________________
The General Conception of Knowledge
169
The same is known as upayoga. Vidyānanda holds that the jñāna is power ( labdhi ) and not upayoga'. Devasūria rejects this view and holds that labdhi cannot be the efficient cause of knowledge. The efficient cause ( karana ) means that which has the effect as its next stage. The labdhi and knowledge are not successive stages. They are mediated by upayoga. So, the upayoga only can claim to be the efficient cause of knowledge. But, the above objection is not very serious. Upayoga is the function of consciousness; and a function is not considered as an intervention between cause and the effect. The later logicians have changed the definition of karana accordingly. They hold that efficient cause is karana only when it is functioning. However, the function known as jñāna is not different from the soul. The second derivation points out to the cause of knowledge (jñāyate anena ). It is interpreted as the ksaya or kşayopaśama of the corresponding obscurance. In its positive sense, it is also not different from the soul. The third derivation points out to the substratum (jñāyate asmin ). It is nothing but the soul, where the quality of cognition subsists. Thus, jñāna in its all the three aspects is nothing but soul.
Relation between Subject and the Object or
Proper Epistemology The definition of knowledge was analysed into three parts. The first part was related with the metaphysical position of knowledge, which has been already discussed. We have known that knowledge is a function of consciousness, that is, the soul. Now, we shall try to know what sort of function it is. In other words we shall try to find out how a subject comes in relation with the object, and thus, we enter into the second phase of the problem; which is the problem of epistemology proper.
1. Tattvārthaślokavārtika 2.18.1, p. 327 2. Syādvādaratnākara p. 49-50.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
