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Epistemology of Jainas naiścayika-avagraha, and thereby includes it into mati wbich is both pramāņa as wellas apramāna. As a matter of fact, though mati is pramāna; yet, its first stage, where no judgement is formed, is neither pramāņa nor apramāņa.
Hemacandra? excludes nirvikalpaka pratyakșa from the category of pramāņa by inserting virņaya in his definition. Though he specifies the exclusion of Buddhist perception and apadhyavasāya only; yet, it brings darśana also to the same lot by implication.
According to Virasena? darśana also is a judgement. The question of its validity, he holds, is not subjective but objective. Jñana, which he names prakāśa or pratibhāsa is both pramāņa as well as apramäņa. But, darśana, being a cognition of the self, is always pramāņa. It is absolutely free from doubt (samsaya) illusion (viparyaya) or indefiniteness (anadhyavasāya). We can compare this view with Sankara who holds cognition of the self as always free from doubt etc. Division of Darśana
Darśapa is divided into the following four types :3 1. Caksurdarśana.
3. Avadhi darsana. 2. Acakşurdarśana.
4. Kevala darsana. The first two types depend upon the senses as their cause while the remaining two are supernormal. They are produced by the self independently. According to Dhavalā all the four darśanas spring from the self. None of them has sense as its cause.
1. The term caksurdarśana does not require any explanation. It is related with the sense of vision.
2. About acakşurdarśana there are different views. The general conception is this, that the darśana related with nonvisual senses and the mind is acaksurdarśana. The discrimina1. Pramāņa Mimāṁsā p. 5. 2. Dhavalā p. 148 3. Prajñāpanā, 29 Upayogapada
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