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Direct Knowledge
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(3) As far as the cognition of physical mind is concerned, there is no difference between the two exponents. Both of them hold that physical mind is perceived by manaḥparyāya.
It may be mentioned here that according to Mabābandha, 1 the physical mind is apprehended by the mind (Mana) of the cognizer. Akalanka2 interprets 'mana' as soul while Dhayalā interprets it as Matijñāna. But, the contention of Dhavalas is not right; as according to this view, Manahparyāya loses the credit of being a direct (pratyakşa) cognition. If it depends upon Mati it must be helped by the senses or mind; and thus, must fall into the category of Indirect cognitions (paroksa). Though, an attempt is made to explain away this difficulty and it is said that Mati, in the present case, is not a producing cause; but, only a helper pointing out the location of the object of Manaḥparyāya, just as the cognition of cloud in perceiving the moon. But, when Manaḥparyāya cannot perceive the contents of mind directly, it will have to depend upon the cognition of mind as a producing cause; as it is in the case of inference.
(4) It is about the cognition of objects conceived that there are two opinions. Jipabbadra holds that it is an inference abd beyond the scope of manaḥparyāya. Akalarika holds that it is manaḥparyāya, Now the question remains whether manahparyāya, according to Akalanka, cognizes the conceived objects directly or indirectly. If it perceives directly it would perceive the immaterial objects also, which is an impossibility. Akalanka says that the cognition of the conceived objects is not direct. They are congized through the perception of the physical mind. Thus, Akalarka also has accepted in a way the 1. Mababandha p. 64 2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika p. 58 3. Dhavalā p. 1258 4. See-Studies in Jaina Philosophy pp. 66 68
Višeşāvaśyakabhāsya G. 814-821 Tattvārtharājavārtika p. 58 (1-23-6-7)
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