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Epistemology of Jainas
causation has four parts : The cause, its application (vyāpāra), the cognition and its result. If we consider these four stages in relation to the cognition, we have two central points. In case the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) is accepted as the main point the determinate (savikalpaka) perception would be accepted as the result (pbala), the senses as the source of knowledge (pramāna) and the contact as its application (vyäpāra). In case the determinate cognition is regarded as the main point, the attitude is the result, the contact is the source, and the indeterminate cognition is the application (vyāpāra). The vyāpāra itself is not a cause and, therefore, the mediation of nirvikalpaka does not lead to the dependence of savikalpaka on a cognition.
Bbasarvajñal defines perception as the cause of right and direct (aparoksa) experience. His definition is related with the cause of knowledge. Moreover, he does not define the term aparoksa which is merely another name of pratyakşa. Rāghava, the commentator of Nyāyasāra, defines aparokşa as the cognition not produced by speech (śabda) or sigpo (linga). But, this does not serve as the criterion of perception. It only means that perception is that which is neither inference nor verbal knowledge. Bhāsarvajña divides knowledge into three types only. He does not recognize comparison as a separate source of knowledge. Consequently, he excludes the above two only from the category of knowledge to discriminate pratyaksa. His definition does not help much in deciding the actual gature of perception.
Prasastapādas points out two significant factors in the definition of pratyaksa. Firstly, he gives the derivation of pratyakşa, meaning that which depends upon akşa, the senses. Secondly, he says that pratyaksa is that cognition which is produced by the four-fold-contact. In the case of inference or 1 Nyāyasāra p. 2 2 Nyāyatattvaparyādipikā p. 71 3 Prasastapāda Bhāsya Kandali 186
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