Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvāda 137
which is concerned with presenting, consecutively (kramārpanaya), the two aspects of being' and 'non-being', although it is expressed in the shortened form of a single proposition. It is because of this consecutive element that this mode is aptly called 'differenced togetherness' (or distinguishable togetherness) in contrast to the phrase 'undifferenced togetherness' (or undistinguishable togetherness) which signifies avaktavya. Both aspects are primitive', co-ordinate and mutually irreducible. Our mental (perceptual and other) as well as expressive (bodhanasāmarthyam and vacanasamarthyam) faculties being ill-adapted for comprehending and asserting both of them at once in their primary togetherness (ubhaycpradhānvam) we can grasp and assert them either successively or confess to our inability to do if asked to do it at a single stroke.174 This is precisely what is done under the third and the fourth modes, respectively. 175
It is contended that the third mode is redundant, or superfluous, and, therefore, is unjustifiable176 as a distinctive alternative in the dialectical scheme of conditional predications. The reason pleaded for this contention is that it does not exhibit any unique or novel feature of objective reality, being almost a mechanical conjunction of the two simple predicales contained, severally, in the first and second modes. While not denying the fact that it is a conjunctive predication, the Jaina does not agree with the contention that it is redundant. A conjunctive proposition embodies a judgment of consective togetherness which is no less a unique or distinctive moment of factual significance than any other, and, cannot, therefore, be expunged from a methodological scheme which pretends to synthesise, exhaustively, all possible moments, or alternatives, within its fold.
A similar consideration applies to the concept of the inexpressible. This concept confronts us with a logical, psychological, and verbal failure to embody, within any one symbol (sanketa), the two fundamental aspects of reality, with equal prominence. This is indeed an inconvenient predicament inevitable in any effort to take in, in one sweep, the whole range of truth. But the inconvenient or the impossible is not necessarily illogical or untrue. Limitations in the range of human powers of thinking and expression entail such a
174. iti sakalavācakarahitatvādavaktavyam vastu yugapatsaltvāsattväbhyām prad
hanabhāvārpitābhyām ākrantain vyavatiśthate/SM, p. 145. 175. Sea SBT, p. 62. PNTA, IV. 15, and SRK thereon in SRK, pp. 718-719. 176. See SBT, p. 69 €.
