Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 451
________________ 426 Epistemology of Jainas propose nirākāra, as the cognition of generality has no particular form or shape. 4. The Buddhists proceed from particular to general. The Jainas from general to particular. 5. According to the Buddbist nirvikalpaka cognition occurs when three factors of mental-stream (citta-saptati), sepse-stream (indriya-santati) and object-stream (visaya-santati) meet one another. According to Jainism it occurs just after the contiguity between senses and the object. This contiguity is not necessarily a contact but the capability of perceiving the object; caused by a particular kşayopasama. In the case of intuitional (avadhi and kevala) darśanas the senses do not play any part 7. As far as the cognizer and the object are concerned the Jaina does not hold any difference between jñāna and darśana, According to Buddhism nirvikalpa is the result of above three factors while savikalpa is mere mental. In one case the object is real, in the other it is unreal. 8. The Buddhism holds pratyaksa as the ielumination and anumāna as creation. According to Jainism every cognition is illumination. Kumārila i holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the individual (vyakti), which is the substratum (ādhāra) of its generic and specific characters. The Buddhist also held individual as the object of inarticulate cognition; but, that individual was devoid of all concepts. Kumārila maintains, the same as the substratum of class-concepts. He also holds äkāra as the name or class but, unlike Buddhism they are not merely conceptual. Prabhā kara maintains that both the generic and specific characters are the object of inarticulate cognition; but they appear in it as an indistinguishable mass. 1 In his view 1. Slokavārtika Sūtra IV. 113. see also Strūa lv, 112 and 118; and Nyāyaratnākara Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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