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to be indescribable owing to a genuine difficulty.92 In so far as it appears to be something, an illusion or illusory objcct cannot be said to be unreal like a square circle or the son of a barren woman, which never cven appears to exist. Again, in so far as it is sublated or contradicted afterwards by some experience, it cannot be said to be absolutely real like Brahman whose reality is never contradicted. Māyā and every illusory object have this nature and compel us to recognise this nature as something unique and indescribable in terms of ordinary l'eality or unreality. To say that Māyā is anir vacaniya is only to describe a fact, namely our inability to bring it under any ordinary categary, and it does not mean any violation of the law of contradiction. Real means, 'absolutely real' and unreal means “absolutely non-existant, and Maya or Avidya is neither. These two terms are not contradictories and hence the Law of contradiction and excluded Middle are not overthrown. The Law of contradiction is fully maintained since all that which can be contradicted is said to be false. The Law of excluded Middle is not overthrown, since "absolutely real and 'absolutely unreal' are not exhaustive. Mandana Miśra, a contemporary of Sankara rightly pointed out while defending anirvacan ayattva of Māyā or Avidya, that "Māyā is false appearance. It is neither existent nor nonexistent. If it were the characteristic nature of anything, then whether one with it, or different from it, it would be a real thing and could not then be called Avidya. If it were utterly non - existent, it would be like the sky - flower and would have no bearing on practical experience as Apidyā has. Thus, Avidya has to be recognised as indescribable. This is an explanation which should be accepted by adherents of all the different schools of thought. 93 Really, the word Māyā signifies what is inconsistent and inexplicable, had it been concistent and explicable it would not be Maya but would be real. "* It is also unwise to say that, existence of Maya or Avidyā cannot be proved by any accredited means of knowledge. Ayidya is perceived in the forms of 'I ain ignorant', I do not know myself or any body else'. Here negation of knowledge is not perceived, since legation implies the object negated. 'I do not know, this perception apprehends general nescience. If cloes not apprehend negation of a particular object. Perception of nescience is different from perception of negation of a particular object. It can be known by non- apprehension. In dreamless sleep general nescience is perceived. It leaves an impression behind. On waking from sleep it is revived, and brings about the recollection' 'I do not know anything during deep sleep.' Thus, nescience is perceived.95 Even we perceive snake on a rope. Māyā is also inferred through its effects. (kāryānumeyā). It is already pointed out that even scriptures speak of Māyā, which can
