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Epistemology of Jainas
We can compare the view of Dhavala with the conception of Sākṣicaitanya as held by the Vedanta.
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Darśana and Pramāṇa
As on the nature of darśana, there are different views regarding its validity also. According to Buddhism and the Vedanta it is the sole claimant of real validity. The articulate cognition or conceptual knowledge can have only a discursive validity. In the systems of Nyaya and Vaiseṣika the conception of validity changes with the change in definition of pramāņa. The old schools generally define pramāņa as the experience free from illusion. On this basis Śrīdhara has accepted inarticulate cognition as pramaņa. Viśvanatha also follows him. But, Gangesa, the father of the school of Navyanyaya, holds validity of predication as an essential condition of pramāņa.1 According to him darsana is neither pramā (valid knowledge) nor aprama (invalid knowledge). The systems of MImaṁsā, Sankhya and Yoga, generally follow the Nyaya in this respect.
In Jainism the problem of pramāņa is a contribution of the logical period. The Agamic conception of samyak or mithya was subjective. All knowledge related with a samyagdṛṣṭi was samyak and that with a mithyadṛsti was mithya. But, darśana was held as free from the controversy of samyak or mithyā. In the division of upayoga there are three ajñanas or mithyajñānas in addition to the five jñanas. But, we do not see such division in the case of darśana. As a matter of fact the notion of samyak and mithya is related with personal attitude. It is the fruit of jñāna. Through jñana one decides whether an object should be accepted, rejected or held indifferently. Darsana is not competent to help in the formulation of that attitude; as it does not lead to any judgment,
Siddhasena Ganin2 clearly states that the difference between samyagdṛṣṭi and mithyādṛṣṭi exists in the case of articu1. Nyayakandalf 198; Kārikavall 134
2. Sanmatitarka Tikā, p. 553
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