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Direct Knowledge
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The Problem of Omniscience
It has been stated above that kevalajñāna is infinite. It knows all the objects with their states and modes entirely. This brings us to the question of omniscience. Indian philosophers hold different opinions regarding it.
The system of Cārvāka totally denies the existence of extraordinary cognition. It does not believe in any supersen. sual or spiritual knowledge, nothing to say of omniscience. The Sūtrakstānga mentions another system known as Ajñānavādin; which resembles modern scientist. It does believe in supernormal cognition; but asserts that its scope is limited. There is no cognition with unlimited area. One cannot know all the objects of past, present and the future. The capacity of knowledge is naturally limited.
The Mimāņsā system is very particular about the supreme authority of the Veda. In accepting the existence of omniscience also it it cautious that the Vedic authority is not violated. According to Sabara, only through the Veda can know objects that are past, present, future, minute, obstructed or distant. No sense-organs can approach them. Kumārila says, “We do not aim at the refutation of omniscience. We only mean, that it is not possible without the knowledge of the Veda. If the existence of an omniscient is proposed on the basis of all the six sources of knowledge, there can be no objection. But, when it is held as effected by one source only it is not probable. It is like the apprehension of all the properties of smell, taste etc. by the organ of sight." We can sum up the Mimāṁsā conception as follows :
1. As far as the meaning of omniscience is concerned the Mimāṁsā does not differ from the Jaina. Both of them agree that omniscience (sarvajñatva) means the cognition of entire universe. 1. Śabarabhāşya Sū 1.1.2. 2. ślokavārtika. 1. 110-12.
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