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admit that the latter is a case of truly cognising this object, it being according to him at case of something mistakenly appearing to be a true cognition of this object on account of its proximity to the preceding sensory experience which is really a true cognition of this object. In this connection the Buddhist has also worked out a fivefold classification of kalpan and his contention is that each type of kalpanā cither inistakenly ditlerentiates things which are in fact identical or mistakenly identifies things which are in fact different. Thus on his showing when a class-character, : quality or ul action is attributed to a thing it is a case of dillerentiating things which are in fact identical (a class-character, a quality or an action being nothing different from the thing concerned) and when a name or the possession of another thing is attributed to a thing it is a case of identifying things which are in fact different (a name or a thing possessed being in fact different from the thing concerned). This too is il considerably confused thesis. Really, all thought identifies a thing as belonging to a class and this it does through observing in this thing features that are characteristic of this class, these features being called a quality if they stand for some static aspects of the nature of this thing, an action is they stand for some dynamic aspect of it; in fact, even to attribute a qualiiy or an action to a thing is to identify it as belonging to a relatively simple class, but there is some point in distinguishing between an individual quality or action and a class-character which is essentially an ensemble of certain qualities and actions. And all names attributed 10 a thing are attributed to it either because of its possessing a class-character or because of its possessing a quality or an action; even a proper name auributed to a thing becomes a reminder of the qualities and actions characteristic of this thing. Lastly, the case of one thing possessing another is a case of these two things entering into a relation where cach has its own distinctive role; and a name attributed to a thing might also be a name attributed to it because of its entering into a relation with another thing. All these aspects of the true situation are at the back of the Buddhist's mind when he works out his thesis on a fivefold kalpanā, but his misguided conviction thai a kalpanā must somehow falsify the nature of things real has played havoc with all this. A detailed comparison between what is the case and what he says is the case is futile, but a point or two might be noted profitably. Since all kalpana is to be conceived as a case of attributing--potentially if not actually-a name to a thing, the fourth kalpanā-type is to be understood as a case of attributing a proper name to a thing. Again, the Naiyayika posits a classcharacter, a quality or an action is an independent real existing besides the thing to which it belongs, and the Buddhist's impatience with this sort of proliferation of independent reals is somewhat understandable, but the
