Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 86

Theory of Anekāntavāda 69
given. Now this distinction is itself a mode of truth : and as the definite given is taken to be being and negation or particularity and existence together, the indefinite may be considered as together with or distinct from each of these elements taken singly. It may be taken to be a particular i.e. to be together with position, and it may be taken to be many indistinguishable negations, to be the universal - existence as itself a confusion of the negations of many particulars, as not-A, not-B, not-C..... indefinitely together. Thus we have altogether seven modes of truth--bhangas as they have been called viz. particular position or being, its negation or the universal- existence, position and negation as distinguishably together or determinate existent, these as indistinguishably together or the indefinite, this indefinite as itself a being or particular position, as many negations together, and finally as distinct from the determinate existent. If there be an eighth mode, it would be non-distinction of the definite and indefinite, which however is but the indefinite, nothing more specific than the fourth mode.
The value of these modes of truth for logic cannot be fully discussed within the limits of this paper. We may conclude by pointing out that these modes of truth are not merely many truths but alternative truths. The last mode may be regarded as implying the other modes but is not therefore in any sense a comprising unity. What is implied by a mode is a different mode. The implying relation in objective terms is but indetermination. The implying mode and the implied mode are at once distinct and indefinitely non-distinct. Truth as an indetermination or alternation of truths is but manifold possibility. Each mode of truth as alternative with the others is a possible though it has to be taken as objective.
There is the conception of indeterministic will to which there are many possibles, any of which can be really chosen by it. Here we have already the notion of manifold possibility as objective to the will. But the logic of this notion has not been sufficiently investigated, though the relations of objective possibles cannot be adequately expressed by the categories of ordinary logic. The Jaina theory elaborates a logic of indetermination--not in reference to the will-but in reference to the knowing though it is a pragmatist theory in some sense. As a realist, the Jaina holds that truth is not constituted by willing though he admits that the knowledge of truth has a necessary reference to willing, His theory of