Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture

Author(s): Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 66

Anekāntavāda : The Principal Jaina Contribution of Logic 49
simple judgments that go to constitute a complex sevenfold judgment when one seeks to convey to others how certain mutually contradictory traits are harmoniously synthesized in one single whole. Thus the Doctrine of Partial truths (nayavada) and the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment (bhangavāda) are natural corollaries to the non-absolutistic standpoint.
True, in the Vedicist philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Vedānta, etc. and so also in the philosophy of Buddhism, we often come across a tendency (drsți) to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus synthesize its various aspects ;6 but the utmost insistence (atyaniika ägraha) that every aspect of everything must be viewed from every possible standpoint, and the unflinching faith that the consummation of all thought-process lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy. It was as a result of this insistence (and this faith) that the Jainas gave birth to those independent (svatantra), systematic disciplines (vyavasthita sästra) called 'Doctrine of Non-Absolutism' (anekāntavāda), “Doctrine of Partial Truths' (nayavāda), and “Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment (saptabhangī), disciplines which became a part and parcel of their treatment of Logic (pramāna-sāstra) and on which no other school produced even a single or even a minor text. Though an advocate of Vibhajyavāda (Doctrine of the Avoidance of Extremes) and Madhyamamarga (Middle Path), the Buddhist system, remained blind to the element of permanence exhibited by a reai entity, and hence declared everything to be but momentary. Similarly, though actually employing the word "anekānta" to characterize their own standpoint, the Naiyāyikas could not help harping on the thesis that atoms, souls, etc. are absolutely unchanging (sarvathă aparināmin). Again, the Vedāntists, even while taking recourse to the various standpoints called 'empirical' (vyāvahārika) ‘ultimte' (päramarthika), etc., could not help insisting that all standpoints except the standpoint of Brahman (Brahma-drsti) are of an inferior—or even utterly false—sort. The only reason for this anomaly seems to be that these systems did not imbibe the spirit of non-absolutism to the same extent as did the Jaina. Thus the Jaina synthesizes all the standpoints and, at the same time, grants that all these standpoints are equally competent and true so far as their
6. See Sänkhya-pravacana-bhasya, p. 2: Siddhānta-bindu, p. 119 seq.;Vedäntasütra,
p. 25; Tarkasamgrahadipikā, p. 175; Mahāvagga, p. 6, 31. 7. Nyaya-bhasya, 2.1.18.