Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 208

Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda) 191
contention of the Buddhist idealist who believes in the multiplicity of consciousness-units has no substance. He believes in the unity of each consciousness-unit, but denies the subject-object polarization as due to the association of contents. The contents of consciousness are held to have no reality apart from consciousness. Thus when one becomes aware of blue, the awareness of blue does not establish the independent existence of blue. The 'blue' is only a content of consciousness and is non-different from it. It is due to the inherent proclivity of our thought movenient for the belicf in the separate existence of the content that the latter is not felt is identical with consciousness. To be more precise, the manifestation of consciousness informed with an apparent content has no raison d'etre outside the separatist tendency of our thought-activity, which is the legacy of false knowledge or ignorance from which we all suffer. But the Vedāntist would urge that if the appearance of a content as an other to consciousness be only an illusion as admitted by the Buddhist idealist, then why should one consciousness be held to be different from another consciousness ? The difference is felt owing to the difference of contents associated. But when contents are illusory and their association is only a false appearance, why should the difference of contents be made the ground of assertion of difference in consciousness ? The difference of subject and object, the cognizer and cognized, in the same consciousnessunit is a felt fact. But still the experience of the two poles is not believed to argue a real difference in the consciousness-unit on the ground that the difference is only illusory. Parity of logic and consistency of argument demand that the difference of contents, illusory as they are, should not affect the unity of consciousness as such. Not only this. The affirmation of absolute identity between consciousness and content on the part of the Buddhist idealist would, on the conirary. make it impossible for him to meet the criticism of the Buddhist Sünyavādin who would deny the reality of consciousness and its content alike. If consciousness is identical with its content, which is admitted to be a false appearance, why should not consciousness also be regarded as a false appearance ? Certainly between two things held to be identical, one cannot be regarded as real and the other as unreal. If a content is denied independent reality on the ground that it is never cognised outside and apart from consciousness, such also should be the case with consciousness, which is never felt apart from a content. If the variation of contents and the invariant continuity of consciousness be the proof of the superior status of consciousness, why should the