Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 456
________________ Darsana 431 the sound and infer the car. In the case of jar we see a particular colour and form and infer the jar. There is no material difference between the two cases. It can be said that sound is not a quality of the car. It is a mark, indicating existence of the car. In the case of visual perception the form and colour are the very characteristics of the object. The person who has cognition of this type does not make further attempts. His curiosity is satisfied. The process of perceiving the object is finished along with it. But, in the case of sound one is not satisfied with that much. He desires to ascertain further till the object is clearly seen. It shows a clear difference between the knowledge of sound and that of the form. But, this distinction holds good in a rough estimate only. When the question is discussed minutely it does not stand any longer. The desire does not prove the absence of clarity; but, the anxiousness to know a particular quality on the part of the subject. In the case of a mango-fruit the subject is not satisfied with the observation of colour and form. He is not satisfied till he does not taste it. In the case of a flower one is not satisfied till he smells it. In the case of a musical instrument one desires to kaow its sound. The desire depends mainly on the purpose served by the object. The object is not deemed as known until its main quality, for which it is recognized as such, is known. What is said about the sound and car, can be said of taste and the fruit also. The objection that sound is different from the object, does not apply to this case. The taste is a quality of the fruit. One infers the nature of fruit through its taste; which is an essential characteristic of all the tangible objects (rūpins). Thus, we can say that all the conceptual knowledge is inferential. According to the view under discussion all knowledge, i. e. jñāda is conceptual or inferential. It is a judgment, where something is predicated. The appearance without predication is darśana. If the present view is accepted in the sense explained above, not much difference remains between it and the popularly accepted view which we have numbered three. The only difficulty Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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