Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition

Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/022928/1

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SOCIETY, EPISTEMOLOGY
AND Logic In INDIAN TRADITION
DHARM CHAND JAIN
SEN
PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY
Jaipur (Raj.)

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About the Book
Indian epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions as knowledge (jñāna) and organ of valid cognition (pramāna). This book deals with both the dimensions along with the view point (naya) of a knower. It also discusses acquired knowledge (apara vidya) and selfmanifested spiritual knowledge (parā vidyā), sensuous and super-sensuous knowledge, nirvikalpaka (devoid of verbal designation) and savikalpaka (determinate) knowledge, its five kinds according to Jaina philosophy as 1. Matijñāna (sensous knowledge) 2. Śruta jñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3. Avadhijñāna (clairvoyance) 4. Manaḥparyaya jñāna (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5. kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge). It describes definition of pramāṇa, its kinds as perception, inference, and testimony along with the establishment of recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), inductive reasoning (tarka), as pramāņa.
It mentions logic as a part of pramāṇamīmāmsā in the form of inference for others and also as inductive reasoning. Buddhist contribution in defining perception as nirvikalpaka (devoid of verbal designation) and the contribution of Jaina philosophers to Indian epistemology and logic has been enumerated.
It also discusses about the concept of society in world-renouncing philosophy of Jainism and Impact of Vedic culture on it. A chapter analyses the concept of consciousness according to Jaina scriptures which does have importance even in the modern scientific era and an another chapter provides with solutions of conflicts prevailing in the minds of human beings and the society.

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SOCIETY, EPISTEMOLOGY
AND Logic IN INDIAN TRADITION
DR. DHARM CHAND JAIN
PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY
Jaipur (Raj.)

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PUBLISHER
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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition With Specific Reference to Jainism
by Dr. Dharmchand Jain PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY, JAIPUR
Book Printed on Eco-friendly paper

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Publisher's Note
This book deals with the Indian epistemology and society. There are mainly three branches of philosophy i.e. (1) Ontology or metaphysics (2) Epistemology and logic (3) Ethics. Ontology or metaphysics is a core area which deals with the reality or physical existent elements in the universe. Epistemology discusses about the origination of knowedge, its nature, sources and validity; and logic is a science of argumentation and inference for others. Ethics covers the concept of sinful and virtuous conduct of a human being.
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Indian tradition is quite rich in thoughtful and consistent ideas. Regarding epistemology and logic three schools are the foremost in India - Nyaya Vaiśeşika, Buddhist and Jaina school. Dr. Dharm Chand Jain has worked in the field of Buddhist and Jaina epistemology and logic. His two books are available in Hindi regarding Buddhist and Jaina epistemology. One is published from Parshvanath Vidyapitha, Varanasi and another from the Buddhist Studies Centre, Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur. We have a pleasure to publish his English book which is a collection of his valuable research papers presented in National and International seminars in India and abroad. This book contains his six articles on Jaina and Buddhist epistemology and logic. He has discussed the subject in such a way that it touches the views of other philosophical schools also. Dr Jain accepts that epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy i.e. jñāna-mīmāmśā

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(Theory of Knowledge) and pramāṇa-mīmāṇśā (Theory of organ of valid cognition). He has written articles on both the aspects. In Indian philosphy logic is a part of pramāṇamīmāmśa.
Articles on knowledge, naya and nāyabhāsa, nirvikalpatā and śrutajñāna are related to epistemology. An article on concept of consciousness is important in the modern era which is also connected with the philosophical branch of epistemology. Two articles namely 'Society in Jaina Philosphy and Literature' and 'Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism' are related mainly with Ethics.
We are happy to publish this book and hope its usefulness for the interested readers of Indian tradition and philosophy in general and Jaina and Buddhist schools of philosophy in particular.
D.R. Mehta
Founder & Chief Patron Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur

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Preface
Indian philosophy has a rich tradition of different ideas about metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with nature of knowledge (jñāna), its origination, sources, validity and consistency and also it deals with an organ of valid cognition (pramāṇa).
Every Indian philosophy proposes a goal to achieve a blissful life and emancipation from sufferings forever. Knowledge is a powerful resource to control and remove the feeling of sufferings. It is helpful in knowing and propounding the real truth of existent elements of the universe and the pious deeds.
In this book an article entitled "Knowledge in Jainism: an Overview" discusses the nature and kinds of knowledge and the contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy. Knowledge is considered as an attribute or property of a soul. Nyāya philosophers consider it as a separate category of attribute which resides in a soul with inherence relation whereas Jaina philosophers consider knowledge as an essential, identical and natural attribute of a soul, without which consciousness cannot be defined in a soul. Vedānta philosophers also accept knowledge or cognitive function as an essential character of the soul or brahma.
Knowledge is not only acquired, it is also intrinsically manifested in a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidencecum-destruction (kṣayopaśama) of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraṇa) karma. Sense organs, mind and intellect are the

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means of acquiring knowledge and soul is a knower. This acquired knowledge is called as aparāvidyā in the Upanișads. In Jainism, it is called as matijñāna. A soul has an ability to know the objects directly without the help of sense organs and mind also. That knowledge is defined as supersensous and spiritual knowledge which emerges within a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidence-cum-destruction of knowledgeobscuring karma. In the Upanişads, it has been called as parāvidyā. In Jainism, this knowledge has been considered as avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna, Śrutajñāna is considered as a scriptural, verbal and spiritual knowledge.
Thinking about validity of knowledge is also a subject of epistemology. Yogācāra Buddhists and Jaina philosophers accept knowledge as illuminating the self and the object.Hence in their views, no other knowledge is required to determine the validity of that knowledge in the practiced position, but if the knowledge of an object is not familiar, then another knowledge is needed to verify its validity. Nyāya philosophers accept that validity of one knowledge is determined through some other valid knowledge. Mimāmsaka philosophers have a different view. They accept that invalidity in a knowledge comes from other causes, knowledge itself is valid.
Jaina tradition has contributed in the field of Indian epistemology by propounding five types of knowledge viz- 1. Matijñāna (sensous knowledge) 2.Śrutajñāna(scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3.Avadhijñāna (clairvoyance) 4. Manaḥparyāyajñāna (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5.kevalajñāna(pure and perfect knowledge).
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Śrutajñāna is important, because of its utility in revealing kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge). It is found in every living being in a right or perverted form, hence the prevalent meaning of śrutajñāna as a verbal or scriptural knowledge is insufficient. This fact has been pointed out and a wide meaning usable for achieving liberation has been investigated in the article entitled "Significance of Śrutajñāna".
Indian philosophers have developed a distinguished branch of epistemology and logic as pramāņa-śāstra and nyāya-vidyā. An organ of valid cognition is called pramāṇa and an examination of a reality through pramāņas is called nyāya. Method of inference for others using two to five organs (avayavas) is also called as Nyāya. In the western terminology it has been defined as logic. Every Indian philosophical school has accepted pramāņa as an organ of valid cognition, but they have different opinions in their numbers. Cārvaka considers only one pramāņa i.e. perception (pratykşa). Vaiseșika and Buddhist philosophers propound two pramāṇas including inference (anumāna) with it. Jainas also accept two, but they gave a different name to second pramāņa as indirect (parokşa) pramāņa, in which they include recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), inductive reasoning (tarka), inference (anumāna) and testimony (āgama) as its kinds. Sāmkhyas propound three pramāṇas as perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna) and testimony (āgama). Nyāya philosophers describe four pramāņas keeping comparision (upamāna) as a different pramāņa. PrabhākaraMimāņsakas accept five including arthāpatti (presupposition) and Mimāņsaka Kumārila Bhațța accept six pramāņas propounding non-availability (anupalabdhi) as a different pramāņa. The article on Jaina Epistemology and Logic gives a
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brief account about the development of Jaina epistemology and its contribution to Indian epistemological tenets alongwith discussing the pramāṇas in general. -
There is a discussion in Indian epistemology on perception (pratyakşa), whether it is nirvikalpaka(devoid of verbal designation) or savikalpaka (determinate)? Buddhist philosopher Dignāga has propounded that perception through sense organs is always nirvikalpaka. Kalpanā (mental or verbal construction) is an addition to it, and that is not a part of perception. This concept of nirvikalpatā has been discussed in a separate article entitled "The concept of Nirvikalpatā in Buddhist Logic and the Indian Tradition" in this book. Here it is notable that Jaina philosophers accept pramāņa as a determinate knowledge which is devoid of doubt, pervertedness and indeterminateness,hence pramāņa should be sarvikalpaka (determinate) in their view. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti has given arguments in favour of nirvikalpaka perception. Other schools of Indian Philosophy like Yoga, Nyāya and Mimāmsā have also discussed nirvikalpatā.
Nayavāda is a specific original contribution of Jainism to the panorama of Indian epistemological doctrines. Nayavāda is a view point or stand point to know and to describe a reality. Jaina philosophers discuss mainly two and seven kinds of nayas, which have been described in an article on “Naya, Nayābhāsa and Nikṣepa" Naya is also a science to grasp the real meaning of sentence, whereas nikṣepa is a term to investigate the appropriate meaning of a word. Naya and Nikṣepa are related to linguistic aspect also. When a naya bears an absolustic view point then it is treated as nayābhāsa.
An article entitled "The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism" presents the nature of consciousness, its various levels
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as alertness (apramattatā), cognitive function (upayoga), vitality (prana), body-consciousness, sañjña (eagerness to eat, feeling fear, sexual desire, desire of possessiveness), vedanā (feeling of pleasure and sorrow), vīrya (enthusiasm) etc. Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes, whereas Jainism accepts that these body parts are felt conscious due to the consciousness of a soul. According to Jainism consciousness is an essential and inseparable attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments.
Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence it is assumed often that society is neglected in it, but this assumption is not true. Lord Mahāvīra and other Tirthankars deliver their preaching for the welfare of the society and all living beings. A concept of fourfold ford (caturvidha tīrtha or sangha) gives a formation of society of religious persons in Jaina Philosophy. Although the followers of Jainism follow Hindu laws in respect of various social ceremonies. Vardhamānasūri(15th century) has propounded various sacraments for monks and house holders. Non-violence, theory of Karma, Non-absolutism (anekāntavāda), non-possession (aparigraha), compassion of tīrthankara also convey the social importance of all living beings. In this way this article proves the social significance of Jaina tenets. It also evaluates the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of society and presents the social attitude of present Jaina society as well.
"Conflict Removing Vision of Jainsim" is an article, which provides with a light to understand the causes of confrontation among the human beings and the solutions available in the Jainism with the views of anekāntavāda, Nayavāda, non-violence, theory of karma etc.
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I am delighted to express my respect and gratitude to Dr D.R. Mehta, founder of Prakrit Bharati Academy for inspiring me to prepare this book. I bow to his honest dedication for service to humanity and love to valuable literature. I am also grateful to Prof. Peter flügel for his able guidance and permission to include the paper entitled "Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature" which was presented at Centre of Jaina Studies, SOAS, university of London in 2006. Paper on Buddhist Nirvikalpatā was presented in Lumbini International Research Institute, Lumbini, Nepal in 2013. I am obliged to Prof. Cüppers for permission and Prof. Jayendra Soni, Austria for editing it. I am also indebted to the organizers of various National and International seminars and lecture series (at Valiyanad-Kocchi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Delhi) who invited me to present the papers and for inclusion of them in the present collection. I heartily thank Prof. KalpanaPurohit and Dr. S.K. Harit who have gone through these articles and improved the language. I shall be satisfied, if it is proved useful to any interested reader.
Dharm Chand Jain Department of Sanskrit Jai Narain Vyas University Jodhpur, Rajasthan

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Contents
Preface
1. Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature
2. Knowledge in Jainism: An overview..
3 Significance of Śrutajñāna
4 Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines........
5 The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition
6 Naya, Nayabhāsa and Nikṣepa
7 The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism...
8 Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism
.43
66
.81
.128
.143
......163
..177

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature
Jainism is considered as a religion and philosophy that promotes world-renunciation. It might therefore be assumed that there are no rules for society in Jainism. Yet, this would be a misconception. Jaina philosophy and literature have enough citations to prove that welfare of all beings' society is always in focus in preachings of fordmakers (tīrthankara). Society denotes mutual co-operation or inter-relationship of individuals which takes place in the path of salvation too. Ford (tīrtha) or four-fold religious order (caturvidha-sangha) is a significant evidence to confirm this notion.
This article aims to (i) explore the concept of society in Jainism, (ii) analyse the philosophical tenets from the point of view of
their social significance, (iii) discuss the position of society in Jaina canonical and
posterior literature, (iv) evaluate the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of
society, (v) present the social attitude of present Jaina society.
Concept of Society in Jainism
Human survival is nearly impossible without the existence of society. Although society is a changing phenomenon, it exists all the times. What is society? It is not merely a group of people, but it denotes the inter-relationship of individuals. The sociologists R. M. Maciver and Charles H. Page (1950: 6) state: “Society exists only where social beings

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
'behave' towards one another in ways determined by their recognition of one another." Umāsvāti says: "Souls render service to one another." Nathmal Tatia explains Umāsvāti's statement and the commentaries of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī, Pujyapāda and Siddhasenagani as follows:
"Worldly souls influence each other through service that may be favourable or unfavourable, beneficial or harmful. They cannot live independently of one-another. They have to share their pleasure and pains with others. They create a common environment and live together in weal and woe.'
,,2
This explains a wider concept of society of all beings. It keeps all souls in the view, propounding their relationship which includes the society of human beings also.
2
Jaina canons describe the concept of six categories of worldly souls (saḍ-nikāya)3 and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own identity. All the human beings also have their separate identity. Mutual interaction and relationship of these make a concept of society in Jaina philosophy and religion. In the Bodhapāhuḍa, the fourth chapter of the Aştapāhuḍa, Kundakunda says that the religion stated by tīrthankaras is beneficial for beings of all six categories.*
The central theme of Jaina religion and philosophy is spiritual purification, but it cannot be achieved without the
2
1
TS 5.21: parasparopagraho jīvānām.
Tatia (1994: 131).
3Ṣadnikāyas are six categories of worldly souls: prthvīkāyika (earth bodied beings), apkāyika (water bodied beings), taijaskāyika (fire bodied beings), vāyukayika (air bodied beings), vanaspatikāyika (vegetation) and trasakāyika (mobile beings with
two or more sense organs). For details see AS 1.1.2-7.
Bodhapāhuḍa, verse 60: chakkayahiyańkaramuttam.
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3
Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature
purification of behaviour of a soul towards the whole world of other souls. Mahāvīra, the 24th tīrthankara of Jaina tradition is always concerned about the world of all beings in his teachings to the people." He established the equality of all human beings and other souls on the basis of their sensitivity. The Sūtrakṛtāngasūtra tries to make a man sensitive towards the all beings of the world. It says: as you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way if you torture them.' This kind of preaching of non-violence (ahimsā) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the living beings of the world. In Acārānga and Sūtrakṛtāngasūtra non-violence has a social aspect, which motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness. Violent behaviour is enemy for the society,' but non-violence is a prerequisite friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society non-violent and friendly behaviour is very much essential. Praśnavyākaraṇa-sūtra states that non
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1) AS 1.2.3: savvesim jivitam piyam nāivāyejja kañcaṇam. 2) DK 6.11: savve jīvāvi ichanti jīvium na marijjium.
a. SK 2.1.680: savve pāṇā savve jīvā savve bhūyā savve sattā na hamtavvā, ņa ajjāveyavvā ņa parighetavvā ṇa paritāveyavvā, na uddaveyavvā.
b. SK 1.1.4.9: evam khu naṇiņo sāram jam ṇa himsai kiñcaṇam ahimsā samayam ceva, etāvamtam viyāṇiyā.
'SK 2.1.679: se jahānāmaye mama assāyam daṇḍeņa vā aṭṭhiņa vā [...] himsākaram dukkham bhayam padisamvedemi, iccevam jāņa savve pāṇā jāva satta dandeņa vā jāva kavāleṇa vā āuḍijjamāṇā vā hammamāṇā vā tajjijjamāṇā vā tādijjamāṇā vā pariyāvijjamāṇā vā kilāmijiamāṇā vā uddavijiamāṇā vā jāva [...] evam ṇaccā savve pāṇā jāva savve satta na hamatavvā, na ajjāveyavva, na parighetavvā, ņa paritāveyavvā, ṇa uddaveyavvā.
Ācārānga- and Sūtrakṛtāngasūtras stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as AS 1.4.2 says: savvesim pāṇāṇam savvesim bhutāņam savvesim jīvāṇam savvesim sattāṇam asayam apariṇivvāṇam mahābhayam dukhham ti, tti bemi.
'AS 1.1.2: tam se ahitaya tam se abodhie.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
violence is like a shelter for fearful persons, like a flying path for birds and like water for thirsty persons. It results in benefit for all beings, mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara)."
Thus concept of society in Jainism can be formulated in the following words- "Society is a phenomenon of all living beings that exists on their mutual relations and behaviour." All human beings on the ground of humanity are equal and their purpose is achieving high goals of life. The perception of society in Jaina philosophy and religion is to strive for a condition of existence without fear in order render service to one another. It should be without exploitation and be beneficial for all.
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Relevance of Society in World-Renouncing Jainism
Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence someone may assume that concept of society in Jainism is difficult to sustain, but Jaina religion has both the qualities. It suggests the principle of renunciation of the worldly sensual pleasure for the sake of salvation from sorrows and also it inspires to engage oneself in doing welfare of others along with self-restraint from the sensual pleasure and sinful acts. The Uttaradhyayanasūtra explains:
"Refrain from one side and engage your self to other side, abstain from sinful acts and do the acts of self-restraint.'
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10PV 2.1.3: esā sā bhagavai ahimsā jā sā bhīyāṇam viva saranam, pakkhiņam viva gamaṇam, tisiyāṇam viva salilam, tasa-thāvara-savva-bhūya-khemankarī.
"Utt 31.2: egao viraim kujjā egao ya pavattaṇam;
asañjame niyattim kujjā, sañjame ya pavattaṇam.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature
This statement inspires us to leave the bad acts and do the good acts. Good action may be of two types - first leads to self-purification and other one instructs in doing welfare of the society of all beings - including human beings. Upādhyāya Amar Muni (1966:21) accepts that:
“The feeling of renunciation in personal life is prerequisite for fair social well-being. Emancipation from limitless lust and desires is essential ethical
duty of a person for performing social service." Sukhlāl Sanghavī (1957: Part 2/146) observes:
“A society neither can entirely sustain on the maze of reclusive principles, nor can it rely on worldly pleasures. People believing only in worldly pleasures can submerge in the whirlpool of physical and materialistic ambitions, it is also true that high and dry philosophical inclination towards renunciation can also alienate living society from the source of vitality. It is historical and philosophical fact that involvement and detachment are the two sides of the same coin. No one can escape from doing evils, if he does not make efforts
for attaining virtues” (Translated from Hindī). Sāgarmal Jain (1982 II: 140) comments:
“Both world engagement and renunciation are relevant in their spheres, but mutual encroachments may endanger the significance of each of these two” (Translated from Hindī).
These statements by leading exponents prove that Jainism is not only considered to be a world-withdrawing religion, but it is a religion of acts of welfare too, and offers numerous significant ideas related to society.

