Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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Anekāntavāda : The Principal Jaina Contribution of Logic 41
generally supposed to be mutually antagonistic.
The same idea can be elucidated with the help of the illustration of trees and the forest. When the several, mutually different, particular trees are viewed not in the form of this or that particular tree but in a collective, general form designated 'forest" the particular features of these different trees do not cease to exist but they are so much absorbed (lina) in the general feature-observed for the time being of these trees as to appear to be non-existent. In this case we see the forest and it alone and our outlook may be characterised as monistic. Again, sometimes we take note of these trees one by one, that is, in the form of particular entities. Here we see the particular entities and them alone, and the general feature of these entities is so much absorbed in their particular features-observed for the time being-as to appear to be non-existent. Now an analysis of these two cognitions (anubhava) will suggest that neither can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other. Both are true within their respective spheres but neither represents the whole truth; for the whole truth lies in a proper synthesis of these two cognitions. Only such a synthesis can do justice to the two cognitions, viz. cognition of the forest in general and cognition of each, single, particular tree, both of which are uncontradicted (abādhita). The same holds good of the monistic and pluralistic world-views (that is to say, they do represent the whole truth only when properly synthesized).
The above was an account of the monism versus pluralism controversy in regard to features that might be spatial (daisika). temporal (kālika), or non-spatio-temporal (de'sa-kālātita): there is a special controversy between the doctrine of temporal generality (kalika sāmānya) or eternalism (nitvatvavada) .and the doctrine of temporal particularity (kalika viśeşa) or momentarism (kşanikatvavāda). These two octrines too seem to be mutually antagonistic, but the non-absolutist standpoint suggests that there is no real conflict between the two. Thus when an element (tativa) is viewed as being continuous (akhanda) throughtout the three periods of time, that is, as beginningless and endless, it is certainly eternal (nitya), for in that case it is of the form of a continuous flow (akhanda pravāha) that has no beginning and no end. But when the same element- undergoing that continuous flow-is viewed as divided in terms of relatively large or small temporal units (kāla-bheda) it appears as having assumed a limited (simita) form which lasts for this or that interval and which therefore has a beginning as well as an end. And in case the interval in
