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Kalıdas Bhattacharya
Unlike mere unreflective notice of subjectivity, introspec. tion is pure subjectivity experienced as distinct in itself and with an ontological status, with a being of its own, not as mere transcendental presupposition of the form 'T=' This is pure subjectivity, I experienced in its maximum dissociation It is pure consciousness, though still the self-revealing individual I The Advaitin calls it jīvasāksin In a later section it will be shown that even this subjectivity is not consciousness at its puiest form for the time being, however, we stop with introspection
But intiospection as the puiest forin of subjectivity is still only one of the elements of the individual person, called I. Why should it be as it has been taken by the Advaitın, the sole reality of the individual person, everything else-every mental state, the body and whatever else is bodily-being all faked? The Advaitin has even gone further and held that this pure consciousness is the sole reality of the whole world, the only ultimate being, the only reality What does he mean by all these ?
If introspection were of the psychological type (as distinct from the spiritual), mental states as its objects, however different from physical things, would be different equally from that introspection Like physical things, they, though qualitatively different from them, would be over there, to be just picked up and known. There would be no question of reducing them to, understanding thein in terms of, introspection These states, however short-lived, and, therefore, then whole field, called mind (antahkarana), would then have to be understood as constituting the individual person quite as much as that introspection and coordinately with it So is the case with body and bodily states too, including sensations and percepts (in driya-výttis). they would equally constitue the individual person But if introspection piopei, as we have already decided, is taken as of the spiritual type, it is just what discovers