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Opposition to the brāhmaṇical Caste System
In the Vedic tradition of Indian philosophy, the Hindu class system and system of stages of life (varṇāśrama-dharma) were governing factors of Hindu Society. There were four classes (varna) - Brahmin (brāhmaṇa), warriors (kṣatriya), merchants (vaiśya) and service class (śūdra) on the basis of profession and virtues of a person. As the Bhagavadgīta 4.13 says: "I created four varṇas on the basis of virtues and profession."
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These four varṇas, after a period, were developed into four castes. Although the names of four varṇas and castes are the same, but the caste is considered by birth, whereas varna is considered by profession or conduct. A varṇa may change in to another varṇa e.g. a kṣatriya may become a brāhmaṇa by his conduct or profession, but caste does not change like it. A kṣatriya as a caste remains always a kṣatriya in his whole life.
6
Principle of caste system can create a complex of superiority and inferiority among the people. The Uttaradhyayana opposed the prevalent caste system of superiority and inferiority of human beings on the basis of different castes. As Pierre Paul Amiel (2008: 30) observes: "In Jainism, divisions in castes and sub-castes did not concern higher and lower classes like in Hinduism." He also observes thereto: "In Jainism, when one speaks of castes and sub-castes, it is more questions of profession and geographical origin."
Discrimination among them on the basis of caste, creed and colour is not justified according to the
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caturvarṇyam mayā sṛṣṭam guṇakarmavibhāgaśaḥ.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature
Uttarādhyayanasūtra. It opens the doors for everyone to attain salvation from sorrows. Harikeśī Cāņdāla, a man of very lower caste, assigned duty in cremation places, became a great monk and experienced the path of liberation. The Uttarādhyayana mentions an event of Harikeśī Muni who was denied alms by the brāhmaṇas indulged in performing a sacrificial rite (yajña)." The scene depicted there in a few gāthās is really alarming. Brāhmaṇas having pride of their caste told Harikesī muni-"Where did you come from? You are looking like a ghost; go from here, this food has been prepared only for brāhmaṇas. We cannot give it to you."
Muni was tortured with sticks and whips by the disciples of those brāhmaṇas and expelled from that place." It was really a formidable task to fight with such stubbornness of caste system at that time. Mahāvīra believed in the virtues of a man. He established the importance of virtues in spite of outer colour, caste and creed. As the victory of Harikešimuni over the brāhmaṇa attitude proves this fact. The essence of the chapter 'Harikesiya' of the Uttarādhyayana has been presented in the following words: -
“The effect of penance is clearly visible, while effect of caste is barely seen. ”IS
Caste is not important; the significance of penance is always experienced. A man becomes good or bad by his virtues and behaviour, as mentioned in another chapter of the Uttarādhyayana:
13 Utt: chapter 12.
Vide Utt: chapter 12. 1 Utt 12.37: Sakkham khu dīsai tayo viseso, na disai jāi visesa koi.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
“A person does not become a monk (śramaņa) only by shaved head, equanimity makes him monk, by chanting omkāra nobody becomes brāhmaṇa, he becomes brāhmaṇa by virtues of celibacy (brahmacarya), only living in jungle does not make a monk, he needs real knowledge for it, a person becomes an ascetic by holding penance not by having grass garbs. A person becomes brāhmaṇa or kșatriya
or vaisya or sūdra by his conduct.”:16 Thus virtue or conduct is important in Jainism.
Jaina ācāryas have criticized the concept of caste system, Guņabhadra says in Uttarapurāņa:
"There is no difference in human beings on the basis of their shape as it appears between a cow and a
horse.” 17 Ravişeņa (7th C.) says in his Padmapurāņa:
“No caste is vile, virtues are only the cause of welfare, a Cāņdāla performing vows has been known as brāhmaṇa by jinendras."!
Āśādhara (13“ century CE), in his Sāgāradharmāmrta, says that a śūdra, person of lower caste can follow a religion after attaining a maturity of time (kālalabdhi)." 16 Utt 25.31-33: na vi mundieņa samaņo, na omkāreņa bambhaņo; na muņi ranna vāseņam, kusa cīrena na tāvaso. samayāe samaño hoi, bambhacerena bambhano; nānena ya muni hoi, tavena hoi tāvaso. kammunā baṁbhano hoi, kammunā hoi khattio, Vaisso kammunā hoi, suddo havai kammunā. Uttarapurāna 74.492, quoted in Šāstri (1948: 348): nästi jātikrto bhedo manusyanam gανάένανat. * PP 11.203: najāti garhitā kācid, gunāḥ kalyāṇakāraṇam;
vratasthamapi candālam, tam deva brāhmaṇam viduḥ. "SD 2.22: jātyā hinopi kālādilabdhau hyātmāsti dharmabhāk.

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The Uttarādhyayanasūtra suggests some virtues of brāhmaṇa, which are obviously the characteristics of a Jaina śramaņa. For instance:
“A lotus flower originated in water does not get besmeared with water. Similarly who is not inflicted with passions is called a brāhmaṇa. »20
Jainism does not support the āśrama system of the Vedic tradition.” Efforts for liberation from worldly sorrows and evils are given top priority in the Jaina religion and philosophy. Sthānāngasūtra propounds three types of ages for adopting ascetic life in the first part of life, in the middle age and in the middle past life. 22
Jainas do not bear the viewpoints that brāhmaṇa born from the mouth of brahma as mentioned in Veda.23 Prabhācandra (980-1065 CE) refutes this idea. He asks whether brahma is brāhmaṇa or not? If he is not, then how can a brāhmaṇa take birth from him? A human being cannot take birth from a non-human being. If brahma is brāhmaṇa then the question is whether he is brāhmaṇa with all his organs or only by mouth. If he is brāhmaṇa at all organs then all the beings of
Utt 25.27: jahā pommam jale jāyam, novalippai vāriņā;
evam alilttam kāmehim, tam vayam būma māhanam. There are four stages of life (āśrama): (i) Life of a studentship (brahmacarya -- up to age 25), (ii) Life of a householder (grhastha - up to the age of 50), (iii) Life of an anchorite (vānaprastha - up to age 75) and (iv) Life of an ascetic (samnyāsa- up to death).
Sth 3.2.122: tihim vaehim āyā kevalam munde bhavittā agārāo anagāriyam pavvaijjā, tanjaha-padhame vae, majjhime vae, pucchime vae. * As Puruşasūkta of the Rgveda 10.90.12 says: Brāhmana has been born from the mouth of brahma, kshatriya from his arms, vaiśya from his thighs and sūdra from his feet (in Telang & Chaubey 1973).

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:
10
the world born from brahma come in the category of brāhmaṇa. If brahma is brāhmaṇa from mouth only, then other parts of the body come in the category of sūdra, hence brāhmaṇas should not bow their heads in the feet of brahma.24 Jaina Ācāryas on Society Haribhadrasūri (700-770 CE) and Somadevasūri (10th century) have given some thoughts regarding the society from the Jaina point of view. Haribhadra propounds two kinds of religion for laity (grhastha-dharma): (1) Common and (2) Specific. Common dharma of a householder is to perform honestly the traditional graceful good works. Specific dharma of his is to follow twelve vows of a laity (śrāvaka). ” He puts stress on honest earning “If a householder earns money honestly then it is beneficial for this world and for the other world of that
person.” 26
Somadevasūri (11" century) has rightly described two types of dharma- worldly religion (laukika) and other worldly religion (laukottara). Worldly religion has been defined according to the Vedas and Smstis and other worldly religion has been defined as śramaņa-dharma and śrāvaka-dharma.”
A well-known Tamil work, Thirukkurala (author unknown), of the 1* century BCE, considered as a Jaina treatise
24 NK commentary on verse 65: kiñca brahmano brāhmanyamasti na vā? yadi năsti, kathamato brāhmanotpattih? na hi amănuşyāt manuşyotpattih pratītā. atha asti, sarvatra mukhapradeśe eva vā? yadi sarvatra, sa eva prāņinām bhedābhāvānuşangah, atha mukhapradeśe eva,
tadānyatrāsya śūdratvānuşańgāt na viprāņām tatpādayoḥ vandyatvam syāt. 29 Vide DB prakarana 1 & 3. ** DB 1.4: nyāyopāttam hi vittamubhayalokahitāyeti. 27 Yaśastilakacampu 8.373, quoted in Šāstrī (1989: 64).

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on the basis of its contents, is significant for every householder and monk. It guides a person to live a better personal and social life. It comprises three sections of religion (dharma), property (artha) and pleasure (kāma) and 133 chapters on various subjects related to personality development of a human being. We find various useful thoughts in dharma section on gratitude, impartiality, self-restraint, celibacy, patience, sinful acts, giving alms, vegetarianism, non-violence, truth-speaking etc.; in artha section on qualities of king, learning, illiteracy, gauging of power, choosing the proper time, duties, cruel rule, espionage, strenuous effort, method of action, essential elements of a state, agriculture, mendicancy, way of accumulating wealth, greatness of an army etc. and in kāma section on beauty, love, mutual desire, temporary quarrel etc. The three sections support the Vedic view of three goals of life (trivarga: dharma, artha and kama), but do not support the varṇasrama system of Vedic tradition. It is also to be pointed out that there is explicit acceptance of the fourth goal of salvation (mokṣa-puruṣārtha) in dharma and artha sections of this treatise. Actually, the Thirukkurala requires a separate study to determine its significance from the social point of view.
Somdevasūri in his Nītivākyāmṛta has also discussed dharma, artha and kama along with penal code, polity, defence, war, ethical conduct etc. keeping in view the right path of Indian society.
Impact of Hindu Culture
Acarya Jinasena (late 9th century CE) in his "Adipurāna" has given place to varṇāśrama dharma system of Vedic tradition. He has mentioned that the king Rṣabhadeva

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who became the first tīrthankara established three varnas namely kșatriya, vaiśya and śūdra. His son Bharata established a new varņa- brāhmaṇa.“ Jinasena has referred to about marriage norms and other sacraments also." He has divided śūdras into two kinds: artisan (kāru) and non-artisan (akāru). Kāru-śūdras were also of two types, one of them were untouchable to other persons." Such description in Jaina literature is considered as an impact of prevalent Vedic or "Brāhmaṇical system.
According to the essence of Jaina philosophy the division of human beings in four varņas of brāhmaṇa, kșatriya, vaisya and śūdra is not real. It is only conventional. A person of low status (nīca-gotra) karma may attain high status (uccagotra) in the same lifespan by adopting great vows (mahāvratas) in real sense. *2
Mahāvīra, gañadharas and ācāryas did not propound separate social norms for Jaina followers, but they suggested some reformations in them. For example animal sacrifice (paśu-bali), ceremony performed in honour of departed spirits (śrāddha) and death feast (mộtyu-bhoja) were not acknowledged by Jaina ācāryas. Although some Jaina families perform śrāddha after the death of their family members and they also organize feast after few days of the death due to effect of Hinduism on them. Marriage ceremonies with seven rounds
28 ĀP: 16. 243-245.
ĀP:16. 246. 30 AP: 16. 247. 31ĀP:16.185-186. »? As discussed by Šāstrī (1989: 130).

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are arranged according to Hindu rituals. Mostly the Hindu Paņạitas perform methodical ceremony of marriages except few instances in Khandelval Digambar Jains and some individuals of various Jain sects.
The Ācāradinakara written by Vardhamānasūri (15th century CE) a disciple of Abhayadevasūri (third) of Rudrapalligaccha is a notable Jaina work, which describes 16 sacraments (samskāra) of a householder, 16 sacraments of a saint and 8 sacraments common for the both." It is the first book in Jain literature which elaborates the sacraments in a systematic way from the Jaina point of view. Sixteen sacraments of household person found in Ācāradinakara are as follows: 1. Conception sacrament (garbhādhāna-samskāra) 2. Male production sacrament (pumsavana-saņskāra) 3. Birth sacrament (janma-saņskāra) 4. Worshiping idols of sun and moon
(sūrya-candra-darśana-saņskāra) 5. Milk feeding sacrament (kṣīrāśana-samskāra) 6. Worshiping mother deity (șașthi-samskāra) 7. Purification sacrament (sucikarma-samskāra) 8. Naming sacrament (nāmakarana-saņskāra) 9. Food giving sacrament (annaprāśana-samskāra) 10. Sacrament of piercing the ears to put earrings on
(karņavedha samskāra) 11. Ceremony of tonsure (cūļākaraṇa-samskāra) 12. Initiation sacrament (upanayana-samskāra)
* See ĀD, pūrva pīthikā and udaya 1-40.

