Book Title: Sambodhi 1989 Vol 16
Author(s): Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 214
________________ all thought and is non-illusory. Uptil now Jayanta was preoccupied with the first element of this definition, now briefly criticises its second elenient. Thus he submits that on the logic adopted by the Buddhist there can be no perception that is illusory.99 The plea that a casc like cognition of two moons is a case of illusory perception is rejected on the ground that in such a case too there is nothing illusory about the concerned nirvikalpaka congnition which alone is what the Buddhist calls perception; thus on the Buddhist's logic a nirvikalpaka cognition cognizes but one mooi which the concerned post-nirvikalpaka thought misinterprets as two moons just as a nirvikalpaka cognition cognises but mirage-sands which the concerned postnirvikalpaka thought misinterprets as water.20 The Buddhist pleads that in the former case the cye has been rendered so defective that it cannot sec one moon but must see two moons; Jayanta retorts that on this logic it too might be said that in the latter case the eye las been rendered so defective that it cannot sccmirage-sands but must sec water.1 The Buddhist agrees to Jayanta's point, but then he is told that in that case he has no right to say that a valid post-perceptual thought rightly interprcts what the preceding nirvikalpaka cognition lias cognised, an invalid post-perceptual thought interprets it wrongly.39 This exchange of arguments is important because it throws enough light on low our philosophers grappled with the rather ticklish problem of nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka distinction. Thus the Buddhist came nearest to maintaining that what he called perception and defined as a sense-born nirvikalpaka cognition is in fact the physiological process of bare sensory experience; hence it was that so many lines of argumentation adopted by him led to the conclusion that there can be no illusory perception. For certainly, there is nothing illusory or non-illusory about bare sensory experience which just takes place wlien the appropriate causal aggregate is duly operative; thus, for examples the causal aggregate which includes a normal cye as a member produce, the sensory experience which the post-experiential thought interprets as the perception of one moon, while the causal aggregate which includes a defective eye as a member produces the sensory experience which the postexperiential thought interprets as the perception of two moons. So, when Jayanta suggests that in both these cases the concerned nirvikalpaka cognition cognises one moon, he is as much wrong as the Buddhist when he suggests that in the former case it cognises one inoon while in the latter case two moons. Jayanta pertinently points out that the Buddhist himself adopts another line of argumentation while explaining the case of a mistaken cognition of mirage-Sands as water; thus on the latter's showing the concerned nirvikalpaka cognition here cognises mirage-sands which the postnirvikalpaka thought misinterprets as water, cssentially the same sort of explanation Jayanta suggests for the case of a mistaken cognition of two

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