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Division of Knowledge
219
ception. If the question of cause is left aside, the first characteristic of its nature is that it is inexpressible (avyapadeśyam). It is not simple to ascertain the exact meaning of this term. Jayanta, sums up his long discussion about it with the following remarks: “I have stated the views of different exponents on the basis of tradition. The scholars may accept, whatever appears them the right.”l
According to the interpretation of old Naiyāyikas, he says, 'avyapadeśyam' means the knowledge which does not fall as. the object of speech. We apprehend the form, taste etc. of an object without associating them with any name, as the apprehension of baby, who is ignorant of language. It is perception. But, when the same are associated with names, and we are conscious that it is the cognition of form or taste, and are in a position to convey them to others, we pass from the limits of perception to those of Āgama. VBh. expressing the views of some Ācāryas indicates the same thing hy way of pointing out the distinction between mati and śruta. According to it, every cognition before the association of name is mati, and śruta after the association.
According to another interpretation ‘avyapadeśyam' means. absence of association with any other simultaneous sound-cognition, such as hearing the name of an object, uttered by some person, at the time when it is perceived. If by the moment, when we see a cow, a man says 'here is a cow', the knowledge of the sound as associated with the perceptual appearance is not considered as perception but as sound-knowledge (sabda-pramā). This view is supported by the definition of sound-knowledge as. given by Gautama.
According to the third interpretation the adjective 'avyapadeśyam' is introduced in order to refute the conception of grammarians, who hold that there is no cognition without the association of speech. 1 Nyāyamañjari p. 82
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