Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

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Page 79
________________ 62 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda or synthesis. Synthesis implying the factors should mean then that the unity must break out actually into difference. In the last resort it will amount to saying that the Absolute should be experienced, not merely thought, as necessarily reproducing itself in actuality. But is the actual universe experienced as necessary ? It is only thought to be necessary; and accordingly the implication by the Absolute of actual differences--the necessity of its self- reproduction is not distinct as a substantial truth from the mere presupposition of the Absolute by the universe. The identity then of a synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not an identity in the sense of mutual implication. If the relation be still called identity, it must be taken as simply intuited, as all identity is taken to be in the Nyāya. Apparently then the Hegelian, while subordinating distinction to identity, has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity, corresponding to the difference of thought and intuition, which cannot be reduced to further identity. This however is a contradiction. A similar contradiction may be brought out in the Nyāya view. Here however we start with the priority of distinction to identity and we have to end, as will appear presently, by admitting an identity that is not distinct from any thing at all. Confining ourselves to positives, we have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of Samavāya or the relation of inherence. Without going into the subile technicalities of the Nyäya in this connection, we may indicate that Samavāya is understood by it as the relation of attribute to its substratum and of a whole to its part. It is a relation of distinct objects and is regarded as what is presupposed by every other relation of existents. It is not a mere formal relation of identity : the distinction of the terms of this relation is taken to be real and to be in no sense superseded by it. Hence it is not called identity in this theory but it is pointed out that one term of the relation-attribute or whole-exists inseparably from the other substratum or part, the inseparability being eternal although no term may be infinite or permanent. This eternal inseparability may accordingly be regarded as a form of concrete identity. Now this identity is taken as knowable by perception, unlike the implicational identity of Hegel which is supposed to be known only by necessary thought. As a percept it is a distinct among distincts, not as in the Hegelian theory comprehensive of the distincts. Ultimately there are objects like the simple atoms distinct in themselves and not

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