Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 138
________________ Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition pramāṇa all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramāṇa. G. Acārya Kundakunda has proved the nature of knowledge as illuminating the self and the object. H. Although Nyāyāvatāra is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalanka has contributed a lot. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramāṇa under the category of parokṣa pramāṇa. He introduced kāraṇa, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans. I. 124 J. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (sāmvyavahārika pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyakṣa in the Nandisutra. The Mukhya pratyakṣa was given a new name as pāramārthika pratyakṣa by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as sakala (complete) and vikala (partial) pratyakṣa on the basis of a division found in the Sthānanga-sūtra as kevala and no-kevala. K. The Svetambara logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized, Whereas Digambara logicans like Akalanka, Māņikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramāṇa that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized. L. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is an instrument of śrutajñāna.

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