarily true that existence is understood only as a part of the connotation of the subject, since there has been a class of thinkers who call in question the reality of all things in an unrestricted reference. Again, 'existence' by itself is not capable of being understood in a uniform sense. Existence may be absolute or relative and, as such, there is room for misconception. Moreover, the assertion of all predicates is subjected to a question, which has been made a peg upon which the idealist and the sceptic hang their respective theories Is the predicate a real characteristic of the subject, which belongs to it in its own right, or a characteristic which is foisted upon it from outside ? In the first alternative, the predicate is useless as it does not assert anything new. In the second alternative, it is false as it does not belong to the subject of which it is affirmed. But the question is neither fair nor sincere. The necessity of predication lies in the subjective necessity of attaining knowledge of an objectively real characteristic. The very fact that there has been a difference of views among philosophers about the authenticity of the predication shows that the problem is not so simple as the question seems to indicate. The predicate 'existence' may be a part of the connotation of the subject, but it is discovered only after the meaning of the assertion is understood and verified. So the proposition is synthetic before it is ascertained and verified, and is analytic after such discovery. The sceptic ought to be satisfied by the answer that all propositions are analytical to an omniscient soul, but synthetical to an enquirer of