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13. Learning sacrament (vidyārambha-samskāra) 14. Marriage sacrament (vivaha-samskāra) 15. Vow adopting sacrament (vratāropaṇa-samskāra) 16. Funeral sacrament (antya-samskāra)
These sacraments have some differences from the Vedic tradition of samskāras. Garbhadhāna- and pumsavanasamskāras are also different in nature to some extent. Vardhamānasūri has interpreted these sacraments from the Jaina point of view.
He mentioned 16 sacraments of a saint: 1. Celibacy adopting ceremony
(brahmacarya-vratagrahaṇa-vidhi)
2. Lower monk ceremony (kṣullaka-vidhi)
3. Initiation ceremony (pravrajyā-vidhi)
14
34
34 Vide AD, udaya 17-32.
4. Ordaining ceremony (upasthāpanā-vidhi)
5. Ceremony for elevation of mind, speech and body (yogodvahana-vidhi)
6. Lesson receiving ceremony (vācanāgrahaṇa-vidhi)
7. Permission ceremony for a teacher monk (vacanānujñāvidhi)
8. Ordaining ceremony for religious teacher
(upādhyāya pada-sthāpanā-vidhi)
9. Ordaining ceremony for a preceptor (ācārya-pada-sthāpanāvidhi)
10. A specific penance ceremony of a monk
(bhikṣupratima-udvahana-vidhi)

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11. Initiation ceremony of a nun (sādhvī-dīkşā-vidhi) 12. Ordaining ceremony of a teacher nun
(pravartinīpada-sthāpanā-vidhi) 13. Ordaining ceremony of a chief nun
(mahattarā pada-sthāpanā-vidhi) 14. Daily routine of a monk (ahorātri-caryā-vidhi) 15. Routine in different seasons (rtucaryā-vidhi) 16. Religious death ceremony through diminishing the passions (samlekhanā-vidhi)
These sacraments are related to a saint or a sādhvī, simultaneously these are having a social importance, because an ācārya and upādhyāya remain indulged in teaching and administration in their gaccha or gaņa.
The eight common sacraments for a householder (śrāvaka) and a saint are as follows: 1. Consecration ceremony of an idol (pratișthā-vidhi) 2. Peace making ceremony (śāntika-karma) 3. Nourishing ceremony for good deeds (paușţika-karma) 4. Oblation ceremony (bali-vidhāna-vidhi) 5. Expiation ceremony (prāyaś citta-vidhi) 6. Ceremony for execution of essential deeds (āvaśyakavidhi) 7. Penance ceremony (tapa-vidhi) 8. Rank ordaining ceremony (padāropaņa-vidhi).
The above description about sacraments denotes that in the 15th Century A.D., Jaina ācāryas tried to describe sacraments (samskāra) in the framework of Jainism. 35 Vide ĀD, udaya 33-40.

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Samskāras related to sadhus are specific, which are not found in the Vedic tradition, but names of samskāras propounded for householders are almost similar like garbhādhāna, pumsavana, nāmakaraṇa, annaprāśana, karṇavedha, cūḍākaraṇa, upanayana, vidyārambha, vivāha, antyeṣṭi etc. but some separate sacraments have also been described, such as vratāropaṇa samskāra. This samskāra has been mentioned instead of vanaprastha and samnyāsa samskāra of the Vedic tradition. It has a provision of twelve vratas of a śrāvaka or śrāvika. The sacraments common for both monks and householders are also specific which are not found in the Vedic tradition.
16
This account of sacraments gives a path to social system of Jaina householders, monks and nuns, but we can say that it was a result of influence of the Vedic tradition of various sacraments mentioned in Smṛti-literature. However it proves that Jaina ācāryas have a concept of society in their mind when they talk about the separate sacraments for sadhus and householders. It also makes it clear that the Jaina ācāryas tried to develop a separate social system for Jaina community or society. In fact Acăradinakara of Vardhamanasūri requires a separate article on it.
Jainism is a religion of salvation. Hence there is no much impact of Acāradinakara on Jaina society. Monks follow the Jaina rules, but householders are still following the Hindu social rituals, because they are unaware of the basics and fundamentals of Jainism. Actually there is not much difference between Jaina sacraments and Hindu sacraments. Before Vardhamānasūri, Somadevasūri (11th century), the famous author of the Yasastilakacampu was having a view that:

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“Jaina tradition can accept all those Vedic social norms which are not inconsistent with right view (samyaktva or samyagdarśana) and do not corrupt the vows of a male laity (śrāvaka) or female laity (śrāvikā)." 36
This is a clear path for Jaina societies to follow the customs of prevalent Hindu tradition. It was a reason that Vardhamānasūri mentioned 16 sacraments with mild difference in Hindu sacraments or rites (saņskāra). Some of the Jaina families have formulated new Jaina system for marriage ceremonies, but it is not being followed by a majority of Jainas. Thus Jaina tradition is not totally different from Hindu tradition regarding the social customs. This tendency of assimilation of Hindu customs by Jaina societies was one main reason of their stability in India. Still in modern India some judges of High Court and Supreme Court do not provide Jainas a cadre of minority. Here we can say that Jaina societies are different from Hindu societies from the religious point of view, but they are not so much different from the social point of view.
At present, several social customs of Jaina society such as marriage ceremony, birth ceremony and other rites are often performed in Hindu manner, but many festivals like mahāvīra jayantī, paryușaņa, samvatsarī, daśalakşaņa parva, jñānapañcamī etc. are celebrated by Jaina norms. Although Jaina paņditas have evolved separate book for performing marriage sacrament, there is a paucity of Jaina panditas to perform the marriage ceremony, so the brāhmaņa paņạitas are called at the marriage occasions of Jaina families also.
* Yaśastilakacampu 8.34, quoted in ....:
sarva eva hi Jainānām, pramānam laukiko vidhih; yatra samyaktva hānirna, yatra na vratadūşaņam.

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Organisation of the Tirtha
Mahāvīra did not propose any profession-based social organization, but like other tīrthankaras he propounded fourfold (caturvidha) ford (tīrtha or sangha) for the followers. As mentioned in the Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra:
“Tīrtha comprises four categories of sangha-monks (śramaņa) nuns (śramaņi) laity (śrāvaka) and female laity (śrāvikā). "37
The tīrtha is a religious organisation, which is meant for performing religious practice(sādhanā) for the attainment of salvation, but there are also some rules for mutual behavior amongst sanghas.
There are some stern provisions and codes of conduct for the mutual behaviour of monks (samaņa or sadhu) and nuns (samaņi or sādhvi). Four Chedasūtras explain these rules elaborately. How a sādhu should behave with his ācārya and other colleagues, with sādhvis, śrāvakas and śrāvikas has been also propounded in the canonical literature.” Observing the five mahāvratas, fivefold self-regulation (samiti) and threefold selfcontrol (gupti), a Jaina monk or nun should take care to avoid improper conducts. For example a sādhu should not stop to talk to a sādhvī at cross roads and when alone. Sādhus and sādhvis cannot live together in their living places. Even they cannot do meditation (kāyotsarga) in one another's places. These
»VP: 20.8: tittham puna cāuvvannāinne samaņa-sanghe panntte, tañjahā-samaņā,
samaņio, sāvagā, savigāo. 38 The four Chedasūtras are: Dasāśrutaskandha, Brhatkalpa, Vyavahāra and
Nisitha. 39 UttI & BK explain it at many places.

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restrictions have been imposed with a view to protect their celibacy." However, in case of calamities, they can give support and can touch each other to save their lives. If a nirgranthasādhu gives support to a slipping or falling sādhvi then he does not disobey the preaching of a Jina.“
Some more sūtras of the Brhatkalpasūtra say that for removal of a thorn, a piece of glass or a chip of stone, a sādhu can help a sādhvi and a sādhvī can help a sādhu.“ Rules regarding behaviour with śrāvakas and śrāvikas by the samaņas and samaņīs have also been mentioned in Jain canonical and later literature. Śrāvakas and śrāvikās are supposed like parents of samaņas and samaņīs for well support of their restraint and disciplined life and good conduct. All the codes of conduct have been laid down for the faultless accomplishment of the fourfold sangha. The codes of conduct support the spiritual advancement of the souls and their flawless behaviour to the world. Ācārya Samantabhadra (6th century) mentions as characteristic of the Jaina tīrtha:
"Your tīrtha is destroyer of all sufferings, and is
eternal, and it leads to welfare of all beings." Theory of karma and Society In the theory of Jaina karma philosophy concept of statusdetermining (gotra) karma is often defined that birth in a higher
BK 3.1.73: no kappai niggamthānam, niggamţthīņam uvassayamsi citthitaye vā --- --- sajjhāyam vā karittaye jhānam vājhāittaye, kāusaggam vā thāittae. BK 6.7.180: niggamthe niggamthini duggamsi vā visamamsi vā pavvayamsi vā pakkhalamānim vā pavadamāņim vā giņhamane vā avalambamāne vā
naikkamai. 42 Vide BK 6.3-18. * YA 61: Sarvāpadāmantakaram nirantam sarvodayam tirthamidam tavaiva.

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race or descent is a result of high status (ucca gotra) karma and birth in a lower race or descent is a result of lower status (nīca gotra) karma, but it is to be clarified that according to the theory of Jain karma philosophy nīca gotra karma may change into ucca gotra in the same life-span.** Thus here 'gotra' word does not denote any caste or sub-caste, but it denotes the internal impressions (samskāra) of a person. If he does not have pride of his own caste, beauty, creed, richness, character, knowledge, penance and power, then he bears an ucca gotra, and if he takes pride in these then he becomes a person of nīca gotra." In one life span one can have both the gotras.“ Hence the concept of gotra karma in Jaina philosophy is not related to the birth in specific caste. It is related to the internal impressions of the attitude of a person. Question is - what is the social aspect of gotra karma? Here we can say that although it is related to the higher or lower impressions of a person, which is an internal matter, its effect is seen in outer world also. In the view of Jaina karma theory, a person who is possessed with pride is not great, but the person who is not possessed with superiority and inferiority complex is great.
The concepts of pleasure giving (sātāvedanīya) karma and grief or pain giving (asātā vedanīya) karma instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad
* KG 2:16: says that nīcagotra karma remains manifested up to fifth guṇasthāna,
after that ucca gotra occurs in sixth and other higher gunasthānas. When a
person becomes a sādhu, he bears ucсagotra karma. * In the commentary of AN 2.88: Jātirupakulaiśvaryasilajñanatapobalaih;
kurvānohankytim nīcagotram badhnāti mānavaḥ. * Utt 12: Harikesi Muni is an instance of this fact.

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consequences to you. The causes of these sātā- and asātāvedanīya karmas have been mentioned in the Tattvārthasūtra as follows:
"If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, crying, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts asātāvedanīya or pain karma, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of sātāvedanīya or pleasure karma."47
Forbearance is also a cause of sātāvedanīya. The Tattvārthasūtra explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behaviour results in pain or asātā. This is not just a theory of karma, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also. Triratna and its Social Corollary Jainism is considered as the religion and philosophy of salvation. It underscores the value of right world-view (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna) and right conduct (samyakcăritra) for its attainment. This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. In spite of this samyagdarśana, an essential element of salvation bears a characteristic of kindness (anukampā).*9
47 TS 6.12-13: dukhah-soka-tapākrandana-vadha-paridevanānyātma
parobhayasthānyasadvedyasya. bhūtavratānukampādānam sarāgasamyamādiyogaḥ kṣāntiḥ saucamiti sadvedyasya.
TS 1.1: samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāni mokşamārgaḥ. “ TB 1.2: tadevam praśama-samveganirvedānukampāstikyābhivyaktilaksanam
tattvārthaśraddhānam samyagdarśanam.

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Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (karuņā) one may not have samyagdarśana and in the absence of samyagdarśana eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism. Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for liberation.
Right knower (samyagjñānin), a person having samyagjñāna changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (cāritra), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (krodha) changes into forgiveness (kşamā), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment." His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of samyagjñāna. It controls the behaviour of a person to himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been told in Brhatkalpabhāșya 4584:
“What you desire for yourself, desire for others too; and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire
** Utt 28.30: nādamsaņissa nānam, nāņeņa viņā na hunti caranaguņā;
agunissa natthi mokkho natthi amokkhassa nivvānam. 51 DK 8.39 : uvasamena hane koham mānam maddavayā jine;
māyam cajjavabhāveņa lobham samtosao jine.

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for others at all - this is the essence of preaching of
Jina. 1952
This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also:
“A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself.953
As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in Ācārāngacūrņi in some different words:**
“As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them."
This thinking can protect not only human rights, but can save the rights of every being of the world.
At present, there are more than fourteen thousand Jaina sādhus and sādhvīs in India. The Daśavaikālikasūtra of the Svetāmbara sect instructs that a sādhu should not be a burden on the society. His conduct of taking food from the houses of laypersons is compared with a black bee that takes nectar of flowers without torturing them. Like that an ascetic monk also
52 jam icchasi appaņatto, jam ca na icchasi appaņatto;
tam iccha parassa vi, ettiyagam jiņasāsaņam. * ātmanaḥ pratikūlāni pareșām na samācaret (a renowned verse). ** AC 1.1.6: jahā me itthāṇitthe suhāsuhe tahā savvajīvānam. 35 Babulal Jain (2010: 116).

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takes food from the householders without harming them." This kind of behaviour of an ascetic has two aspects - the first is his own spiritual practice (sādhanā) and another is not to give trouble to others. This gives a message to us to behave in such a way that others should not be troubled for the sake of our cause. Importance of Others' Life
A famous motto of Jainism is: "Live and let live." We can say that Jainism is a philosophy that gives importance to others life also. We should understand that every worldly soul wants to live, and we should protect his or her right to live as much as possible. Āaārangasūtra (1.2.3) says:
If understood at the level of human beings, this fact will lead to positive change in the attitude and behaviour towards the
society.
56
24
"All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they want to live. Life is dear to all beings."
9957
58
Mahāvīra suggested that no living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless." Ahimsa is not merely non-violence. It has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (maitrī) to all living beings. Amitagati in Sāmāyikapāṭha (verse-1) says:
57
DK 1.4-5 vayam ca vittim labbhāmo, na ya koi uvahammai;
ahāgaḍesu rīyamte, pupphesu bhamaro jahā. mahugārasamābuddha, je bhavanti aṇissiyā; nāṇāpinḍarayādamtā, teña vuccanti sāhuno.
savve pānā piyauyā suhasāyā dukkhapaḍikūlā appiyavahā piyajīviņo, jīviukāmā savvesim jiviyam piyam.
58
AS 1.4.1: savve pānā savve bhūtā savve jīvā savve satta na hamtavvā, ņa ajjāvetavvā, na parighetavvā, na paritāveyavvā, na uddaveyavvā.

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"Friendliness towards all beings, delight in the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever."
9959
Non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) and Society
Non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) is the central philosophy of Jainism. It defines reality as universal-cumparticular. Society is also of this nature. Maciver and Charles Page (1990: 7) say:
59
"Society involves both likeness and difference. If people were all exactly alike, merely alike, their social relationship would be as limited, perhaps, as those of the ant or bee."
Thus anekāntavāda itself defines the nature of society. Anekāntavāda has its ethical value also. It provides an opportunity to understand the other's views through theory of different standpoints (nayavāda). It is very much useful for social communication and mutual harmony. Prejudices close the doors to understand other's views rightly. Anekāntavāda is a base of human behaviour as the eminent Jaina philosopher Siddhasena (5th century) says:
25
"I bow to the anekāntavāda, a teacher of the world, without which behavior of the world cannot run.'
9961
sattveṣu maitrim guniṣu pramodam, kliṣṭeṣu jīveṣu kṛpāparatvam; mādhyasthabhāvam viparītavṛttau,
sadā mamātmā vidadhātu deva. ?
60 PT5.1: tasya visayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣādyanekāntātmakam vastu. "SP 3.69: Jena viņā logassa vi vavahāro savvahā na nivvaḍai; tassa bhuvaṇekkaguruņo ṇamo aṇegantavāyassa.

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Thus, anekantavāda is the root of social behaviour. This point of view goes well with post-modernist perception of social welfare imbibing the principle of diversity and respecting its existence. In recent decades the western world has seen rise of authoritarian ideologies. Jainism with its emphasis on diversity in society provides apt answer to such authoritarian tendencies.
Language and Society
Language is a principal instrument for communication among the human beings and maintaining social relations. Jaina tīrthankaras delivered their sermons in the Ardhamāgadhī language," which was a language of common people at that time. Although every language has its social importance, a language of common people has crucial and sometimes central role to play in social transactions. The use of Ardhamāgadhī by Mahāvīra denotes the belief in proper communication in the maximum people of society.
Social Importance of the Anuvratas
Jaina code of conduct for laypersons mentions twelve vows, out of which five vows of partial renunciation (anuvrata) are very important for a good citizen of any country and for the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts in the society. The five aṇuvratas that are mentioned concern: the abstinence from killing a living being (prāṇātipāta-viramaṇa), abstinence from falsehood (mrṣāvāda-viramaņa), abstinence from stealing (adattādāna-viramana), satisfaction with own spouse only (svadāra or svapati-santoșa-parimāṇa), and limiting the
62
SS 34.22: bhagavam ca nam addhamāgahie bhāsāe dhammamāikkhai.

