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Epistemology of Jainas
explanation is merely a fancy. It is not supported sound by logic.
Moreover, one more fundamental difficulty remains unsolved. All souls are all-pervading. Thus, no particular mind and particular body can be assigned to a particular soul. Thus, all experiences should be common to every body. The Nyāya tries to explain it on the basis of destiny (adrsta); but, the latter also stands in the same relation to every soul.
Consciousness and Cognition
The systems of the Vedānta, Sārkhya, Jaina and Buddhism make a distinction between consciousness and cognition. consciousness, they say, is the power or nature of the self and cognition is its effect, generated through a certain process. The Nyāya does not recognise any difference between the two. It holds that there is no consciousness when there is no cognition. It is an advocate of asat-kāryavāda holding that effect does not exist in any form before its production or emergence. It is produced quite a new. In the state, wben cognition is absent, the soul remains almost like a dead. It does not possess any power that can develop into cognition. The responsibility of producing a cognition is equally shared by all the members of collocation. The soul is distinguished only by the fact that it inheres in the knowledge while others do not.
In addition to the general factor noted above, there are some other factors also responsible for particular types of knowledge. In case of the perception of external objects fourfold contact is essential.1 the self unites with the mind, the mind with the senses also and the senses with the object. The object, light senses etc also stand as members of the collocation by implication. The qualites of soul as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion knowledge and effort are cognized by twofold contact of the soul with the mind. In the case of inference the middle term is 1. Prasasta Pādat Bhāsya 187 2 Ibid.; Kārikāvali 57
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