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Epistemology of Jainas
Vacaspati Miśral and later logicians of the Nyāya school interpret it as the expression of indeterminate cognition. Taey hold that the Nyāya accepts two types of pratyaksa , viz., determinate and indeterminate. Gautama bas specified both of them in his definitian through the terms of ‘vyavasāyi' and 'avyapadeśyam' respectively. It is a matter of investigation how far the Buddhist notion of 'kalpanāpodham' is comparable to the ‘avyapadeśyam' of Gautama.
If we accept the last view as representative of the Nyāya theory, it can be concluded that the Nyāya does not attach any importance to the distinction between perceptual and imperceptual knowledge, as for as their appearance is concerned. Though the variety of indeterminate cognition is confined to perception only; yet, that does not cover the whole range of perceptual knowledge.
The first and second views try to draw a line between perceptual and the verbal knowledge. The Jainas also deal with the same problem when making a distinction between mati and sruta. If a cognition, according to the first view, appears as associated with words, it is not perception, it is to be regarded as verbal knowledge. The Jainas do not endorse this view. They hold that mere association of words does not make an appearance a verbal knowledge. It is verbal only when it depends upon the speech uttered or distinctly remembered at the time of appearance. When a person learns from an authority that such and such object should be named as such, his knowledge is verbal. But, when the same is assimilated and appears in a form mixed with sepse-perception, it is not verbal or śruta. In the logical period it was regarded that every cognition is necessarily composed of three parts; viz, the cognition of the object, the cognition of the object-cognition and the cognition of the self. The cognition of jar is identical with the appearance of 'I know a jar'. Thus, the Jainas do not regard non-association of words as the criterion of perception. 1 Nyāyāvatāra Dipikā, p. 70
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