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possession (parigraha-parimāṇa) or limiting the desires (icchāvidhi-parimāṇa) (UD Chapter 1). These aṇuvratas have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these aṇuvratas cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. According to first anuvrata a person is not allowed to keep others in captivity, to beat or kill them, to mutilate, to overload and to deprive them of food and drink." This shows the necessity of compassion and equality towards other living beings of the world. It involves the recognition to life of all and their equal right to live.
The second anuvrata is related to control the speaking of untruth. Liars are not to be harboured in society:
"Falsehood is censured by saints in the world. It is a cause of mistrust among the people, hence it should be avoided.
63
64 وو
27
One should speak harmless truth. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to others." The third aṇuvrata demands abstaining from the inclination for theft." Taking a thing that has not been granted or given by the owner, comes under the category of theft. Refraining from theft shows respect for others' property and rights. It involves abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to social disintegration. This aṇuvrata
UD 1.45: bandhe vahe chavicheye aibhāre bhattapāṇaviccheye.
64 'DK 6.13: musavão ya logammi, savva sahūhim garahio.
avissāso ya bhuyāṇam, tamhā mosam vivajjae.
65
TB 7.9: himsāpāruṣyapaiśunyādiyuktam vacaḥ satyamapi garhitamanṛtameva
bhavatiti.
"TS 7.10: adattādānam steyam

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has a wide power to control economic corruption in the society. Fourth vrata is important for restraint of sexual corruption. It has at least three benefits: - (1) Increase in mental and spiritual power, (2) control over sexual corruption in the society and (3) control over some diseases like AIDS.
The fifth vow (vrata) puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. This parigraha-parimāņa vrata keeps a person tensionless because of the limit of desire. Jaina philosophy says:
“Even if the whole world is given to a person, he will not be satisfied by it, hence the worldly things cannot contend a soul.”87
The modern society is heading towards the final critical stage of capitalism and facing the danger of the greed of acquiring materialistic things. Jainism does not oppose the science and scientific development, but it makes us cautious about the attachment towards the materialistic world. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression, or bodily diseases then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals. Uttarādhyayanasūtra points out:
“If the whole world is yours, whole money is yours, then also it is not sufficient for you, and it cannot protect you."
Utt 8.16: kasinam pi jo imam loyam, padipunņam dalijja ikkassa;
tenāvi se na samtusse, ii duppurae ime āyā. “ Utt 14.39 : savvam jagam jai tubbham, savvam vā vi dhaņam bhave;
savvampi te apajjattam, neva tānāya tam tava.

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This message was given by Queen Kamalāvati to King Isukāra in the Uttarādhayanasūtra, which is relevant in the modern society also. It is the eternal truth that the allurement of materialistic world cannot ultimately protect our lives.
The Jaina religion and philosophy also propound that the outer world or materialistic world is not the cause of grief or sorrows, our inner world is the real cause of our own sorrows. Mahāvīra says:
“The materialistic world is not the cause of equanimity (samatā) and inequanimity (vikrti), but the inner world of aversion (pradveșa) and possession (parigraha) through delusion or attachment (moha) generate sorrows or deformity in human beings."
Although this teaching of Mahāvīra is directly related to an individual, its impact goes to the society. Society changes through the fundamental thoughts regarding life. Attitude of the Jaina Tīrthařkaras
Tīrthankaras of Jaina religion reflect compassion towards all beings of the world. They preach their sermon for the benefit of the beings of the world, as depicted in Praśnavyākaraņasūtra:
"Reverend tīrthankara has given his sermon for the protection and compassion of all beings of the
world.” 70
Utt 32.101 : na kāmabhogā samayam uventi, na yāvi bhogā vigaim uventi;
je tappaosi ya pariggahī ya, so tesim mohā vigaim uvei. * PV 2.1: savva-jagajīva-rakkhana-dayathayāe bhagavayā pāvayaņam
sukahiyam

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In the Sakrastava," a eulogy performed by the Indras, many such adjectives of tīrthankaras are available which express their benevolent attitude towards the world. For example Lord of the world (loganāhāṇam), Benefactor of the world (logahiyāṇam), Lamp of the world (logapaivāṇam), Revelator of the world (logapajjoyagarāṇam) are the words which depict that the persons enlightened with pure complete knowledge kevalajñāna always do good for others. The Caturvimśatistava," a eulogy of the 24 tīrthankaras depicts a tīrthankara as a person who enlightens the world with his knowledge. Knowledge is not useful only for oneself; it is useful for enlightening others also.
Some Ethical Doctrines and Society:
73
The concept of religious giving (dāna) in Jainism is having an important aspect of social behavior. Umāsvāti says that for the welfare of others if something is given with relinquishing one's ownership then it is called dana." Action of dāna cannot sustain without the assertion of the concept of society. Dana is of many kinds. It mainly deals with food, knowledge, medicine and fearlessness or protection (KA 362). This concept of dana is very important for the positive inter-relationship of human beings and all other beings. Conception of dāna is doubly beneficial. Donors as well as receivers both are benefited by dāna. Donor is benefited with dissociation of his sinful karma
71
It starts with the word namotthunam. It is called praṇipātasūtra also. It is a part of the Sāmāyikapāṭha.
72 Vide AvS chapter 2.
13 TS, 7.33: anugrhārtham svasyātisargo dānam.

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and with earning of meritorious (punya) karma. Receiver is benefited by getting the things, knowledge and fearlessness. It has also a socio-cultural impact on human society.
In modern society we talk about free will. Jaina philosophy accepts the idea of free will because of the independence and self-doership of every soul, but it suggests keeping a control of rationality on our mind.
“The mind is like a wicked horse, it runs everywhere, and so by understanding a real
dharma, control over it, is possible.”74
Jaina philosophy enlightens that one should keep control on his mind, speech, body and belongings." He should do good activities and leave bad activities. One should think good for others, speak well and do activities for the welfare of mankind.
In Jaina ethics, social aspects of religion have been given suitable importance. Sthānāngasūtra mentions 10 kinds of dharmas:" (i) observance of custom of a village (grāmadharma) (ii) observance of customs of a city (nagara-dharma) (iii) duty towards a nation (rāsțra-dharma) (iv) religion of a renouncer (pākhanda-dharma) (v) conduct of descents or monks of the same teacher (kula-dharma) (vi) observance of customs of a republic (gaņa-dharma) (vii) conduct of fourfold order (sangha-dharma) (viii) observance of religion of scripture (siddhānta-dharma or śruta-dharma) (ix) observance
7* Utt 23.58: mano sāhasio bhīmo dutthasso paridhāvai;
tam sammam tu nigihņāmi dhamma sikkhāi kamthagam. "Sth 4.2: maņasamjame, vayasamjame, kāyasamjame, uvagaraṇasamjame. **BD 45: asuhādo viņivittī suhe pavittī ya jāņa cārittam. ► See Sth chapter 10.

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of religion of conduct (căritra-dharma) and (x) Properties of extensive substances (astikaya-dharma). Out of these ten dharmas first seven are completely related to the society. Except for the Sthānāngasūtra we do not find such description of dharmas in Jaina canonical literature. This division of ten dharmas seems a later addition to the Sthānangasūtra, but it has established the importance of these sectors of work for a smooth social life. Duties pertaining to grāma, nagara etc. also need the purity of mind, speech and activities of a person.
32
Description of polite conduct (vinaya) or of a disciple towards his teacher has been described elaborately in Jaina literature. Polite conduct is a symbol of educated society.
78
There is a concept of rendering services to others (veyāvacce or vaiyāvṛtya) in Jain canonical literature. It is a service rendered by a monk to another monk, reverend saint, a gana or sangha. Jaina canonical literature considers it as a penance, which is a means of dissociation (nirjarā) of old karmas. Vyavahārasūtra (uddeśaka 10) mentions ten types of service:
1. Service rendered to a preceptor of the order (ācārya-vaiyāvṛtya)
2. Service rendered to a religious teacher of the order (upadhyāya-vaiyāvṛtya)
3. Service rendered to an aged monk, a senior monk or learned monk (sthavira-vaiyāvṛtya)
4. Service rendered to a monk practicing penance (tapasvīvaiyāvṛtya)
"For example, see Utt chapter 1.

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5. Service rendered to a newly initiated monk indulged in
learning (saikșa-vaiyāvstya) 6. Service rendered to a sick monk (glāna-vaiyāvrtya) 7. Service rendered to a monk of the same religious
tradition (sādharmika-vaiyāvrtya) 8. Service rendered to monks related to same teacher
lineage (kula-vaiyāvrtya) 9. Service rendered to monks related to the same preceptor
(gaņa-vaiyāvrtya) 10. Service rendered to the religious order (sangha-vaiyāvrtya)
These ten types of service (vaiyāvrtya or veyavacce) prove the social aspect of a sādhu or sādhvi. Vaiyāvstya is a penance and hence it is a means of karma-dissociation. Although the word vaiyāvrtya has been used for the service rendered by sādhus or sādhvis, it is implied that a householder should also render his services to the needy persons, families and to a sangha.
The Āvaśyakavrtti of Hāribhadra propounds the importance of vaiyāvrttya in the following words:
“Oh lord! One who serves a patient (monk or nun) is thankful or one who visits you? Gautam! One who serves a patient (monk) is thankful.":79
In the Uttarādhyayanasūtra two works of a monk (sādhu) or nun (sādhvī) are considered top priority: (1)
"ĀvN folio 61-62: kim bhante! jo gilānam padiyarai se dhanne udāhu je tumam damsaņeņa padivajjai? goyam! je gilāņam padiyarai.

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-
svādhyāya (study) and (2) dhyāna (meditation), but there is a provision in another sūtra that if a sādhu of that group is ill or suffering from malady etc, then, with the permission or order of ācārya,a monk should first render his services to the sufferer and afterwards he should study (svādhyāya) or perform meditation (dhyāna). Svādhyāya and vaiyāvrtya both are similarly important in ascetic life, vaiyāvstya or rendering of services to ill saint should be without any hate. Concept of selfless service to ailments is available in the Jaina texts. Sūtrakstāngasūtra says:
“A monk should serve an ill saint, without any hate or reluctance.” 82
Some penal codes have been defined in Jaina canonical literature and in latter literature. In the Uttarādhyayanasūtra smugglers have been defined as culprit and some penal codes have been proposed for them.** Āvaśyaka niryukti narrates three panel codes as (i) to aware someone of his wrong doing (hākāra), (ii) to prohibit someone from his wrong doing (mākāra) and (iii) to condemn someone wrong doing (dhikkāra). ** These penal codes also prove the attentiveness of Jaina ācāryas towards the well being of the society. Modern Jaina Society and Social Services by Jains In modern times Jaina society seems very active in religious and as well as in social sector of life. Jainism is open for all the
* See Utt 26.12, 18. *Utt 26.10. "SK 3.4-21: Kujjā bhikkhū gilāņassa, agilāe samāhite. * See Utt chapter 21. "NS, ĀVN v. 167.

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castes and classes. After becoming a monk caste is neglected, but for a house holder caste remains important especially for marriage purpose. For instance, ifa Jaina is Khandelval by caste then he needs a Khandelval girl to marry. Therefore, caste system in Jain followers is still prevailing. It is a social requirement of Jainas. Agustín Pániker (2001:295) stresses:
“The important thing to retain in all this explanation of castes and classes is that Jainism does not eliminate castes.”
But Pániker's observation compels us to perceive that Jainism is a philosophical or religious term and that does not make any difference between two castes (jāti). The rise of Jainism occurred in the context of socially troubled India and appeared to offer a far more unifying theology. However, in contemporary India prevailing social tendencies and habits have proved for stronger determinants than the liberal tenets of Jainism. Though on theoretical level a society without caste barriers is accepted by all and preached by its ācāryas, in practice it has not been found to be translated into reality. This is true of all idealistic philosophies and not of Jainism alone. Yet with changing times the narrow sectarian and caste outlook is far rapidly being changed and more and more Jain polity is trying to remove these narrow barriers.
It has mainly two facets - One is religious in which caste, class, creed, colour have no place and another is of many kinds, such as-based on caste, business, clubs etc.
It does not need mention that presently several Jaina followers and social organizations are dedicated in the field of

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charity and social services. They have built many schools, hospitals, hostels and they are managing them efficiently. Paul Dundas (2002: 198) has rightly mentioned:
36
"Outward piety and restraint, a propensity towards religious giving in the form of building hospitals, temples and educational establishments, and a general reticence about family and business affairs have tended to remain features of Jain lay life."
It is to be clarified that self-purification is primary and the welfare of the society is secondary. It is difficult to change others without the positive change in us. Sometimes a man indulges in the social services, but he increases his pride, anger, deceit and greed. Jaina philosophy suggests that do social services but do not increase the evils within you. It is also an aspect of religious practice that sometimes social services are successful in reducing evils like pride, anger, deceit and greed. Although there is an impact of Hindu social norms on Jains of India and abroad, Jains have their own identity with their Śvetāmbara, Digambara. Sthānakavāsī and Terāpantha sects. They perform religious rituals with major or minor differences. They have developed distinguished societies in the view of other religious followers. The prevalent Jain schools, gaṇa, gaccha and the social and religious practices have attracted the scholars from abroad for studies and research.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that society in Jainism is not limited merely to human beings, but it encompasses all the beings of the world. It is not merely anthropomorphic,

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ethnocentric and culture specific, but it is universal or global due to mutual relations and interactions with all the living beings of the world. Human society is a part of that larger global society. When bird flu or mad cow diseases expand in a country all the human beings become terrorized with its effect on them. At subtle level all beings of the world are inter-connected. This broad thinking of Jaina religion and philosophy makes a human society vigilant to the whole universe. But in narrow sense Jainism talks about the human society also. It considers all human beings equal without discrimination of caste, creed and colour. Human society is only one," as says Jinasena in his Adipurāņa. The Jaina philosophy accepts society as real and suggests reformations to eradicate the evils prevalent at the different times. It accepts that self-purification is not possible without the right attitude of kindness (anukampā) towards the all beings of the world."
Metaphysics, ethics and the epistemology of Jaina philosophy are correlated with society. The Jaina system has discussed the independence of every soul and their mutual relationship. The Jaina theory of karma, the theory of nonabsolutism (anekāntavāda) and the ethics of religious giving (dāna), polite conduct (vinaya), service (vaiyāvrtya), forgiveness (kşamā), friendliness (maitrī) elucidate the concept of society in Jainism. The discussion of varņa-vyavasthā and saņskāras in Ādipūrāņa, Anagāradharmāmrta, Yaśastilakacampu and in Ācāradinakara seems the impact of
$AP 38.45: manuşyajātirekaiva jātināmodayādbhavā. ** Anukampā is a characteristic of samyagdarśana without which a path of liberation does not proceed ahead. There are five characteristics of amyagdarśana as: sama, samvega, nirveda, anukampā and ästikya. (TB: 1.2).

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brahmanical culture on Jinasena, Somadevasūri, Āśādhara and Vardhamānasūri. Vardhamānasūri's Ācāradinakara is an important work which discusses about the sacraments of house holders and saints from the Jaina point of view. Concept of fourfold sangha or tīrtha is a religious organization, but it is intermingled with the society in many forms. Its social aspects cannot be denied.
Concept of society is quite wide ranging and logical in Jaina philosophy and religion rather than the other philosophies of Indian and western tradition. Jainism is considered as worldwithdrawing religion due to its emphasis on the attainment of salvation, but it gives proper attention on the right activity of a person towards the society of all beings of the world including the society of human beings.
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Sth
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Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti. Hindi Commentary and Annotation by Sukhlal Sanghavi, Third Edition, Varanasi: Pārśvanatha Vidyāpīṭha, 1985.
Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī. English Translation by Nathmal Tatia as "That Which Is.", Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1994/2007.
Tattvärthabhāṣya (Sabhāṣyatattvärthādhigamasutra) of Umāsvāti. Hindi Translation by Khoobacandra Sastri. Third Edition, Agāsa: Paramaśruta Prabhavaka Mandal, 1975/1992. Thirukkurala with English and Hindi Translation. Second Edition, Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy, 2006.
Trīņi Chedasūtrāṇi (Dasāśrutaskandha, Bṛhatkalpa and Vyavahārasutra). Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Muni Kanhaiyā Lāl 'Kamal' and Triloka Muni.. Byāvar: Agama Prakāśana Samiti, 1992.
Uvāsagadasão. Prakit. Hindi Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Editor Chhagan Lāl Śāstri. Byāvar: Agama Prakāśana Samiti,
1980/1989.
Uttaradhyayanasūtra (3 Vols.) Prakrit. Hindi Translation by Acārya Hastīmal and Śaśikānt Jha. Jaipur: Samyag-Jñāna Pracāraka Maṇḍal, 1983-1989.
Vyakhyāprajñaptisūtra. Prakrit (Translated and Annotated in Hindi by Śrī Amar Muni. Series Editor: Pt. Sobha Candra Bhārilla. Byavar: Śrī Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1986.
Yuktyānuśāsana of Samantabhadra. Hindi Translation and Commentary by Jugal Kiśora Mukhtāra 'Yugavīra.' Sarasāvā: Vīra Seva Mandira, 1951.
Secondary Sources
Amiel, Pierre Paul. Jains Today in the World. Varanasi: Parshvanath Vidyapith, 2008.

