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the Buddhist's declaration that a thought is not a case of false cognition but he disputes the latter's declaration that it is also not a case of praniāņa. Jayanta concedes that a thought might often be false but adds that a nirvikalpaka perception might often be false; e.g. the nirvikalpaka perception of one moon as two moons is false. 18 Correct is his implication that all thought cannot be dismissed as no pramāna simply on the ground that a thought is often false, but the fact remains that there is no question of a nirvikalpaka perception being true or false, it being not at all a case of cognition; thus the mistaken cognition of one moon as two moons is not a case of false nirvikalpaka perception but a case of false thought. Here Jayanta again distinguishes between a thought arising in a baseless fashion and one arising in the wake of a nirvikalpaka perception, his point being that the former is not but the latter certainly is a case of pramāņa. 10 Really, Jayanta should say that the latter, if it is true of its object, is a case of pranāņa; but he is right in rejecting as invalid the Buddhist's plea that such a thought is not actually a case of pranāņa but appears to be so because it follows in the wake of a nirvikalpaka cognition which is actually a case of pramāņa, the former's point being that this consideration is irrelevant so far as parmāņaship of the thought iu question is concerned." Jayanta cannot say that but the real point is that the question of being or not being prainānna arises only in the case of a thought, not in the case of a nirvikalpaka cognition; even so, his point is substantially valid in as much as a thought even when following in the wake of a nirvikalpaka cognition is true not for that reason but for the reason that it correctly identifies the object concerned. Here actually closes Jayanta's consideration of the point raised by the Buddhist in the cause of the defence of his case. What follows is a rambling sort of discussion interesting in its own manner. So, let it be examined separately.
Jayanta begins by referring to the Buddhist's contention that a thing in all its fullness having been cognised by a nirvikalpaka cognition there remains nothing to be cognised by a post-nirvikalpaka cognition. Here is first repeated the old point that the same thing can well be cognised by two cognitions but then a new point is raised." Thus Jayanta laments : 'It is difficult to say as to what is cognised by a nirvikalpaka perception. You say it is a unique particular that is thus cognised, some say it is the grand universal, some say it is Being-as-such, some say it is speech, some say it is a thing in the form of a commingled mass of qualities, actions, class-character etc. Certainly, on questions related to knowledge, perception is the last court of appeal, but when there is a dispute about perception itself oath seems to be the only court of appeal.''! However, from all this
