Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 205
________________ 180 Epistemology of Jainas... the form, "I know the pot (ghatam aham jānāmi)" or what is the same as “I possess the knowledge of pot" (ghata jñāpavānaham). In such a case, the knowledge (of the pot) comes to be perceived as a quality inhering in the self. The self is directly perceived, and knowledge is perceived indirectly through perception of the self. In the Nyāya scheme of relations between the mind and the percept, already explained, the relation between the perceiving mind and this knowledge falls within the class of samyukta samavāya i. e. inherence in the conjoined. For, in this case first there is a direct connection of mind with the self, and then, through the self, with the knowledge inhering in it. But, this account of the Nyāya does not satisfactorily explain the knowledge of knowledge. The self according to the Nyāya has many qualities inhering in it and all of them are not held to be perceived in the perception of the self. As the attribute of a self is not necessarily perceiyed, therefore, in the perception of the self, it is of little help to say that knowledge is perceived as being an attribute of the perceived self. For, even then, to answer the question why the attribute knowledge should be perceivable, whereas some other attributes of the self are not perceivable, the Nyāya must say, because knowledge is an attribute of the nature of which is to be perceived. "If so, the Vedāntist asks, wbat harm is them in supposing that it is the very nature of knowledge to be perceivable, they gain little by resorting to the round about way, of explaining that knowledge is perceived as an attribute inhering in the self, which is perceived by the mind. The Vedāntins themselves hold tbat it is the nature of knowledge to be self-manifest. When the pot is known, the knowledge of the pot also becomes manifest at that very moment. The self manifesting the nature of knowledge is regarded by the Vedāntins to be a natural subiective characteristic, which, therefore, cannot be classed under immediacy (pratyaksatva) as pertaining to objects. As Madhavācārya puts it.Things like pots are perceived as objects. But knowledge being self-manifest Jain Education International www.jainelibrary.org For Private & Personal Use Only

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