Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra Publisher: Jain Vishva BharatiPage 70
________________ The Anekantavāda of the Jainas 53 its own moment and in its own state. But it will be non-existent in substance other than its own, in place other than its own, in moment other than its own and in state other than its own. The Jainas have taken meticulous care in considering reals under these conditions both as their own and as foreign and concluded that applying these two opposite sets of conditions to reals, they may be regarded as of one character as well as of another character. Without going into further details of application of these conditions we might say that the general conclusion with regard to reals which the Jainas have arrived at is that reals necessarily are of manifold character. So any categorical statement in which we predicate only one quality of a subject in a judgment will represent only one aspect of the real to the exclusion of innumerable ones of which it is capable. Such a statement will thus be an expression of a merely partial truth. Such a one-sided categorical expression of only one aspect of a real, the Jainas have termed naya. Anaya is thus a categorical judgment made with regard to an object by one who, in order to satisfy one's own particular purpose, makes such a judgment without removing the possibility of other judgments with regard to it. From what has been said it is not unnatural to suppose an infinite number of nayas corresponding to the infinite aspects, of which the real is capable. But the Jainas are wise enough to classify under the two heads, the permanent and the changeful aspects, in which they tell us, reals are capable of being represented. These two are comprehensive enough to include all possible aspects of reals. Thus if the facts and phenomena of the world are understood in terms of their permanent and changeful aspects, then and then only we have fulfilment of our practical life. Similarly our practical life is served rightly only when we learn to look at things of the world as both general and particular and not as general or particular. The Jaina is of opinion that our knowledge of the Real can be valid only when such knowledge is consistent with and favours practice. From the analysis of the different nayas as given by the Jainas, it is found that reals are possessed of an infinite variety of qualities, and the nayas are only so many different ways of expressing the relations of the infinite qualities with the real, though each of them is expressive of a partial truth of the matter. The nayas then are infinite, corresponding to infinite qualities of objects and to the infinite variety of relations in which these qualities stand to the reals.Page Navigation
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