Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 449
________________ 424 Epistemology of Jainas matter. The first type is a variety of mati as it is a mental phenomenon. The second type is manifestation of the natural quality of soul. The psychology of early Buddhism divides knowledge into three degrees-ditthi (opinion), vitakka vicāra (logical operations) and bodhi (intuitive knowledge). The latter two degrees can be compared with paroksa and pratyakṣa of the Tattvärtha. The first degree is characterised as opinion not guided by reason (pannindiya) but, by desires (tanha). In the Jaina literature we meet both the terms; i. e. darśana and ditthi. But the ditthi of Buddhists is related with wrong attitude only. They do not hold any category as right attitude; because all conceptual knowledge, according to them, is false.1 Epistemology and Darsana In the theory of knowledge darśana is generally interpreted as inarticulate (nirākāra) appearance preceding articulate (sākāra) knowledge.2 Almost all the Indian schools of philosophy, except Bhartr hari, Madhva and Vallabha, have admitted two stages of perception and recognized the existence of an indeterminate cognition before the stage of determinate cognition. But, they hold slightly different views regarding the nature of these two stages: - Sankara holds indeterminate perception as the apprehension of mere being; the particular object and its properties are beyond its scope. According to this view the appearance of mere being (satta) is the only appearance of reality. The association of particular names and properties is a projection of avidya, and therefore, false. It means that the first stage of inarticulation is the cognition of reality and the stages of articulation are mere concepts, without corresponding objective 52 1. Psychological attitude of Early Buddhism p. 2. Prajñāpana 15 pada. 3. Vedanta Sara Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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