Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
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Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvāda 135
common structural and phonetic pattern the word 'gauh', when uttered or written against any one of the several meanings, is a specific symbol different from what appears to be and structurally and phonologically is—the same symbol against another meaning connected with it. In other words, the word “gauh as meaning 'a cow' is different from the word 'gauh' as meaning a 'vāhika'. The fact that two or more meanings have the same linguistic symbol (samiña) is. according to the Jaina, simply a matter of linguistic coincidence just as in the case of two persons, who are entirely different from each other in many respects, having the same name, say Devadatta. The farthest that the Jaina could go concerning the question of the occurrence of the same symbol against several meanings is that he can conceive every instance of its occurrence as being only similar (sādršyopacārädeva)71, linguistically, to the other instances.
In the general position"72 taken up by the Jaina on the problems of tlic philosophy of language our concern here is with the specific problem173 of the relation between word and meaning
nāsmábhirapohaśabdena 'vidhireva kevalo'bhipretaḥ näpyanyavyāvsttimätram, kintvanyāpohavisisto vidhih sabdānāmarthal/Ibid., p.3. This view is opposed to the widely accepted view of apoha which consists in 'mutual negation (parasparaparihara or anyavyāvrtti, as referred to by Ratna karaśānti in the above quotation between point-instants (see Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 157, f. n. 3). Criticising the above view, of Ratnakaraśānti, that one word (dhvani) may generate in us two cognitions (vijñanadvaya), one positive and the other negative, at once, Prabhācandra writes : athaikenaiva gośabdena buddhidvayasya utpādāt naparo dhvanir mrgvah; na ekasya vidhikārino niśedhakärino vā dhvaner yugapat vijñānadvayalaksanaphalānupalambhāt/vidhinisedhajñānayos ca anyonyam virodhāt katham ekasmat sambhavah/ PKM, pp.431-2. Bhämaha is
at one with Prabhācandra on this question. See the following f.n. 170. Bhämaha, like syädvädin, holds that "no single word can have two fruits" or
meanings, as is evidenced by the followed kā. quoted with approval by Prabhācandra : nanu jñānaphalah sabda na caikasya phaladvayam/ apavādaidhijñānam phalamekasya vah kathan/Ibid., p. 432. Commenting on this kā., quoted also by Santarakṣita, Kamalasīla observes : na hyekasya vidhikārinah niśedhakārino vā sabdasya yugapadvijñānadvayalaksanam phalam/ TSS., kā.913,
and the P.thereon. 171. See supra. 172. The following works deserve attention for their treatment of the problems
concerning the philosophy of language from the Jaina point of view : PKM, ch. III,
pp. 391-465;NKC, Vol. II. ch. IV. pp. 530-604, ch. V, pp. 636-54, ch. VI, pp. 690-766. 173. Closely allied to this problem of word-meaning relation is the question whether the
meaning of a word resides ir the word as a natural power (svabhāva) or is associated with it as a mere convention. In the debate on this question the Mima nisaka takes the former view and the Naiyāyika takes the latter view. In conformity with his reconciliatory attitude the Jaina takes the middle position
