Book Title: Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Page 304
________________ Indirect Knowledge 279 is the same as apadhyavasāya. If they are included into Mati, the latter claim to be a pramāņa or valid knowledge. Jinabhadral replies to the above in two ways. The first reply is mainly counected with the logical period. According to it, none of the categories can be identified with doubt etc. The latter are not knowledge; because they do not lead to any decision. They stop where they are. The categories of avagraha etc. on the other hand do not stop where they are. Ultimately, they lead to a judgement. They are the middle steps carrying to valid knowledge. If they are invalid the resultant cognition cannot be valid. So they cannot be discarded as Apramāna. The criteria of a jñāna is that which leads to a judgement. It should not hamper the successful activity. The aniścita' category of the twelvefold division does not obstruct the subject. ja his successful activity. It differs from its opposite in not having the firm conviction, that ibe latter does. Both of them are equally active for successful result. In the case of doubt the subject is lost in alternatives. In Īhā he strives to reach a judgement. The category of Niśrita as explained in the second sense, also does not stand in the way as an obstruction. The subject knows the object as it is, but he is slightly disturbed by a parallel notion; but, he does not stop there. The parallel notion does not stand in the way of his activity. For instance, the subject correctly knows animal in his sight, as buffalo, and acts according to the conviction, but, occasionally, his conviction is slackened and he begins to suspect the same as a horse also. Even then, he does not diverge from his activity according to the former notion. The difference between Naiscayika avagraha and Apadhyavasāya is this, Avagraha does not stop where it is. It provides material for further apprehension. It is a starting point. Anadhyavasāya stops where it is, as in the case of a mad or inattentive persons. Avagraha is knowledge, because it serves as means for subsequent real stages of knowledge. Apadhyavasāya 1. Višeşāvaśyaka Bhāşya G. 313 For Private & Personal Use Only Jain Education International www.jainelibrary.org

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