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Epistemology of Jainas
Thns, the eontent of the knowledge is not something different from knowledge itself. It is the qualification of knowledge. The Vedānta and Sankhya accept a separate existence of consciousness, which is pure and unqualified. The Jainas do not favour this vicw. They hold that conscionsness must have some content or qualification, in all its states.
If we leave aside the grammatical conventions, which sometimes lead to confusion in the domain of philosophy, the question does not arise at all. It arises only in the act theory of Mimāmsā, which has its own explanation. According to Jainas different cognitions are mere states or modes of the soul; just like coil and straightness of a snake. Those states may refer to particular object at a particular moment, but do not requirc the object as an essential cause. Mere reference cannot confer upon the obj:ct the credit of causation. Functions of Consciousness
The modern psychology divides consciousness under three functions : knowing, feeling and willing. Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra enumerates six functions as the sings of the self.1 Out of them jñāna is same as knowing in the modern psychology. Sukha (pleasure) and Duhkha (pain) are included into feeling; and Icchā (desire), Dveșa (hatred) and Prayatna (volition) are only different modes of willing. Abhidharma divides these functions into four skandhas or groups : They are Vedanā (feeling) Samjña (ideas) Samskāra (volition) and Citta Vijñāna (pure consciousness, without content).
The Jaina division, to some extent resembles that of Buddhism. The Jaina technical term for Citta or pure sensaction is Darśapa, for Samjñā it is jñāna, for saṁskāra it is Moha. Vedana is the same as in Abhidharma. Cetanā or Caitanya is the common cause of all these functions. According to Jainism these four funetions are related with the self
1. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10; Vaiśesikasūtra 3.2.4 2. Stcherbatsky Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 15
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