Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 237

220 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
concludes from these premises that the phenomenal objects are the creations of ignorance, cosmic or individual, and are unreal in the absolute sense. The Jaina admits the truth of the premises. But does not think that the Vedāntist conclusion is inevitable. The Jaina does not admit that reality is free from determinations. It is experience alone that can give us insight into the nature of reality, and experience acquaints us with determinate existents. Indeterminate or universal existence is only a matter of abstract thought. It has been said in the beginning of this chapter that the opposition of determinate being with indeterminate being is the startii:g point of the sevenfold dialectic. It has also been made clear that indeterminate being is only a logical thought and not an ontological fact, and that the relation of opposition does not presuppose the co-ordinate status of the opposites in the ontological order. The Jaina agrees with the Vedāntist that reals are indefinites, but this does not afford a logical warrant according to the Jaina for declaring them to be unreal appearance, engendered by ignorance. It is not untrue because it cannot be expressed by a single positive concept. We have to take it as it is, although it refuses to fit in with the logical apparatus, as employed by traditional philosophy. I take the liberty of quoting the pregnant observations of Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya and present them in spite of their difficulty to the reader without any comments. Prof. Bhattacharya with his microscopic vision has seized hold of the secret of Jaina thought and no better elucidation seems possible. The determinate existent is ...being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the Jaina calls kramārpana. The given indefinite—the 'unspeakable' or avaktavya
as it has been called as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than consecutive togetherness; it implies sahārpana or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. ... It is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence, it represents a category by itself. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if is not understood.'!
5. 6.
The matter of predicaticn of the third proposition. The Jaina theory of Anekānta-Vada by prof. K.C. Bhattacharya, p. 13. (The italics are mine.)