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objects, one producing nirvikalpaka perception and the other cognised by savikalpaka perception. In this connection Jayanta reminds the Buddhist that on the latter's own showing kalpana is not a case of false cognition in the manner the mistaken cognition of nacrc as silver is. 19 Then it is submitted that savikalpaka perception does not cease to be a cognition born of sense-object contact simply because it requires the services of a word learnt in past, Jayanta's point being that the concerned sense-object contact persists cven while the services of a word are being availed of. 1 3 This submission too is substantially sound, for if anything can be called perceptual cognstion it is what the Naiyāyika calls savikalpaka perception, and it is called perceptual cognition precisely because it consists in the identification of an object with wliich a sense-organ is in contact; by the same token, essentially mistaken is the Buddhist's counter-submission that it is not this cognition (which lic calls 'post-perceptual thought and treats as no pramāņa) but the preceding sensory experience that is to be called perceptual cognition. The Buddhist has elaborately argued that a word can render no services to a sense-organ in the production of perceptual cognition, but this argument is valid only because he has arbitrarily chosen to equate perceptual cognition with bare sensory experience; certainly, in the production of bare sensory experience a sense-organ does not need the services of a word. Jayanta's refutation of the argument in question is equally elaborate but its details cease to be much note-worthy once the basic fallacy vitiating this argument is kept in mind. Thus he contends that there is nothing incongruous about the causal aggregate of savikalpaka perception including a word recalled, that the memory of a word creates no gap between a sensory cognition and its object, that savikalpaka perception inspite of being a time-consuming process is of the form of perceptual cognition.14 All this is plainly understandable. Then Jayanta takes exception to the Buddhist's argument that a thing in all its fulness having been cognised by nirvikalpaka cognition nothing new remains to be cognised by post--nirvikalpaka thought, the former's point being that the same thing can well be cognised by two cognitions. 15 But as has been already noted, on this question both the Buddhist and Jayanta are wrong simply because nirvikalpaka perception is not at all a process of the forin of cognition. Lastly, Jayanta refutes the Buddhist thesis on a fivefold kalpanā. In a nutshell his point is that a class-character, a quality and an action are each an independent real located in the thing to which they belong while nobody ever identifies a name with the thing to which this name is attributed or a thing with another thing which possesses this thing. 16 The point is substantially sound but for the fact that a quality, an action or a class-character even if really belonging to a thing are not an independent real existing besides this thing. In this connection Jayanta welcomes