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Cort, John E. Jains in the World: Religious Values and Ideology in India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Dundas, Paul. The Jains. Second Revised Edition. London: Routledge, 2002.
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Flügel, Peter. "Jainism and Society [Review Article of J.E. Cort, Jains in the World]." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69, 1 (2006) 91-112.
Handiqui, K.K. Yasastilaka and Indian Culture. Sholapur: Jaina Samskṛti Samsthāna Sangha, 1949 (Jīvarāja Jaina Granthmālā 2).
Jain, Babulal Ujjavala. Samagra Jain Caturmāsasūcī. Mumbai: Gajendra Sandeśa Kāryalaya, 2010.
Jain. Sagarmal. Jaina, Bauddha aur Gītā ke Acara Darśanom kā Tulanātmaka Adhyayana, Vol. 2. Jaipur: Rajasthan Prakrit Bhāratī Samsthan, 1982.
Maciver, R.M. & Charles H. Page. Society: An Introductory Analysis. Madras: Macmillan India, 1950/1990.
Pániker, Agustín. Jainism: History, Society, Philosophy and Practice, Translated into English from the Revised Spanish Edition by David Sutcliffe. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 2001/2010.
Sangave, Vilas A. Jaina Community, Second Revised Edition, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980.
Sanghavi, Sukhlāl. Darśana aur Cintana, Hindi. Ahmedabad: Gujarāt Vidya Sabha, Bhadra, 1957.
Śāstrī, Phulcandra. Varṇa, Jāti aur Dharma. Second Edition. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jñānapīṭha, 1963/1989.
Tatia, Nathmal (tr.). That which Is, London: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1994/2007.
Telang, N. Kanta Nath Shastry & Braj Bihari Chaubey (ed.). The New Vedic Selection. Part II. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakāṣan, 1973.
Upadhyāya Amar Muni. Śri Amara Bhārati (Monthly). Agra: Sanmati Jñānapītha, April 1966.

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview
Knowledge is a key of upliftment of our present life, development of values and salvation from sufferings. Hence, in the Upanişads two kinds of knowledge (vidyā) are propounded as parāvidyā and aparā vidyā (Mundakopanişad 1.1.4-5). Aparā vidya is a kind of knowledge which is earned and useful for elevation and success of a human being in his empirical life, where as parāvidyā is a knowledge which is intuitively emerged and manifested in a soul by which ultimate truth is achieved and spiritual upliftment is experienced. This parāvidyā is solicited for liberation from sufferings and sorrows forever. Both of these are also useful for generating human values. Parāvidya generates eternal values whereas aparāvidya can generate contexctual values.
Vaiseșika philosophy discusses about vidyā and avidyā'. Avidyā is of four kinds’ as - doubt (samsaya), perverted knowledge (viparyaya), unditermined (anadhyavasāya) and dream (svapna) and vidyā is also of four types as 1. Perception (pratyakşa) 2. Inference (anumānal Laingika), 3. Recollection (smsti) and testimony (ārşa/śābda). Vaiśeşikas mention vidyā as a quality (guņa) which remains in a soul with relation of inherence. 'Iśāvāsyopanişad(11) also mentions these two:
vidyām cāvidyām ca yastad vedobhayam saha.
avidyayā mrtyum tirtvā vidyayāmstamaśnute. Prasastapādabhāsya, gunavaidhaīmya prakarana (In Vyomavatī, vol.2 p.115): tatrāvidyā caturvidhā samsaya-viparyayānadhyavasāya-svapnalaksaņā. Ibid.: Vidyāpi caturvidhā, pratyakşa-laingika-smrtyārşalakşaņā. (In Vyomavati, vol. 2, p. 137)

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In Vedanta philosophy complete destruction of ignorance has been accepted as a means of eternal liberation (mokṣa)* and knowledge (vidya) is the means for achieving it. Samkhya Philosophy accepts two kinds of knowledge. One is reffered as buddhi or mahat which is a product of prakṛti (unconscious element) and another is reffered as a characteristic of a puruşa (conscious element) in the form of Viveka (distinguishing Knowledge) which is helpful in obtaining salvation from sufferings forever. Sensuous knowledge is an activity of prakṛti gaining a shadow of puruşa whereas distinguishing knowledge is a characteristic of conscious purușa.
Knowledge: a characteristic of a soul
44
In Jaina philosophy knowledge (jñāna) is accepted as an essential, natural, identical and inseparable characteristic of a soul. Jaina philosophers do not accept a soul without knowledge. It is an inevitable characteristic of a soul, which represents the consciousness and without consciousness a soul cannot be defined. In the Nyāya-Vaiśesika philosophies, knowledge is not considered as a natural characteristic of a soul. They consider it as an attribute which remains in a soulsubstance due to relation of inherence and in the state of salvation this attribute of consciousness vanishes from that soul. Jaina philosophers refute this notion. The Jaina philosophers have similarity to some extent with the Vedāntins. Vedāntins define Brahma or Atman as 'Saccidānanda' (Vedāntasāra,33). Here 'cit' (cid) is the synonym of knowledge and consciousness. According to Jaina text Uttaradhyayana
'Nyāyamakaranda p. 336: avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ

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sūtra (28.11) a soul bears the following characteristics:
nāņam ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo tahā.
vīriyam uvaogo ya, eyam jīvassa lakkhaṇam.
"A soul has characteristics like- knowledge, intuition (darśana), conduct (caritra), austerity (tapa), enthusiausm (vīrya) and consciousness (upayoga)".
Thus Jaina propound some more characteristics of a soul than Vedāntins accept, but these two philosophies agree on the point that knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul.
Jaina philosopher Umāsvāti propounds 'Upayoga' (consciousness) as the main characteristic of a soul in his renowned work Tattvārthasūtra (2.8). Upayoga is of two kinds- (i) Jñāna (articulate cognition) and (ii) Darśana (inarticulate cognition). These two are the categories of cognition. Jñana is an articulate cognition (Sākāropayoga) and Darśana is an in-articulate cognition (Anākāropayoga). Darśana and Jñāna have an essential order. Darśana or anākāropayoga occurs first and then after Jñana or sākāropayoga takes place.
The Jaina conception of knowledge has its most significant place in the sphere of Indian philosophy. According to Jaina philosophy no one soul can exist without knowledge. All the souls of the world including the organisms like tree, fire, water etc. having only one sense of touch, also have the characteristic of knowledge. Even liberated souls do have knowledge. They have complete knowledge which is called kevalajñāna and the worldly souls have atleast two types of knowledge namely matijñāna and srutajñāna. Here, one thing is to be clarified that knowledge in Jainism is accepted either as

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samyak (right) or as mithyā (wrong or perverted). If the souls have right view or Samyagdarśana then they have right knowledge and if they are possessed of perverted attitude then they have mithyājñāna or ajñāna. The word 'ajñāna' in Jaina system does not denote the complete absence of knowledge, but it indicates the pervertedness of the knowledge. In this way the living beings bearing one sense-organ of touch are possessed of ajñāna, but it is true that the phenomenon of cognition is also found always there. The creatures like caterpillar, ant, termite, butterfly also have knowledge in the form of ajñāna. Thus knowledge or cognition is an essential and inseparable characteristic of a soul in Jainism. Jñānāvarana karma: An obstruction in manifestion of knowledge
Jaina thinkers accept that every bhavya (having potential for ultimate emancipation) soul has a capability of becoming omniscient, but the bondage of jñānāvarana (knowledge covering) karma is an obstruction in its manifestation. Whenever a soul completely destructs the Karma-bondage of jñānāvarana, the pure and complete knowledge Kevalajñāna arises at the moment. Before arising of kevaljñāna, mohanīya karma (deluding karma) is destructed. Darśanāvarana (intuition covering) karma and
*There are eight karmas in Jainism which obscure or obstruct the menifestation of real attributes of a soul. They are (i) jñanavaraņa (obscures knowledge) (ii) darśanāvaraņa (obscures sensitivity or intuition) (iii) vedanīya (provides pleasure and sorrows) (iv) mohanīya (deduding karma) (v) āyuşya (karma related to lifespan) (vi) nāma (provides body, sense organs etc) (vii) gotra (provides higher or lower life-values) (viii) antarāya(obstructs the qualities of generousity etc.).

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antaraya (Obstructive) karma also got destructed altogether with jñānāvaraṇa. Umāsvāti says
"Pure and perfect knowledge (omniscience) arises when deluding karma is eleminated and as a result, knowledgecovering, intuition-covering and obstructive karma are eliminated."
It means knowledge is affected by deluding karma. Whenever deluision in our views arises, the right knowledge is affected. Hence for manifestion of right knowledge destruction of mohaniya (deluding) karma is needed.
Causation of knowledge
According to Jaina philosophy knowledge does not come from outside. It always manifests in a soul after the destruction (kṣaya) or subsidence-cum-destruction (Kṣayopaśama) of Jñānāvaraṇa Karma. Although we know the objects through sense-organs and quasi-sense (mind), but these are only the instruments. The knowledge does not manifest in them. Knowledge is an attribute of a soul. In the view of Jaina thinkers light and objects are not the real causes of the origination of a knowledge. Although their presence helps in the manifestation of a knowledge to us, but these are not needed for a person who has supersensuous intuition, therefore the Jaina philosophers do not accept the direct causation of light and object. Acārya Hemacandra says (In brief) :
"Tattvärthasutra, 10.1: Mohakṣayāj-jnāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāyakṣayācca
kevalam.

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"Light and object are the general causes like space and time. These are not the direct causes of generating knowledge in a living being."' Further Hemacandra says- "In the mirage we know water inspite of its absence. some animals like cow, cat, etc. can see in the night without light, hence light and object are not the real causes of the knowledge. Yogins know the objects of past, present and future, but causation of the objects is not seen there.”8
Self and Object - illuminating (Sva-para-Prakāśakatva)
Jaina philosophers propound that knowledge illuminates itself and the object. Self illuminating and the object illuminating (Svaparaprakāśakatva) is a natural characteristic of a knowledge. In the view of Jaina philosophers, if a knowledge does not illuminate itself, then it cannot illuminate the objects also. They give an example of the sun, which illuminates itself and the objects as well.'
Naiyayikas accept that a knowledge can not illuminate itself, it can illuminate, its object only. For illumination of a knowledge an another knowledge is required. Buddhist Vijñānavadins do not accept any existence other than of vijñāna (knowledge). Hence they accept a knowledge self-illuminating only.
'Pramāņa- mīmāmsā 1.1.25 vrtti: Nārthālokau Jñānasya nimittama-vyatirekāt. Bāhyo visayah prakāśaśca na caksurjñānasya sākşāt Kāranam; deśakāladivattu vyavahitakāranatvam na nivāryate, jnānāvaranādiksayopaśamasāmagryāmārādupakārit-venānjāñādiva- ccaksurupakāritvena cābhyupagamāt. See Pramāna mīmāmsā 1.1.25 vstti 'Niyamasāra, tātparyavrtti, 159 and Pramānanaya-tattvāloka 1.17

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Samyag jñāna: two forms
We find two forms of samyagjñāna (right knowledge) in Jaina literature. First form of samyagjñāna is included in the trio-jewels (samygjñāna, samyagdarśana and samyak cāritra) which lead to the path of salvation. This samyagjñāna is linked with samyagdarśana (right view). In the presence of right view the existing knowledge converts into samyag-jñāna (Sarvārtha siddhi, 1.1.7). On the contrary in the presence of mithyādarśana or midhyātva (deluded view) the existing knowledge is called as ajñāna or mithyā-jñāna. Mithyādarśana: is a perverted or deluded view of a soul which leads to mundane world and samyag-darśana leads a soul to the path of salvation. This is the first form of Samyag-jñāna found in Jaina canons and latter literature.
The second form of samyag-jñāna is found only in the epistemological literature, when Jaina philosophers define pramāņa (an organ of valid knowledge) as samyag-jñāna“Samyag-jñānam pramāņam."! Vidyānanda (775-840 A.D.) and Abhinava-dharmabhusana have given definition of pramāņa as samyagjñāna, but here samyag-jñāna is not linked with the inevitable presence of samyag-darśana. In defining pramāņa samyag-jñāna has another characteristic i.e. devoidness of doubt (samśaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indeterminateness (anadhyavasāya). The knowledge determining the self and the object and devoidness of doubt, illusion and indeterminateness is called pramāna."
''Tattvārtha Sūtra, 1.1 "Pramāna-parīksā, p.1 & Nyāyadīpikā, p.9. "Pramānāmīmāmsā 1.1.1. Vrtti & Nyāya-kumuda-candra, Vol. I p.4.8: Prakarsena samśayādi-vyavachedena mīyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramānam pramāyām sādhakatamam.

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Thus samyag-jñāna defined as pramāna is different from the samyag-jñāna leading to liberation. The basic difference in these two is of inner view. First one right knowledge is leading the path of salvation and another one is guiding our empirical behaviour. First one may be compared with parāvidyā of Upanisadas and second one with aparāvidyā. Vattakera in Mūlācāra defines samyag-jñāna as follows:
“By which the truth is known, by which the mind is restrained and by which the soul is purified is the knowledge in Jaina-teachings.”
By which a man abstains from attachment, by which he engages himself in welfare and by which friendly behaviour with everybody takes place is the knowledge in Jainateachings."
This knowledge is one of the jewels in trio-jewels leading to the path of liberation, but Jaina scholars accepted the empirical world as a reality, hence they developed their own epistemological fundamentals which are more practicable. Knowledge as pramāna
Jaina logicians propounded pramāņa for uncontradictory behaviour of a person. The foremost Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara says in his Nyāyāvatāra- “This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even thought it is propounded here.”l4
"Mūlācāra, Verses 267-268 "Nyāyāvatāra,32: Pramānādi-vyavastheyamanādinidhanātmikā
Sarvasamvyavahartr nām prasiddhāpi prakirtitā||

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Pramāņa is a part of daily cognitive life. Without Pramāņa knowing process may remain unsuccessful or invalid. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti also says- "Validity of knowledge is proved through daily behaviour"15
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Jaina logicians created many works for the establishment of Jaina pramāņa vidyā and for refutation of other systems in this regard. They developed pramāņa śāstra and logic on the basis of knowledge and its kinds enumerated in the Jaina canons. They kept an empirical view in the development of pramāṇa-śāstra, hence they considered the sensuous knowledge after wards as perception and established smrti (recollection), pratyabhijñāna (recognition) and tarka (inductive reasoning) as indirect (parokşa) pramāṇa. They included kāraṇa, pūrvacara and uttaracara probans in the list of right probans (sadhetus).16
Right Knowledge and mohaniya karma
In Jaina philosophy, it is notable that the right knowledge leading to the path of liberation is not only connected with the subsidence or destruction of knowledgecovering (jñānavaraṇa) karma, but it also has relation with the subsidence or destruction of the view-deluding (daršana mohaniya) karma, The righteousness of knowledge (jñāna) depends on the destruction or partly destruction and subsidence of deluding-karma (mohaniya). Mohanīya karma is mainly of two types - (1) View-deluding karma (darśana mohaniya) and (2) cunduct-deluding (caritra mohaniya) karma. Darśana mohaniya karma represents the deluded inner view of a person
15 Prāmāṇyam Vyavahāreņa - Pramāņa vārtika, 1.7
16
"A separate chapter of this book on 'Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines' is discussing on Pramana and hetus.

