Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
JAINA CRITICISM OF BUDDHISTIC NIHILISM
It is impossible to reproduce in extenso the criticism which the Jaina philosophers apply to the Buddhistic nihilism. They point out that it is not always true to say that atoms are the constituent parts of all things. Soul and Space, for instance, are Reals although they are not constituted of material atoms. Then again, it is not impossible for atoms to be eternal and at the same time to produce compounds. It is quite possible for atoms to continue unchanged, so far as their essential nature is concerned, and yet at the same time to combine with each other for making compounds. At the same time, it is to be noted that the production of compounds is not wholly dependent on the atoms themselves. There are other factors which determine what compounds are to be formed at what times and this is why the compounds come up successively and not all at once.
In criticism of the inconsistent position of the Sūnyavāda, it is said:
विचार वस्तुरूपश्चेत् कि सिध्यत् सर्वशून्यता।
विचारोऽवस्तुरुपश्चेत् किं सिध्यत् सर्वशून्यता ।। "If your argument has any substance, how do you establish your doctrine of absolute unsubstantiality? If your argument has no substance, how do you establish your doctrine of absolute unsubstantiality?"
The Jaina philosophers in agreement with the other schools of Indian philosophy thus maintain that absolute nihilism is an impossible position. You must admit reality somewhere. What then, is the Real or the primal substance at the basis of this world?
THE SĀBDIKA THEORY OF WORD AS THE PERMANENT AND ESSENTIAL REALITY
In our opening lecture, we had an occasion to cursorily indicate the theory of a school of Indian philosophers according to whom Sabda, or Sound was the one fundamental Reality of which all the things of the world were manifestations. There we pointed out how these sābdika thinkers