Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition Author(s): Dharmchand Jain Publisher: Prakrit Bharati AcademyPage 97
________________ Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines Tattvārthasūtra is the first work of the Jaina system which propounded right knowledge as pramāņa (an organ of valid cognition) and divided it into two types, pratyakşa and parokșa. This division of pramāņa is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through a soul was called pratyakṣa pramāņa (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi sense was called as parokșa pramāņa (other than perception or indirect knowledge) In Indian philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of parokşa. They explain that the knowledge that occurs directly through a soul without the help of sense organs comes under the concept of pratyakşa or direct cognition and the knowledge occurs through sense organs and mind is kept in the category of indirect cognition (parokşa pramāņa). The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accepted the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception (sāmvyāvahārika pratyakşa). This development is seen first in the Viśeșāvaśyakabhāşya of Jinabhadragaại Kșamāśramaņa. He says jam indiyamaņobhavam tam samvavahāra-paccakkham (Viśeșāvasyakabhāșya, 95) which means knowledge occuring through sense organs and quasi sense is sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa (empirical perception). Bhasta Akalanka and otherPage Navigation
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