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towards the life and the world. Caritra-mohanīya is linked with the perverted activities of a soul, e.g. anger (krodha), proud (māna), deceit (māyā) and greed (lobha) are conduct-delduing passions. Each of these are of four types, viz-Anantānubandhi (tenacious), Apratyākhyānāvaraṇa (non-abstinent), pratyākhyānāvaraṇa (partially abstinent) and sañjvalana (flickering passions). When the category of anantānubandhi krodha, māna, māyā and lobha are subsidised or destructed alongwith the category of darśana mohanīya the right-view emerges in a soul and the existing perverted knowledge changes into right knowledge.
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This righteousness of knowledge depends on the subsidence, subsidence-cum-destruction or destruction of some part of mohaniya karma. Another very important relation between them is manifested when the total destruction of mohaniya karma leads to complete destruction of jñānavaraṇa karma and then kevalajñāna emerges in a soul. In this way destruction of mohaniya karma is a cause of destruction of jñānāvaraṇa karma after which complete and perfect knowledge kevalajñāna arises.
Types of Knowledge
Five types of knowledge found in Rajapraśṇīya, Uttaradhyayana(28.4) Sthānānga(5.3.464) Anuyogadvāra sūtra(sūtra, 1), Nandisūtra(sūtra, 1) and Vyākhyāprajnaptisūtra (8.2.23) are as follows:
1.Abhinibodhika jñāna/mati jñāna (sensuous knowledge) 2. Śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge)
3. Avadhijñāna (visual intuition/clairvoyance)
4. Manaḥparyaya jñāna (intuition of mental modes)
5. kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge/omniscience)

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These five types of knowledge are the specific contribution of Jaina wisdom to the Indian epistemological sphere. In Nandisūtra(sūtra 2) this fivefold knowledge has been divided into two kinds- (1) pratyakṣa (direct) (2) parokşa (indirect). This broad division of knowledge has been accepted by Jaina logicians in the division of pramāņa also. The knowledge which requires the sense-organs and quasi-sense in its manifestation, comes under the category of indirect (parokşa) knowledge and the knowledge which occurs only through a soul without the help of sense organs and mind is called direct (pratyakşa) knowledge.
In this respect the Jaina view is different from the other Indian systems because all other systems of Indian philosophy consider the sensuons knowledge as direct knowledge where as the early Jaina thinkers accept it as indirect knowledge. The Jaina logicians including Jinabhadragani (6th century CE), Bhatta Akalańka (720-780 CE) introduce sensuous knowledge as empirical perception (sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa). This was a latter development in the Jaina philosophy.
Matijñāna or Abhinibodhikajñāna
Generally matijñāna or abhinibodhika jñāna is considered as sensuous knowledge. Somewhere it occurs through sense-organs only, somewhere through sense-organ and quasi-sense, and somewhere it occurs through quasi-sense (mind) only. In Nandisūtra (sūtra 71) we find synonyms of abhinibodhika jñāna as- īhā, apoha, vīmamsā, maggaṇā, gaveṣaṇā, saņņā, saī, maī and panna. These synonyms present a vide perspective of matijñāna or abhinibodhika jñāna.

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Thinking, reasoning, memory, intellect are also the forms of abhinibodhikajñāna. Jāti-smaraṇa jñāna(knowledge of former birth) is also included in the abhinibodhika jñāna. Thus it is having a vast area of knowledge. Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthasūtra (1.14) has defined it as the knowledge which is generated or manifested by the sense-organs and quasi-sense. He has given five synonyms" of it as sensuous knowledge, memory, recognition, argument and inference. All these are the kinds of matijñāna or ābhinibodhika jñāna which were approved as the base of development of Jaina logic. Bhaṭṭa Akalanka considered. 'mati' as sensuous perception and quasisensuous perception and developed new prmāṇas as smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka and infernce pramāņa from the memory (smrti), recognition (sañjña), thinking (cinta) and abhinibodha words.
This abhinibodhika knowledge has been divided into two types-(1) śrutaniśrita and (2) aśrutaniśrita. Asurataniśrita matijñānā is divided into four kinds of buddhis-(1) autapattikī (2) vainayikī (3) karmajā and (iv) pāriṇāmikī.
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Autpattiki buddhi is an intellectual exercise of highly and quickly right decision, about the situations and things which were never seen, heard or otherwise known before. Vainayiki buddhi is the intellct of finding out a right solution in a complicated matter after getting some guidance. Karmajā is the intellect developed through practice in a particular work. The pārināmiki intellect is attained through inference, reasoning and other such methods after seeing a result of prior
17
"Tattvārtha sūtra, 1.13: matiḥ smṛtiḥ sañjña, cinta-bhinibodha ityanarthantaram.

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action. These four types of buddhis are mentioned in the Nandisūtra with examples (sūtra 48-52) and in the Sthānāngasūtra(4.4) by names. This division of aśrutanisrita is not available in Digambara tradition. In Śvetāmbara tradition this division is not found in the Bhagavatī, Prajñāpanā, Āvaśyaka niryukti and Anuyogadvāra sūtra.
Śrutaniśrita matijnāna is of four kinds- (i) Avagraha (ii) īhā (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāranā. These four types of matijñāna are actually the four stages which occur in a certain order and have a significant value in the theory of knowledge in Indian System.
Avagraha is a non-specific cognition of mere existence of an object, Ihā is a further step in which the knowledge is inclined towards ascertainment of that object. It is different from doubt because during the doubt, knowledge hangs towards two things while in Ihā the knowledge is inclined towards one of them. 'Avāya' is the ascertained knowledge of the object. Dhāraṇā is retention or impression of the judgement which becomes the cause of memory. In the Nandisūtra, commentaries of the Tattvārtha sūtra and in the Viśeşāvaśyakabhāşya of Jinabhadraganin a detailed account of these four stages of matijñāna is available.
Here, it will be an important note that these stages may be helpful in strengthening the learning process of human being. The things which we want to recall, the learning process of them should go upto dhāraṇā (retention) stage. Dhāraṇā is the cause of memory. In this way study and application of these four stages namely avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā might

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have been proved fruitful in the field of educational psychology for moderating the learning process of children.
Śrutajñāna (Scriptural Knowledge)
The Nandisūtra says that where abhinibodhika jñāna is present, śrutajñāna is also there, and where śrutajñāna is present, the abhinibodhika jñāna is also there. Both of these are found together. One characteristic of śrutajñāna is quoted everywhere in Jaina literature that śrutajñāna occurs after matijñāna - śrutam. matipūrvam." Nandisūtra says'maipuvvam jena suyam".
56
20
18
19 Tattvärthasutra, 1.20
20 Nandisutra,45
Generally śrutajnāna is defined as scriptural Knowledge or verbal knowledge, but it has been accepted in Jaina literature that every living being bears at least two knowledges as - matijñāna and śrutajñāna. Hence a question arises here that when every living being possesses śrutajñāna alongwith matijñāna, then it cannot be a scriptural knowledge, because a soul like one-sensed being has no knowledge of scriptures or canons. Although canonical literature of angapravista and anarigapravista comes under the roof of śruta-jñāna, but there must be some another characteristics of śrutajñāna or śruta-ajñāna as it is found in every worldly soul." śrutajñāna is like a directive knowledge to lead a life. It is an inner voice of the self, depending on the experience occured through matijnāna.
"Nandisutra, 45: jattha ābhiṇibohināṇam tattha suyanāṇam, jattha suyanāṇam tattha abhinibohināṇam dovi eyāim annamannamaṇugayāim.'
"A separate article on 'Significance of śrutajñana' is available in the book for
detailed discussion.

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57
Somewhere in Jaina canons śrutajnāna is considered as equal to kevalajñāna in some respect. Gommațasāra of Nemicandra says
“In the respect of knowing all the objects śrutajñāna and kevalajñāna are equal, but śrutajñāna is considered as parokșa (indirect) and kevalajñāna is always pratyakşa
(direct). 22
This statement glorifies the significance of śrutajñāna. Kundakunda says
“The person who knows a soul in the pure form with the help of śrutajnāna, is considered as śrutakevalin, by the yogins who illuminate the world with their knowledge.”:23 Avadhijnāna (visual intuition/clairvoyance)
Avadhi is the knowledge of material objects directly emerged through a soul, in a soul, without the help of senseorgans and mind. It is of two types - (i) Bhava-pratyaya (ii) Guņa pratyaya (kşayopaśamanimittaka). Bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna is found by birth. It is accepted in the souls of hell and heaven. Guņapratyaya avadhijñāna is found in human beings and animals. It is attained by austerity, observing vows etc. In an avadhijñāna one can know a very small fraction of a material and he can also know the all material objects of the world. Guņapratyaya avadhijñāna is of six types(i) Anugāmika- It follows the onwer of avadhi even if he
leaves the place of its manifestation. . (ii) Anānugāmika- It does not follow the onwer if he leaves
that particular place where avadhijñāna was experienced.
* Gommatasāra, Jīvakānda, 369 "Samayasāra, 9

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(iii) Hiyamāna-It shrinks gradually after its appearance. (iv) Vardhamāna- It increases continuously after its
manifestation. (v) Avasthita- It remains steady upto attainment of
kevalajñāna or up to the end of life. (vi) Anavasthita- It decreases or increases or may disappear
after its manifestation. Manahparyāya jñāna
Manahparyāya jñāna is also a direct knowledge in which the modes of mind of others are known lucidly. It is a result of subsidence - cum - destruction of manahparyāya jñānāvaraņa. It is different from avadhijñāna on the following points according to Tattvārthasūtra, (1.26):(i) Manahparyāyajñāna is more vivid and lucid than
avadhijñāna. (ii) Area of manifestation of manahparyāyajnāna is only two
and half dvīpa land, where human beings live. Minimum area of manifestation of avadhijñāna is the small fraction of an angula(finger) and maximum area is complete world
(loka). (iii) An onwer of manahparyāyajñāna can only be a human
being especilly a monk standing in seventh Gunasthāna, while onwer of avadhijñāna may be a soul from any four
gatis (types of living beings). (iv) An object of avadhijñāna may be all materialistic
substances and their modes of the universe, while in manahparyāya jñāna object is only the modes of mind of others.

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Manaḥparyāya jñāna is of two types - (i) rjumati and (ii) vipulamati. Vipulamati is more lucid and vivid than rjumati. Vipulamati is infallible where as rjumati may disappear after certain period. Vipulamati turns into kevalajnana. (Tattvartha sutra 1.25)
There are two opinions about the object of manaḥparyaya jñāna, Pandita Sukhalal Sanghavi has mentioned these in his notes on Pramāņa mīmāmsā (p.37): (i) According to the Nandisutra, Avaśyaka-niryukti and Tattvärthabhāṣya, in manaḥparyāya jñāna, alongwith the modes of manas (mind) the substances and their modes of which thinking is prevailing are also known.
(ii) According to the Viseṣāvasyaka- bhāṣya and Nandi-curņi, only mental modes of others are perceived through manaḥparyaya jñāna and the things of which thinking is prevailing are known through inference.
Kevalajñāna
Kevalajnana is a complete and perfect knowledge after which nothing remains to know. It is a knowledge by which all substances and their modes of present, past and future are known directly and lucidly. It never needs sense-organs and mind for its manifestation. After complete destruction of jñānāvaraṇa karma along- with mohaniya, darśanavaraṇa and antarāya karma-bondage, this perfect, pure and complete knowledge appears in a soul. It is also defined as omniscient knowledge. Jaina thinkers give many cogent arguments in favour of omniscience of kevalin or kevalajñānin. Ācārya Hemacandra says-"The degree of knowledge should rest at the

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extreme. This extreme of knowledge is kevalajnāna which is considered as omniscience."24
Some more arguments are as follows:
(1) The things subtle, hidden and far are assumed as perceptive by someone, because of their knowability. In kevalajñāna all the things are known lucidly."5
(ii) Many times the statements of astrologers are seen true, It means it is enough possible to know the things which are not perceptive by the sense-organs.
26
25
(iii) There is not any contradictory pramāṇa against omniscience.27
60
In the respect of omniscience a question arises that what the purpose of knowing everything of the universe is? The Jaina philosophers reply that it is a nature of pure soul that every object is known by it. Some of the Indian systems do not agree with the concept of omniscience of a person. Especially, Mīmāmsakas criticise the notion of omniscience at a length. Buddhist philosophers agree with the concept of omniscience. Asvaghosa says- "(Buddha) saw the whole universe (in his knowledge) like in a clean mirror."28, but a pioneer Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti denies the purpose of omniscience as he says:
"Knowledge of distant objects is not important, if it is so then we should worship vultures who see the objects at a very high distance."
24
9929
Pramāņa mīmāmsā 1.1.16: prajñātiśaya- visräntyādi-siddhestat-siddhih. Pramanamīmāmsā vṛtti 1.1.16
26 Ibid. 1.1.16
27 Ibid.1.1.16
28 Dadarśa nikhilam lokamādarśa iva nirmale. - Buddhacaritam 14.8 29 Pramāṇavārtika, 1.35
25

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Therefore Acarya Kundakunda propounds that the knowledge of all substances and their modes is possible with an empirical standpoint, but in the view of absolute reality a kevalin knows only the self.30
9,31
Regarding omniscience we get one sentence in Acārāngasūtra (1.3.4). "One who knows one, knows all and one who knows all knows one." Jaina philosophers took it as a proof for the concept of omniscience. Dr. Nathmal Tatia (1951: 70) has explained this statement of Acārānga in this way- "The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called paryayas (modes) of the entity. In order to know as entity completely, these relations or paryayas are to be completely known. And hence, it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible."32
In this way there are two views regarding omniscience. One is empirical, in which kevalajñānin knows directly every thing of the world with its all modes of past, present and future. The another view is of absolute reality in which kevalin knows completely the self with it's all modes. Here one more explanation may be added that kevalin is omniscient in the sense that nothing is remained to be known by him. He knows every thing in that sense.
30
61
31
32
Janadi passadi savvam, vavaharaṇayena kevali Bhagavam.
Kevalaṇānī jāṇadi passadi niyamena appāṇam||. -Niyamasara, 158
Acarangasūtra 1.3.4: Je egam jānai se savvam jānai, je savvam
jāņai se egam jāņai.
Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 70

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Nayavāda
One important point about knowledge in Jainism is nayavāda or the concept of standpoint of knowing. The object according to Jain philosophy, is multidimensional or multifaceted. We cannot know it completely at a time. We know it by one standpoint or another. Our knowledge of the object may be true from some standpoint. This nayavāda has a significant place in Jainism regarding its theory of knowledge. It is related mainly with śrutajnāna. Acquiring of knowledge
Although knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul, and its manifestation depends on subsidence-cumdestruction (kşayopaśama) or on complete destruction (kşaya) of jñānāvaraṇa karma, but it is notable that scriptural knowledge or informative knowledge is acquired by a soul through sense orgams, mind and intellect. In the eleventh chapter of Uttarādhyayanā sūtra five obstructions have been defined in achievement of such knowledge, i.e. - (i) Pride (ii) anger (iii) carelessness (iv) illness (v) idleness." Alongwith this, eight assisting causes are also mentioned for acquiring knowledge- (i) politeness (ii) restrain (iii) silence at other's secrets. (iv) well-conduct (v) avoidance of mis-conduct (vi) avoidance of ardent desire(greed) (vii) victory on anger (viii)interest in the truth." A disciplined desciple is quite able to enrich knowledge as it is clear from the first and the eleventh chapter of Uttarādhyayanasūtra. A student who lives near a teacher with self restrained mind and activities, performing
"Uttarādhyayana, 11.3 * Uttarādhyayana, 11.4-5

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penance, acting affectionately and speaking kindly can get knowledge or education." In the Nandisūtra a process for acquiring knowledge has been described with the help of eight qualities of buddhi
“A desciplined student (i) intends to listen to the teacher (ii) asks real questions (iii) listens the answers carefully (iv) understands them (v) thinks over them (vi) determines the meaning (vii) takes it for further memory (viii) tries to practice them in life."36
In this way a student can acquire knowledge, but it is possible only in the position of subsidence-cum-destruction of Jñānāvaraṇa karma.
Svādhyāya (self-study) is also a means of acquiring knowledge and for destruction of jnānāvaraṇa karma. Uttarādhyayan sūtra (29.18) says- “Through self-study one can destruct the knowledge-obscuring-karma.”
The person having scripturul knowledge may get light in life at every moment, as stated in a different way
“A person having knowledge of scriptures does not loose himself in the world, as a needle with thread fallen on ground is never lost."37
Conclusion
Knowledge is identical with a soul and it cann't be separated from that soul. If it is perverted, it is called mithyā, » Uttarādhyayana sūtra 11.14 ** Nandisutra, gāthā 95: Sussūsai padipucchai suņai ginhai Thae vāvis
tato apohae vā, dhārei karei vā kammam. > Uttarādhyayan, 29.56 :
jaha suī sasuttā padiyā vi na viņassai| evam jīve sasutte samsāre na viņassai||

