Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 413
________________ 388 Epistemology of Jainas time even after realization. This is known as the state of JIvanmukta. An objection is raised to this conception that, as the illusive appearance is the effect of avidyā, it can no longer stay when avidyā is destroyed. The Vedantists reply to this objection in various ways by citing the examples of physical phenomena. For instance, the person whose illusion of snake in a rope has vanished continues to tremble for some time out of the impression of fear lasting in his mind. Similarly, the wheel of a potter continues to move for some time even when the rod, which sets the wheel op motion, is removed. But, these examples do not solve the riddle in its real perspective. The real question is that, when the constituent cause is removed the effect can stay no-where. A cloth cannot last if its constituent yarn is burnt. The above instances do not provo the existence of effect after the destruction of constituent cause. The appearance of snake is only an auxiliary cause of fear or trembling. The real causes are physical and mental weaknesses. The impressions made by the appearance of snake are so intense that they last for sometime even after disappearance of the cause of fear. But, in the case of realization there is nothing on which the impressions can stay. The pure Brabman cannot have any impression. It is pure like the space. Avidyā is the material of which the impressions are constituted. When it is totally destroyed there is no possibility of any impression. The instance of potter's wheel also is a case of auxiliary cause only. Madhusūdana tries to silence the Nyāya, by holding that the impression of avidyā can stay without any substratum just as, according to the Nyāya system, a thing stays for a moment even without any substratum at the time of destruction. But, this is not an explanation. No system other than the Nyāya favours this theory. Sankara has refuted the Nyāya system on this very point in his Sariraka Bhāsya. Nothing can be proved by merely quoting a similar defect in the conception of a rival system. The example of the pot with flower or garlic, which bears the odour even when the contents are taken away, also is not helpful; as the invisible particles bearing that smell are already there. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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