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Epistemology of Jainas
Jinabhadra replies that kevalajñana is complete knowledge. It cannot co-exist with the incomplete knowledge, as they are contradictory to each other. Similarly, we can hold that compdete darśana arises at the expiry of incomplete darśana. But, there is no contradiction between the two types of complete cognitions.
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Moreover, kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana stand on equal ground. To hold that at the expiry of both incomplete jñāna as well as darśana, only kevalajñāna is manifested and not kevaladarsana is quite irrational.
In the above discussion we have mainly followed Jinabhadra; who is an advocate of the first view. The second view is ascribed to Mallavadin, but, his arguments in original are no where to be seen. The third view is represented by Siddhasena Divakara. His arguments are further supported by Yasovijaya in his Jñanabindu. The statement of Pannavaṇasūtra also, presented in the support of the first view, interpreted by Yasovijaya in his own support.
General Remarks
The discussion of kevalajñāna and kevaladarsana is an important commentary on the conception of omniscience. According to the first view, which no doubt, represents the Agamic tradition, sarvajña means a person possessing the power to know all objects. The application of that power is arbitrary. This view seems to be genuine. Other systems also hold the same view.
Later on came the age of competition in the glory of religious founders. Every sect tried to prove its founder as supreme in all respects. The Nyaya and Vedanta observed that God is omniscient without mind. All of his activities go on automatically. The Jainism and Buddhism being atheistic attributed those virtues to Bodhisattva or Arhat. So, the knowledge of Arhat was accepted as constant. It was not possible unless the principle of constant attention (satata upayoga) was accepted.
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