Book Title: Sambodhi 1989 Vol 16
Author(s): Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 233
________________ nothing to do with an eternal unreal Avidya 78 (Pramänānupapatti). Sixthly there is no remover of Avidya. Advaitins believe that Māyā or Avidyū is removed by right knowledge of the unqualified, attributless Brahman. But Rāmānuja says that such knowledge is impossible. Discrimination and determinatiou are absolutely essential to knowledge. Pure identity is a mere abstraction. Hence, there can be no knowledge of indifferentiated attributeless Brahman. And in the absence of such knowledge, there can be no remover of Avidyā.79 (Nivartakanupapatti). Advaitins maintain that realization of identity between individual self and Brahman removes Avidyā. Really, removal of Avidyā is not possible. Avidyā is said to be positive by Advaitins. A thing which positively exists cannot be reinoved from existence by knowledge. The bondage of the soul is due to karma which is a concrete reality, not apparent, as it is actually experienced, and so cannot be destroyed by the integral knowledge of the identity of Braliman and the self. Cessation of bondage can be acquired by devotional meditation on God through his grace. The duality of Brahman and Jivas and the world is real and known by valid knowledge. So, the knowledge of identity contradicts the real nature of duality, and is therefore false. In other words, the knowledge of identity, which seeks to terminate Avidyā, is itself false 8 0 (Nivrit yanupapatti). By all these arguments, Rāmānuja concludes that the doctrine of Mäyä сreates more problems then solutions. So, it is not at all helpful in solving philosophical problenis. Parthasārathi Misra, a follower of Kumārila Mimämsä, thinks that the concept of Māyā or Avidyā, is irrational. His main question against the concept of Avidyā is : 'Is Avidyā false knowledge ? or is its cause different from it? If Avidyā is false kuowledge, it either belongs to Brahman or Jivas. It cannot belong to Brahamn because Brahman is of the nature of eternal knowledge. Jivas are also non-different from Brahman in their essential nature, So, they cannot have false knowledge. Thus, Avidya, a false knowledge does not exist. Therefore, its cause, which is different from it, cannot exist. If Avidyā, a false kuowledge or its cause be said to exist, separate from Brahman, then Advaita is undermined. If Avidya exists in Brahman, what is its cause? It cannot be anything different from Brahman, nor can it be Brahman since it is of the nature of right knowledge. It cannot contradict its nature. So, existence of Ayidya cannot be proved. 81 Even Vijñānabhikṣu, in his introduction of Sankhyaprayacanabhäşya, like Bhāskara, quotes a verse from Padmapurana, and says Māyāyāda is hidden Buddhism. Criticism of Mäyāyāda is found in the works of Madhva, 8 3 Vallabh 84 and in other Vaişņava philosophers. There arguments against

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