Studies in Jainism

Author(s): M P Marathe, Meena A Kelkar, P P Gokhle
Publisher: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication Puna

Page 20

SOME CONCEPTS IN JAINA ONTOLOGY
of parts of space, parts of Jiva etc., they are not the parts which could be obtained by the physical division of space or jiva, or the parts from which space or jiva can be composed. Still we can conceive of space or jiva as made up of parts. And we can conceive of such minutest parts or units of which space or soul is conceived to be a composite whole. But since, like material bodies, space, jiva etc. have parts, they can be named as kāya (body). Thus, as souls etc. exist, they are called asti (Asti in Sanskrit means is or exists) and because like bodies (of animals etc.) they have many pradeśas, i. e. minute parts or units, they are called kāyas. Hence these five are called astikāyas, i. e. extensive substances.' Time does not consist of such parts which may be conceived as existing together and constituting the coinposite whole called Time. Therefore it is not an extensive substance.
What is exactly meant by a pradeśa ? It is defined to be that part of space which is occupied by an indivisible atom of matter.10 Thus a pradeśa is the space equal in extent to an indivisible material particle. Such pradeśas are occupied not only by the material atoms but also by the minute parts of other substances. Just as the minute parts of space are called pradeśas, the minute parts of a soul etc. that occupy such parts are also termed as pradeśas. The material particles occupying pradeśas of space are known as paramāņus or anus (atoms ).
The pradeśas (i. e. the minutest parts) of any soul are inseparably associated with one another. The same thing applies to the pradeśas of dharma, adharma and ākāśa. The material paramānus are not inseparably mixed up. They can be divided as well as united. Time consists of particle-like entities which are not associated with one another either separably or inseparably. Hence it is not an extensive substance. Each time-unit is, really speaking, an independent substance. Thus there are as many time-substances as there are time-units.
As regards the exact definition of substance as such, the Acārārga, the Sūtrakstānga, the Bhagavati etc. are silent. It is the Uttarādhyayana that gives a clear definition of substance for the first time. It defines substance as the possessor of qualities (guna) and modes (paryāya). The distinction between qualities and modes is that qualities are possessed only by the substance,