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Division of Knowledge
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There is no difference between the Nyāya and the Vaiseșika regarding the subdivisions of perception.
It can be observed here that pramā and apramā of the Nyāya are not the same as vidyā and avidyā of the Vaiseşika. According to the Nyāya Smộti is not pramā while according to the Vaiśesika it is vidyā. The Jaipa also holds smộti as pramā. Out of the four types of valid knowledge (vidyā) maintained by the Vaiśeşika, the Nyāya rejects smộti as apramā. The ārsa knowledge is included into perception of the yogin. Thus, the Nyāya sums up the four types into two and adds two more. The Vaiseșika, on the other hand, reduces upamāna and sabda to the category of inference.
The Mimāṁsā, Sankhya and Vedānta systems also look to the cause for their division of knowledge. They hold different theories of perception; yet, are one in the conception of contact between senses and the object as the basis of ordinary perception. Regarding the division of non-perception they hold different views and also regarding number as well as definitions. The Prabhākara school of Mimāṁsā adds postulation 2 (arthāpatti) to the list accepted by the Nyāya. The Advaita Vedānta and the Bhatta School of Mimāṁsā accept ponapprehension (anupalabdhi) also as an additional source of knowledge. The Sankhya is satisfied with three only, viz. perception, inference and testimony. But, this difference does
ot hold much significance as far as the question of proper knowledge is concerned. It may have some significance in the domain of logic where the question of the sources of knowledge is discussed. There also the main attempt of the contending schools is two-fold. The schools having shorter division try to include the bigger one into their own arrangement; while the schools having bigger list try to establish independent existence of each and every member of their classification. The distinc
1 Prakarana Pañcikā v 2 Sārkhyakārikā K. 2
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