Book Title: Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture
Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
View full book text
________________
The Anekantavāda of the Jainas 55
position and negation may be predicated of a real either in succession or with simultaneity. It is easy to understand that in the first two judgments there is no question of succession or of simultaneity. The third judgment becomes possible when we predicate position and negation in succession because we can very well understand how a thing can be considered as existent in its own nature and then we can predicate negation of it afterwards when considered in its nature other than its own. But the more important question arises when we predicate position and negation not in succession but in simultaneity. If a real is both existent and non-existent at the same time, then we fail to determine its nature i.e. the real then becomes indeterminable or indefinable. So in the fourth form of the judgment where position and negation are simultaneous i.e. the real becomes both existent and non-existent at the same time, our positive and negative determinations cancel each other and the real becomes indefinable. But in the fifth form of judgment we find that the Jaina makes further determination of the indeterminate because it predicates existence of the indeterminate. It is interesting to note that in the Vedānta as well as in the Buddhist systems of thought we come across the indefinable form when the Vedānta speaks of anirvacaniya and the Buddhist speaks of catuṣkoțivinirmukta. The anirvacaniya of the Vedantist is māyū and the catuṣkoțivinirmukta of the Buddhist is Nirvāna. The indefinable of the Jainas as it occurs in the fourth form of judgment explains the nature of a real because in the explanation of a real the Jaina contends that it is a form in which every real appears to us under certain circumstances. From this analysis of the term indefinable in the fourth form of predication, it has been regarded by the Jaina as a distinct character of a real. The indefinable is not the result of juxtaposition of existence and non-existence but it stands for a character of the real which is inclusive of existence and non-existence but at the same time transcending them.
From this it is further clear that the indefinable as a distinct character of a real must have existence. So the fifth iudgment becomes a necessary form of predication. In other words when it is
icated of an object that it is indefinable in the sense of a distinct character, then it must have an existence. In this way the Jaina claims to silence those who may contend that when a thing is indefinable, no further predication is possible. And as we know that