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and in the presence of right view (samyagdarśana), it is considered as right (samyak). Samyagjnāna can only lead the path of liberation with the help of samyag-darsana and samyak cāritra.
By accepting Anekantavāda and Nayavāda Jaina Philoso-phers consider the empirical world and its knowledge as a real fact.
Five types of knowledge are the pecularity of Jaina system which exclude Jaina epistemology from other Indian systems. A vast Jaina literature is available to understand the nature of knowledge and its development into pramāņa. Jaina philosophers have specific views regarding the concept of knowledge and its manifestations.
Bibliography Anuyogadvārasūtra of Āryarakṣita, Prakrit with Hindi translation and annotations, Beawar: Āgama prakaśana samiti, 1987.
Buddhacarita of Ašvaghoșa, Varanasi : Chaukhambhā Vidyābhavan, 1983
Gommațasāra (Jīvakāņda) of Nemichandra, Agāsa: Śrī Parama śruta Prabhāvaka Mandala, V.S. 2041.
Išāvāsyopanişad and Mundakopanişad (In Isādi Nau Upanişad), Gorakhpur: Geetapress. Vikram Samvat 2040 Mūlācāra of Vattakera, Delhi : Bhāratiya Jñānapitha, 1992 Mundakopanişad - see lśāvāsyopanişad. Nandisūtra of Devavācaka, Beawar: Āgama Prakaśna Samiti. Niyamasāra of Kundakunda with Tātparyavștti, Jaipur : Kundakunda Kahāna Digambara Jaina Tīrtha Surakşā Trust, 1984
Nyāya-dipikā of Abhinava-dharma-bhūşaņa (ed.) Darbāri Lāla Kothiā, Delhi : Vīrasevamandira, 1968

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Nyaya-Kumuda-candra of Prabhācandra, (2 Vols) Edited by Pt. Mahendra Kumāra Nyāyācārya, Bombay Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, 1938 and 1941
Manikya candra
Nyaya-makaranda of Anandabodha (Adaita Vedantist), Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1901 & 1907.
Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasenasūri, Bombay Parama śruta Prabhāvaka Mandala, 1950
Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā of Hemacandra, Edited and annotated by Pt. Sukha Lāla Sanghavi, Ahmedabad-calcutta Singhĩ Jaina Granthamāla, 1939
Pramāṇa-naya-tattväloka of Vādidevasūri, Hindi Translation by Pt. Shobha Chandra Bhārilla, Ahmedanagar Shri Tilokaratna Sthānakavāsi Jain Dharmika Parīkṣā Board, 2000
Pramāņa Parīkṣā of Vidyānanda, (ed.) Darbārī Lāla koṭhiyā, Varanasi: Vīraseya mandira Trust, 1977
Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti with commentary of Manorathanandi, Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 2nd edition, 1984
Prasastapādabhāṣya ( In Vyomavatī Part 1 and 2), Varanasi : Sampurṇānanda Sanskrit University, 1983-1984
Rajapraśnīya sūtra, Beawar : Agam prakasana samiti.
Samayasara of Kundakunda, Agāsa: Śrī Paramaśruta Prabhāvaka Mandala, V.S. 2038
Tattvarthasutra of Umāsvāti, Hindi Commentary by Pt. Sukha Lāla Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parsvanatha Vidyāpītha, 5th edition, 2001
Tatia, Nathamal, 1951, Studies In Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi: P.V. Research Institute.
Uttaradhyayana sūtra (vol.3), Jaipur Samyagjñāna Pracāraka Mandala, 2nd edition, 1989
Vedāntasära of Sadananda, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1979
Vyakhyāprajñapti sūtra, Prakrit, with Hindi translation, Beawar : Agama Prakaśna Samiti.

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In the Vedic tradition four Vedas are also named as 'śruti' and in the Jain tradition, scriptural knowledge is generally named as śruta or śrutajñāna. But when we study Jain texts, we find that all living beings, even one sensed to four sensed beings not having auditory organ also bear śruajñāna. They bear its perverted form as śruta-ajñāna. Here a doubt arises, how one sensed living beings are supposed to have scriptural knowledge, even when they cannot hear and understand scripts containing sermons of enlightened persons.? Which kind of śrutajñāna exists therein? This paper proposes to discuss this problem and tries to find out a solution from the original Jaina texts. Another point, to be discussed in this article is to differentiate śrutajñāna from matijñāna, which is also found in every living being and occurs before śrutajñāna. Third point to be discussed herein is to find out the importance of śrutajñāna for salvation or liberation from sufferings and sorrows. On the basis of Jaina canonical literature fourteen and twenty types of śrutajñāna are also to be mentioned.
Jaina tradition propounds five types of knowledge:- 1Sensuous knowledge (matijñāna), 2. Scriptural knowledge or knowledge of the self (srutajñāna), 3. Clairvoyance or visual intuition (avadhijñāna), 4. Intuition of mental modes (manaḥparyāya-jñāna), 5. Pure and perfect knowledge (kevalajñāna). Here, we will discuss only the concept of śrutajñāna.

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Meaning of Śruta and Śrutajñāna
Śrutajñāna or śruta word has the following meanings:1- What is heard with auditory sense organ is śruta.
(śruyate ’iti śrutam.) 2- Preachings of a trustworthy person are meant as śruta,
because they are also heard. A collection of their preachings in the form of canons (āgamas) is also śruta. This is the source and instrumental cause for generating
real śrutajñāna in a soul. 3- The knowledge which elevates a soul after listening to
trustworthy persons or after study of canons is also
considered as śrutajñāna. 4- Which is heard by a soul is śruta śruyate ātmana
taditi śrutam (Maladhārī Hemacandra vștti, on Višesavaşyakabhāşya, verse 81.) This knowledge is
helpful in the salvation from sufferings and sorrows. Difference between Śrutajñāna and kevalajñāna
Srutajñāna has been compared with pure and perfect knowledge ‘kevalajñāna', with a slight difference that kevalajñāna is a direct perceptual knowledge, whereas, śrutajñāna is considered as indirect (parokşa) knowledge. Its importance has been mentioned by Kundakunda in Samayasāra and in Pravacanasāra that a
Samayasára, 1.9 : jo hi suyenāhigacchai appānaminam tu kevalam suddhami tam suyakevali-misiņo bhananti loyappaivayarā. Il 'Pravacanasāra, 1.33: jo hi sudeņa vijāņadi appaņam jāņagam sahāveņa. I tam suyakevalimisiņo bhaṇanti loyappadivayarā. II

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68
person who knows a pure soul through śrutajñāna is considered as śrutakevalin by enlightened persons. Kevalin directly knows all the substances and their modes whereas śrutajñānin knows these through śrutajñāna.' Śrutajñāna is a wishful knowledge for a living being which directs him to the right path of liberation. Dravyaśruta and Bhāvaśruta
Umāsvāti provides synonyms of śrutajñāna in Tattvārthādhigamabhāșya as - "āptavacana, āgama, upadeśa, eitihya, āmnāya, pravacana, jinavacana’. All these synonyms establish that the sermons of jinas [who have conquered attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveşa)] or the perfect authentic persons are considered as śrutajñāna . This is a dravyaśruta (śruta in the form of preachings) and it can lead to bhāva-śrutajñāna (manifested knowledge in the self through preachings) in a person who conceives the meaning of that dravyaśruta. Śruta and Śruti
The word 'śruta' bears resemblance with the word 'śruti used for Vedas. Both of these have the same characteristic of verbal testimony. According to Mīmāmsakas, there is no creator of śruti or Vedas, whereas Naiyāyikas consider that the God is the creator of Vedas, but in Jaina philosophy when a Kevalin or Tīrtharkara expresses the truth for the welfare of all living beings, then it Gommațasära, Jivakānda, verse, 369: sudakevalam ca ņāņam, donni vi sarisäni honti bohādo i sudaņaņam tu parokkham, pacchakham kevalam. ņāņam II “Sabhāşya-tattvārthādhigamasutra, 1.20 : "śrutam aptavacan-agamaupadeśa-eitihyam-āmnāyam pravacanam jinavacanamityanarthānataram"

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Significance of Śrutajñāna
is called as śruta or dravyaśruta and when its meaning or message is experienced by someone, then it is called śrutajñāna or bhāvaaśruta. One more interesting point is that śruti is not considered in every living being as an essential element, whereas śrutajñāna is essentially accepted in every living being. It is another thing that due to perverted attitude it may be śruta-ajñāna. Matijñāna precedes Śrutajñāna
It has been accepted that śrutajñāna takes place after matijñāna. In the Tattvärthasūtra, its commentaries and in the Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya, it has been propounded that śrutajñāna takes place after matijñāna. Matijñāna has been considered as an efficient cause of śrutajñāna. Here, a question has been raised by Pūjyapāda Devanandin in his Sarvārthasiddhi that if śruta is manifested after matijñāna then it should also be mati, because 'kāraṇasadṛśam hi loke karyam dṛṣtam', an effect comes out similar to its cause, but in the view of Pujyapāda Devanandi it is not always true, for instance stick (danda) is an instrumental cause for making an earthen pot but the stick (danda) does not turn into a pot. Similarly, matijñāna is not converted into śrutajñāna, but it becomes instrumental cause for producing śrutajñāna. Even in the presence of matijñāna, śrutajñāna may not appear due to effect of śrutajñānavaraṇa Karma. Subsidence-cum-destruction of śrutajñānāvaraṇa karma is also essential for the manifestation of śrutajñāna.“
(i) Tattvärthasūtra: 1.20- śrutam matipūrvam dyanekadvādaśabhedam: (ii) Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya, verse 105: maipuvvam suyam uttam "Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 85

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In the Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya Jinabhadragaṇin kṣamāśramaṇa supports the notion that śrutajñāna is preceded by matijñāna- ‘maipuvvam suyam' and he applies various meanings of word 'purva' which is derived from the root pṛ pālanpūraṇayoḥ. He says that word 'pūrva' may be used to denote the meaning of causing, guarding, nourishing, protecting etc. Matijñāna is an efficient cause of śrutajñāna and it also nourishes and protects the same. He also says that śruta is obtained, and it can be distributed to others through matijñāna. In the absence of matijñāna, śrutajñāna cannot be preserved or sustained.'
70
Bhaṭṭa Akalanka in his Tattvārthavārtika raises a question that if śruta is caused by mati, then there is a beginning of śruta and which has a beginning, has its end also. In this way canonical notion that 'śruta has no beginning and no end' is defeated. Here he answers that for a particular person or situation it may have beginning but in universal point of view, śruta is always present.
8
Although śrutajñāna has been defined as verbal cognition conceived from the words known through matijñāna, but it is not limited upto the cognition of words. Vidyananda explained it that knowledge manifested through sense organs and quasi-sense is instrumental cause of śrutajñāna. In this way knowledge manifested through touch-sense, gustatory sense, olfactory sense and sense of 'Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya, verse 105 and 106:
maipuvvam suyamuttam na maī suyapuvviyā visesoʻyam | puvvam pūraṇa-pālaṇa-bhāvão jam mai tassa pūrijjai Pāvijjai dijjai vā jam maie ṇāmaina palijjai ya maie gahiyam ihara paṇasejjā || Tattvärthavārtika, 1.20.7

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vision may also lead to śrutajñāna.' Śrutajñāna is a later stage of matijñāna. Even a knowledge originated through mind can also lead to śrutajñāna. It is also different from memory, recognition, concomitance and inference. Śrutajñāna is indirect pure knowledge by which a person
becomes able to know the obstructed, distant and the subtle substances. Due to this characteristic of knowing, a knower is called a śrutakevali.
Difference between Matijñāna and Śrutajñāna
71
Umāsvāti, in his Tattvärthādhigamabhāṣya differentiating śrutajñāna from matijñāna clarifies that matijñāna or abhinibodhika jñāna deals with only the present existing things, whereas śrutajñāna deals with the objects of all three times i.e. present, past and future." A question arises here that memory (smṛti) is also a kind of matijñāna and it deals with the past, then how it can be said that mati is limited upto present objects? Haribhadra replied to this question in his Tattvārthavṛtti that memory (smrti) is nothing than the knowledge of the things known in previously present.
11
One more characteristic of śrutajñāna has been pointed out by Umāsvāti that it has more clarity then matijñāna."
'Tattvärtha ślokavārtika: 1.20.10
matisāmānya-nirdeśānna śrotra-matipurvakam |
śrutam niyamyate aseṣamatipurvasya vikṣaṇāt || "Tattvärthabhāṣya, 1.20
"utpannāvinaṣtārtha-grāhakam sampratakālaviṣayam matijñānam Śrutajñānam
tu trikalaviṣayam. Utpannavinaṣtānutpannārth-agrāhakam"
"Haribhadriya Tattvärtha vṛtti on Tattvārtha sūtra. 1.20 p. 99
"smṛteratītaviṣayatvānna sarvamevamvidhamiti cet, na, samprata-kālagṛhūitātiriktasya
kasyacidasmaraṇāt."
"Sabhāṣyatattvärthadhigamasutra 1.20:
śrutajñānam tu trikālaviṣayam viśuddhataram ceti.

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Haribhadra explains that śrutajñāna may deal with the obstructed, distant and subtle objects, hence that has more clarity."
One another differentiating characteristic between these two knowledges, according to Tattvārthabhāsya is that śrutajñāna has wider objectivity than matijñāna. It gives two arguments in the support: the first, that śrutajñāna is produced by an omniscient and the second, that it deals with infinite knowables.
Śrutajñāna is quite different from matijñāna (sensuous knowledge). Matijñāna has stages of avagraha, iha, avāya and dhāraṇa knowledge and it requires sense organs, mind or both for its manifestation whereas śrutajñāna requires an inner light which leads a person to understand and experience the momentariness of worldly things. It is a self-knowledge by which a person becomes able to discriminate between the good (śreya) and covetable (preya). It tends a person to a real spiritual development. He can renunciate the worldly attractions. It can be called as prajña (wisdom). In other words matijñāna is a knowledge and śrutajñāna is a wisdom. Bhāvaśruta-jñāna: Essential in Every Living Being
According to canonical notion every living being has at least two knowledge, i.e. matijñāna and śrutajñāna. In the absence of right view (samyaktva) these are called as matiajñāna and śruta-ajñāna. If we consider śrutajñāna as verbal or scriptural knowledge, then it never appears in one "Haribhadriya Tattvārtha vrtti 1.20, p.103 "Sabhâsyatattvārthadhigamasūtra 1.20 : sarvajñapranītatvād-anantyacca jñeyasya śrutajñānam. matijñānān mahävişayam.

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sensed to four sensed living beings and in some of five sensed beings also. A few human beings can have this scriptural śrutajñāna. Jinabhadra, in his Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya has given a solution to this problem that every living being can have bhāva-śrutajñāna. He propounds two kinds of śrutajñāna as drāvya-śrutajñāna and bhāva-śrutajñāna. Dravya-śrutajñāna is a verbal knowledge and bhāva-śrutajñāna is experienced through it in a soul, but somewhere bhava-śrutajñāna is experienced without dravyaśruta also, as in the case of one sensed to four sensed living beings. It is also propounded as labdhyakṣara śrutajñāna. This kind of akṣarśrutajñāna is a minimum qualification for a soul without which a soul cannot remain a living being. It may turn into non-living thing."
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Significance and Nature of Śrutajñāna
Śrutajñāna is important for emancipation. When right view, right knowledge and right conduct are considered as the path of emancipation, role of śrutajñāna as right knowledge is considered significant. Although matijñāna, avadhijñāna and manaḥparyāya-jñāna are also the right knowledge but śrutajñāna is more important for the achievement of kevalajñāna and emancipation from sorrows. Śrutajñāna may be defined as ātma-jñāna or knowledge of the self. Matijñāna has a limit to know the outer world, but it can help in manifestation of śrutajñāna which is an instrument to know the self. It is not produced through sense-organs. Tattvārthasūtra says
15
"see, Viseṣāvaṣyakabhāṣya, verses 110 to 117

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"śrutamanīndriyasya”." Here 'anindriya' word denotes a mind and a soul. It can be called as ātma-jñāna. Thus śrutajñāna is produced through mind and soul. It is the only knowledge which is important for conquering one self. It shows us that attachment and aversion are not beneficial for a soul. Samaņasuttam Mentions:
“The knowledge by which ultimate truth is known, mind is restrained and soul is purified, is the right knowledge in Jaina tradition. The knowledge, by which a person gets detachment from worldly things and is attracted towards auspicious things and friendliness to the all beings is considered as right knowledge in Jain tradition."
This knowledge can be named as śrutajñāna. Śrutajñāna is an inner light of one self which leads him to right conduct. Acārānga sūtra says:
“A soul is a knower and a knower is a soul”. Knowledge is a quality and power of a soul to cognize the things and oneself and it is never destroyed.
It is important to note that śrutajñāna is never fully obscured. It is experienced by every soul to some extent. It has been accepted in Višeșāvaśyakabhāsya, Sațkhaņdāgama and Gommațasāra that an infinitesimal part of kevalajñāna or śrutajñāna is always un-obscured in
a soul. "
"Tattvārthasūtra 2.22 "Samaņasuttam, verse 252 and 253
jeņa taccam vibujjhejja, jeņa cittam nirujjhadi 1 jena attā visujjhejja, tam ņāņam jinasāsane II jena rāgā virajejja, jena seasu rajjadi !
jena mitti pabhāvejja, tam nāņam jiņasāsane II "Acārānga sutra, 1.5.5 sūtra 177 "Je ātā se viņņātā, je viņņātā, se ātā", (1) Şarkhandăgam 5.5.48 : akkharassānantimo bhāgo niccugghadio. (2) Gommațasāra (Jivakānda, verse 320): havadi hu savva-jahannam niccugghadam ņirāvaraṇam.

