________________
Draśana
439
man. Darśana, on account of its being unassociated with the objective element, is svātman, the real nature of the self. Jñana is associated with the object, and therefore, it is not the real nature of the self. It is parātman. Akalanka also states jñādā. kāra as common to all cognitions (sarvasādbāraṇa) while jõeyākāra as different with each cognition. It is particular (visesa). Thus, we can say that the above statement is a logical interpretation of Dhavalā.
The Criticism of Dhayalā
An objection based on the literal meaning of the term of darśana, is advanced against Dhavalā. Darśana means observation. If the external objects are not observed by darśana, none else can do so. This will render the whole universe invisible as it is in the case of a blind man.
Brahmadeva replies to the above that the function of observation is done by jñāna. Philosophical conceptions do not pecessarily follow the popular sense of a term. The process of knowledge begins with darśana and lasts upto the final stage of jñāna. The purpose of present discussion is to allot the province to each stage. The popular view has no weight whether observation should be included into jñāna or darśana. Moreover, darśana is not directly related to the external object. Indirectly, it covers everything. Darśana observes the self, which contains jñāna and jñāna is related with the external object.
Again, it can be objected; if darśana and jñāna are apprehensions of the self and external things respectively, they should appear simultaneously; as the soul is never selfignorant.
Dhavalā replies, when the obscuring karman is totally removed, jñāna and darśana are always simultancous. But, in the case of incomplete knowledge they appear gradually. In the state of external appearance the internal is obscured. Obscurance does not mean here total disappearance but its falling into the back ground.
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
Jain Education International
