Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 206

Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda) 189
above follow inevitably on the denial of non-existence as a characteristic feature of things. Now, non existence is recognised to be of four types, viz., (i) absolute non-existence, e.g., the nonexistence of colour in air (atyantābhāva); (ii) pre-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of the effect in the cause (prāgabhāva); (iii) post-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of an effect after destruction (pradhvannsābhāva); and (iv) mutual non-existence or numerical difference or non-existence of identity of things (itaretarābhāva). If existence were the whole nature of things, there would be no non-existence anywhere; and in the absence of the fourth type of non-existence, all entities would be lumped together into one thing. viz., Existence. The Sānkhya does not believe in the reality of non-existence. But in that case the enumeration of the different categories and the evolution of the categories from primordial Prakrti in a descending scale and the dissolution of each succeeding category into its immediate predecessor would have no meaning. The existence of a second entity implies that the first is distinct and different from the second and this presupposes the reality of mutual non-existence. The emergence of lower and later categories from the preceding ones presupposes that they were not existent before at least in their developed form. The presupposition of such unprecedented emergence is the second type, viz., pre-non-existence. And the retrograde course of evolution, in which the lower categories are said to be re-absorbed into the higher one, presupposes that they cease to exist at any rate their finished form. This presupposes the third type of non-exister And the non-existence of Primordial Matter (Prakrti) in the Sr (purusa) and of the latter in the former is evidently an admitted fact, and this necessitates the postulation of the first type of non-existence. Thus, non-existence cannot be denied by the Sānkhya without stultifying the whole scheme of ontology propounded by him. But the Sankhya inight maintain that the denial of non-existence on his part does not entail these consequences. He does not believe in the reality of non-existence apart from and independent of the reals as the Vaiseșika does. The denial of non-existence thus amounts to the negation of independent non-existence. But if non-existence be regarded as a formative element in the nature of reals he would have no objection to its reality with all its four varieties. But this is also the position of the Jaina and of the Mimāmsists. If, however, such be the position of the Sänkhya and the Mimämsist, they should no longer characterize reals as existent only. Things, on the contrary, should be characterized