Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 192

Anekanta, Syadvāda and Saptabhangi 175
pramāna means "valid knowledge', sensuous (consisting of mati and śruta) as well as supersensuous (consisting of awadhi, manahparyāya and kevala).57 But the concept of validity, when analysed, is found to include 'comprehensiveness' without which knowledge is not completely valid. A pramāna thus turns out to be a comprehensive knowledge, though there are admittedly different grades of such comprehensiveness, ranging from the most perfect in the kevala-jñāna (omniscience) to the most imperfect in the lowest type of mati-jñāna (sense-perception). Knowledge as a natural function of the self is inherently comprehensive. This comprehensiveness however lapses as soon as the knowledge is influenced by the abstractionist tendencies of logical thought and language. The lapse in its turn may either halt at the assertion of a particular position without negating (but only implicity recognizing) the truth of other plausible views, and thus give rise to what has been called naya (or more accurately, sunaya); or, it may lose the balance and climb down further by asserting a particular
57. For an idea of afa, IT, 3451, 7:9414 and Densita, see my Studies in Jaina
Philosophy Ch. II. 58. CT. Emirterer GreifTMETEL WRT544--farin4-AS, p. 290 (The passage belongs to 32 ). Also see if I 21et seq. Also cf. 37TAT440C, 28 :
सदेव सत्स्यात्सदिति त्रिधार्थो ।
मीयेत दुर्नीति-नय-प्रमाणेः।। According to the last quotation, the proposition forms of दुर्नय, नय, and प्रमाण are respectively T T (a real is existent only), sat (a real is existent) and PITCH (a real is existent in some respect).
In this connection, the views of an are worth mention. According to him, a FT (F7 in the above quotations) gives prominence to a particular aspect and must have RC-it does not matter whether it is expressly stated or taken as understood-in its propositional form, while a GTC is a proposition which asserts the exclusive truth of a particular aspect as in the proposition सद्एव (धवला Vol. IX, p. 183). Both 774 and 74, however, give rise to a comprehensive knowledge inasmuch as the knowledge is ipso facto comprehensive and cannot be fragmentary. (FTTETEGII, Vol. I, p. 204 : 19-art 3719 4Crisa : T e rt, विषयीकृतकान्तबोधाभावाद्) A sunaya expresses the real in its entirety through a particular aspect. This expression of the real in its entirety is known as HOSTEST which is MTETET, that is, under the dominance of M. The fragmentary expression of the real, on the other hand, is known as a choice and is embodied in proposition like अस्त्येव, नास्त्येव, and so on, which are durnayas. The विकलादेश is TOTETT, that is, under the dominance of naya. (TETOHT, Vol. I, pp. 201-4). These observations of a t leave us in darkness regarding the line of demarcation between a sunaya and a प्रमाण inasmuch as both of them are found to be सकलादेश. The problem of fachat et has also been left obscure by . Akalanka has prescribed the use of the expression RITI even in the case of 100 EST (TV, IV, 42, 17) and therefore he ragards it as sunaya. But according to AF, the fact9T,