Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 207

190 Anekāntavāda and Syädvāda
as existent-and-non-existent. What the Jaina objects to is the uncritical, simple characterization of reals in terms of existence as opposed to nonexistence. The nature of reals is always a complex of existence-cum-nonexistence. As regards the affirmation of non-existence as a separate and independent category by the later exponents of Vaiseșika philosophy, the Jaina, too, does not subscribe to it. According to the Jain nonexistence is as much an element in the constitution of a real as existence is. Accordingly a real can be said to exist or not to exist. The predication of existence and non-existence in respect of the same subject, though under different circumstances, is proof of the dual nature of reals.
But the aforementioned consequences of the denial of nonexistence would not affect the validity of the position of the Vedāntist. The Vedāntist denies all difference and distinctions. The plurality is only an illusory appearance called into existence by the inherent nescience of individual selves. there is no plurality of selves either. The difference between self and non-self is also a fiction. But the question may be legitimately posed to the Vedāntist: 'How would you establish your position ? You deny all differences, but by what instrument of knowledge would you substantiate your denial ? Certainly not by perception, nor by inference, nor by scripture, as all these instruments of knowledge record only positive findings. The Vedāntist, however, does not bank upon any one of these accepted instruments of knowledge. He maintains that the non-existence of difference is only a necessary deduction from the failure of the opponent to establish the existence of difference. All the arguments that can be advanced by e opponents would be shown to be inconclusive. After all, the experience of plurality is the sheet-anchor of the opponent. But this experience of plurality is not incompatible with the unity of the Absolute Brahman, which is divested of all differences, intrinsic and extrinsic. Consciousness, undifferentiated into modes and attributes, is the only reality, and experience of plurality is only an illusion. It is common knowledge that space is one and devoid of all differences and distinctions taken by itself. But the person suffering from a defect of sight would see it divided into lines. It is a truism that this experience of linear divisions in space is only an illusion. So there is no inherent impossibility in the association of plurality with the Absolute Brahman on the part of a person whose power of vision is infected with the defects induced by nescience. The
3. yathä visuddham ākasam timiropapluto narah sankirņam iva maträbhir bhinnabhir
abhimanyate,tathe 'dam amalam Brahma nirvikalpam avidyaya kaluşatvam iva' pannam bhedarüpam prapasyati. Attributed to Bhartrhari.