Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 217

200 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
subsequent production as pre-non- existence is without end. In the third, there would be no effect at any time as pre-non-existence is eternal. The fourth alternative is no doubt the accepted position. But the question may be pertinently raised whether pre-nonexistence is one self-identical fact with reference to all effects or its number varies with the number of effects. If it be one, it would cease when even one effect is produced and there being no other pre-non-existence to preclude their production, all possible effects would emerge simultaneously at that moment. Of course the contingency does not arise if each effect is supposed to have a separate pre-non-existence corresponding to it. But it would occasion another difficulty. Let it be true that each effect has its own pre-non-existence, which ceases when the effect comes into being. But has the pre-non-existence in question an independent ontological status or is it dependent upon the positive real to which it relates ? An independent pre-non-existence cannot be regarded as non-being, as non-being is by your very definition a determinant of being and an independent principle cannot be determinant of anything. Let it be supposed that is is dependent upon a positive real. But the only entity upon which it can be supposed to depend is its relative negatum. But the negatum is non est while pre-non-existence persists and the latter ceases to be when the negatum comes into being. So the relation of dependence or independence of prenon-existence in regard to the negatum is unthinkable. But there is a third possibility which may avoid the alleged difficulties. Let pre-non-existence be one and its diversity be supposed to be a relational characteristic with no ontological status. So the contingency of simultaneous emergence of all possible effects on the cessation of pre-non-existence does not arise, for relational diversity will continue as effects will come into being in succession. But if the diversity of pre-non-existence be only relational and not real, then there would be no logical necessity for postulating four types of non-existence. One non-existence in relation to timedivisions, prior and posterior, may appear as pre-non-existence and post-non-existence. The same non-existence, again as related to all the divisions of time, past, present and future, will assume the role of absolute non-existence and that of mutual non-existence with reference to the mutual relation of diverse reals. But if one non-existence may function as diverse types of non-existence, in spite of the lack of intrinsic diversity, why should not reality as