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Viseșāvaśyakabhāsya propounds that śrutajñāna is actually a soul.” In the view of Tīrthankaras, it is a characteristic of a soul as Maladhāri Hemcandra says śrutajñāna is a mode (paryāya) of a soul." Kinds of Śrutajñāna
The Nandīsūtra and Avaśyakaniryukti mention the following fourteen categories of śrutajñāna: 1. Akşara śruta - It is imperishable and divided into
three types- samjñākşara, vyañjanākṣara and labdhyaksara. Samjñākṣara means a particular shape and form of a letter of script. All the words of different languages with particular meaning are called vyañjanākṣara. Labdhyākṣara is the minimum characteristic of a living being and it is considered as bhāva śruta. Anakşaraśruta - It is defined as the symbols of bodily activities. Bhatta Akalanka includes inferential
knowledge in it. 3. Samjñīśruta- It is defined as mental power of retaining
the past experiences and speculation for future plans
etc. 4. Asasjñīśruta- Contrary to samjñīśruta is called
asasjñīšruta 5. Samyak śruta- The scriptures composed by the
Gañadharas or other ācāryas having the knowledge of 10 pūrvas is called samyak śruta.
** Viśeşavaśyakabhäsya, verse 99 "suyam tu paramatthao jivo", "Vțitti of Maladhāri on Viśeşāvaśyaka bhāśya, verse 98 - ātmanaḥ pariņāmasca śrutajñānamiśyate,

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8.
6. Mithyāśruta - Non-Jaina scriptures like the
Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa are called as mithyāśruta, but this is not a proper notion. In the absence of right view, every scripture may turn into
mithyāśruta. 7. Sādi śruta- According to the stand point of modes
(paryāyārthika naya) śrutajñāna may have a beginning. Anādi śruta - According to the stand point of substance (dravyārthika naya) śrutajñāna is not having any beginning. Saparyavasita - In the view of paryāyārthika naya it
can have an end. 10. Aparyavasita- In the view of dravyārthika naya it is
endless. 11. Gamika- The śruta which repeats the same text again
and again is known as gamika śruta. Drsțivadā is
considered in this category. 12. Agamika- The śruta composed in various meters and
prose is agamika. It is also known as kālika śruta. 13. Argapravişța- Twelve āgamas composed by
Gañadharas are called as angapravişta śruta. 14. Anangapravişta- The āgamas composed by the
ācāryas other than Gañadharas are called as anaņgapravișța śruta or angabāhya śruta.
Şațkhandāgama defines śrutajñāna on the basis of alphabets and their mutual combination and provides 20 types of śrutajñāna as-1. Paryāya, 2. Paryāya samāsa,

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3. Akşara, 4. Akṣara samāsa, 5. Pada, 6. Pada samāsa, 7. Sanghata, 8. Sanghata samāsa, 9. Pratipatti, 10. Pratipatti samāsa, 11. Anuyogadvāra, 12. Anuyogadvāra samāsa, 13. Prabhṛta Prabhṛta, 14. Prabhṛta prabhṛta samāsa, 15. Prabhṛta 16. Prabhṛta samāsa, 17. Vastu, 18. Vastu samāsa, 19. Purva and 20. Purva samāsa.
22
Here, Virasena (9th century) in his Dhavalā commentary defines akṣara śrutajñāna as eternal knowledge which is never obscured even in labhdhyaparyāptaka nigoda being." Labhdhyakṣara knowledge is found incessant in every living being. In Gommaṭasāra Jīvakānḍa, it has been categorized under paryāya śrutajñāna." Digambara and Śvetāmbara texts accept that this knowledge is always unobscured in a living being and it is pre-requisite for every living being. This fact proves the eternal nature of śrutajñāna.
Modern scholar Nagin J shah (2003: p. 37) thinks that concepts of matijñāna and srutajñāna have been developed on the basis of Vedic thought of śravana and manana. This thought of Nagin J Shah does not seem proper in the context of Jainism, because in Jainism matijñāna precedes śrutajñāna while in the Vedic tradition śravana precedes manana. one more point discards his view. In Jainism matijñāna is considered as a sensuous knowledge, but in Vedic tradition
"Şaṭkhandāgama 5.5.48, Detail about these kinds may be seen in its
commentary 'Dhavala'.
23 Dhavală commentary on Satkhanḍāgama 5.5.48: akkharassäṇantimabhāgo
niccugghadio.
24
see, Gommatasära (Jivakända), verse 320

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manana is limited up to mind's activity. Kanhaiya Lal Lodha (2010 : p.16) propounds that śrutajñāna is a knowledge which differentiates between wished and unwished, acceptable and to be abondoned elements. It is a natural knowledge of a soul and helpful in eternal liberation. Conclusion 1. Śrutajñāna is an essential characteristic of every
worldly soul. In the presence of right view (samyagdarśana) it is considered as samyag śrutajñāna and in the presence of perverted view
(mithyātva) it is considered as śruta-ajñāna. 2. Generally śrutajñāna is considered as a verbal
testimony. It includes scriptures, canons or sermons of an authentic teacher and the knowledge originated
through them. 3. It is preceded by matijñāna. Matijñāna is manifested
through sense organs and mind, whereas śrutajñāna requires the prior occurrence of matijñāna. This śrutajñāna comes into action after acquiring ability through the subsidence-cum-destruction of
śrutajñānavaraṇa karma. 4. It is not generated only by verbal cause; every
matijñāna may lead to śrutajñāna. Matijñāna is an instrumental cause (nimitta karaṇa) and a soul itself is a natural cause for (upādāna kāraṇa) manifestation of śrutajñāna. According to Jinabhadragaņi, avadhijñāna and manaḥparyāya jñāna may also be the instrumental causes of śrutajñāna.

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5. Śrutajñāna is the only knowledge which has a similarity with kevalajñāna and which can lead to the emancipation from all sorrows and the manifestation of kevalajñāna.
6. If śrutajñāna is accepted as verbal or scriptural knowledge, it is not possible in one-sensed to foursensed living beings and in some of the five-sensed beings also. Hence, there must be a different nature of śrutajñāna. Jinabhadragani has suggested that bhāva śrutajñāna is found in the one sensed to four sensed living beings which can occur directly without dravyaśruta in those living beings.
7. Śrutajñāna is the knowledge which leads a person to decide distinction between the real needs and the futile wants in life. It enables a person in attaining detachment from the worldly allurements and motivates him to proceed towards the salvation from sorrows. It is a big power for spiritual development of a soul. When it is obscured or perverted, a soul cannot decide the right path.
Bibliography
Acārāngasutra (first part), Beawer: Agama Prakashana Samati, 4th edition, 2010
Gommtasāra (Jivakända) of Nemicandra, Agās: Shri Paramashruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1985
Pravacanasara of Kundakunda, Prākṛit. Agās: Shri Paramashrutra Prabhavaka Mandala, 1984
Sabhāṣya-Tattvārthādhigamasutram of Umāsvati, Agās: Shri Paramashruta Prabhavaka Maṇḍala, 1992

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Samanasuttam, Varanasi Sarvaseva-sangha-Prakashan, Rajghat,
80
1975.
Samayasara of Kundakunda, Agās: Śrī Parama-shruta Prabhāvaka Mandala, 1982
Sarvärthasiddhi of Pujyapada Devanandin, New Delhi : Bharatiya Jñāna pitha, 15th edition, 2009
Satkhandagama of Puspadanta Bhūtabali with Dhavala commentary of Virasena (Part 13), Ed. Heeralal Jain, Bhelasa, 1955
Śrī Nandisutram, Jaipur Samyagjñāna Pracharak Mandala, 2nd
edition 2009
Tattvarthadhigamasūtram (with Commentary of Haribhadrasūri), ed. Vijayanemi Chandra Sūri, Jamnagar Shri Harsh Puşpāmṛta Jain Granthamālā, volume 369, Vikram Samvat 2056
Tattvärthasūtra of Umāsvāti, Hindi commentary by pt., Sukhlal Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parshvanatha Vidyapitha, 5th edition, 2001
Tattvärthavārtika of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain, New Delhi, Bharatiya Jñānpīṭha, 8th edition, 2008
Tattvärthaślokavārtikālankara, Part 3, Hindi translation by Gaṇinī Supārshvamati Mātāji, Kolkata, Vikram Samvat 2066
Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya (Part-I), of Jinabhadragani with commentary of Maladhārī Hemacandra, Mumbai : Divya Darshan Trust, 68, Gulabvādi, Vikram Samvat, 2039
Modern Sources
Lodhā, Kanhaiya Lal, 2010; Bandha Tattva, Jaipur : Prakrit Bhārāti Academy.
Shah, Nagin J, 2003- Jaina Darśana mem Śraddhā (samyag darśana), Matijñana Aura Kevalajñāna ki Vibhāvanā, Ahmedabad: sanskrit-sanskriti Granthamālā.
Shastri Indra Chandra, 1990; Jaina Epistemology, Varāṇasi : P.V. Research Institute.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines
[Part I of this article gives an account of the historical development of the Jaina logic and epistemology and Parts II deals with the contributions of Jaina philosophers regarding epistemological doctrines.]
PART - I A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY AND
LOGIC Epistemology : Theory of knowledge
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with origination of knowledge, its nature, sources and validity etc. and logic is a core area of epistemology which deals with valid arguments and inference for others and the concepts of consistency, inconsistency, truth and falsity. The term epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. Jñānamīmāmsā and Pramāņa mīmāmsā. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. Pramāņa is not absolutely different from knowledge or cognition. Particularly in Jaina tradition, pramāņa is always accepted as a kind of cognition or knowledge. Hence, all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of pramāņa. When we discuss pramāņa, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge.

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There is only one difference in pramāṇa and right knowledge (samyagjñāna) that the right knowledge depends on right view (samyag darśana), where as pramāņa does not reqire any such condition. Introduction to Pramāņa
Pramāņa is an instrumental knowledge which is devoid of doubt (samśaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indetermination (anadhyavasāya). In Jaina philosophy pramāṇa has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of pramāņa. Although at the early time of Tattvārthasūtra, there was no such difference between pramāna and right knowledge. Umāsvāti, the author of Tattvārthasūtra had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of pramāṇa without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and pramāņa. He kept matijñāna (sensuous knowledge) and śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding matijñāna) under the category of parokșa pramāņa (indirect organ of valid cognition), and the other three types of knowledge i.e. avadhijñāna (visual intuition), manahparyāya jñāna (intuition of mental modes) and kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge) were placed in the category of pratyakșa pramāņa (perception).*
'Hemacandra, vrtti on PM 1.1.1 : prakarșeņa samśayādivyavachedena mīyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramāņam pramāyām sādhakatamam. (also in NKC of Prabhacandra, Vol. I p. 48.10) ?PT 1.2: Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāņam. Five types of knowledge are : 1. Matijñāna (Sensous knowledge) 2. Śrutajñāna (Scriptural knowledge and knowledge of the self) 3. avadhijñāna (Visual intuition or clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyāyajñāna (intuition of mental modes of others)
5. Kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge ) "TS, 1.10.12 Tat pramānam, ādye pavokşam, pratyakşamanyat.

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Tattvārthasūtra is the first work of the Jaina system which propounded right knowledge as pramāņa (an organ of valid cognition) and divided it into two types, pratyakşa and parokșa. This division of pramāņa is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through a soul was called pratyakṣa pramāņa (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi sense was called as parokșa pramāņa (other than perception or indirect knowledge)
In Indian philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of parokşa. They explain that the knowledge that occurs directly through a soul without the help of sense organs comes under the concept of pratyakşa or direct cognition and the knowledge occurs through sense organs and mind is kept in the category of indirect cognition (parokşa pramāņa).
The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accepted the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception (sāmvyāvahārika pratyakşa). This development is seen first in the Viśeșāvaśyakabhāşya of Jinabhadragaại Kșamāśramaņa. He says jam indiyamaņobhavam tam samvavahāra-paccakkham (Viśeșāvasyakabhāșya, 95) which means knowledge occuring through sense organs and quasi sense is sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa (empirical perception). Bhasta Akalanka and other

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Jaina logicians followed him. Hence, they considered two types of pratyakşa as mukhya pratyakșa and sāņvyāvahārika pratyakşa. The perception that occured directly through a soul comes under the category of mukhya pratyakșa and the perception that occured through sense organs and mind comes under the category of sāmvyāvahārika pratyakșa (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jaina logicians entered into a dialogue with other Indian logicians. Pramāņa in canonical literature
It may be noted that in sthānāngasūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra, the word pramāṇa was used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that pramāņa there in i.e. dravyapramāņa (measurement as substance), kşetrapramāņa (measurement as space), kālapramāņa (measurement as time) and bhāvapramāņa (measurement as modes). Somewhere in the Bhagavatīsūtra (also known as Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra) and Anuyogadvārasūtra the four types of pramāņa propounded by the Nyāyasūtra are also mentioned as pratyakşa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and āgama (testimony)". These four types of pramāņa were also mentioned in Upāyahrdaya an old text of Buddhism.' It sounds that Buddhist and Jaina philosophers developed their own pramāņaśāstra after Nyāya philosophy.
In the Sthānāngasūtra these four types of pramāņa are mentioned as the four types of hetu - (Sthānāngasūtra, 245,
Bhagavatisūtra 5.3.192 (In ST) Pamaņe cauvihe pāņņatte, tamjahā paccakkhe anumaņe ovammeāgame, Jahā aṇuogadare. UH, p. 13: Atha katividham pramānam? caturvidham prāmaņam. Pratyakşamanumānamupamānamāgamasceti.

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Suttāgame, p. 215). Sthānāngasūtra has also mentioned three types of vyavasāya i.e. pratyakșa, prātyayika and anugāmī - (Sthānāngasūtra, 245). Paņdita Dalsukha Mālvaniyā (1966 : 138-139) has mentioned that these three types of vyavasāya have got a place in Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapatākā as the developed form of pramāņa i.e. pratyakșa, anumāna and āgama.
It is true that the seeds and roots of the Jaina concept of pramāņa are found in Jaina canons. The Anuyogadvārasūtra and Sthānangāsūtra have great importance in this context. In the Sthānāngasūtra perception is divided into two types i.e. kevala and nokevala. In the later development of pramāņaśāstra the Jaina logicians termed these types as sakala and vikala perception. In the Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandisūtra perceptual knowledge is divided into two types, i.e. indriya pratyakṣa and no-indriya pratyakşa. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception.
This division of perception is not mentioned in the Tattvārthasūtra. So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraganin (6th century) developed a concept of sāmvyāvahārika pratyakşa as mentioned earlier, on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the Nandisūtra and Sthānāngasūtra. Contribution of Jaina Logicians before Akalanka
Jaina epistemology regarding pramāṇa was actually systematized by Bhaťța Akalanka in the eight century CE. The main contribution of Bhatta Akalanka was to establish smrti (recollection), pratyabhijñāna (recognition) and tarka

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(inductive reasoning) as independent pramāņas under the category of parokşa. This is also one of the main contributions of Jaina epistemology to Indian philosophy.
Before the advent of Akalanka (720 - 780CE), Umāsvāti (2nd - 3rd century CE), Pūjyapāda Devanandin (5th century) Siddhasen Divākara (54 century) Samantabhadra (6 century), Mallavādi Kșamāśramaņa (5€ century), Jinabhadragaại Kșamā śramaņa (6" - 7th century), Simhasūri (7“ century), Sumati (7th - 8h century), Pātrasvāmī (7h century), Śrīdatta, Kumāranandin (74h century) and Haribhadrasūri (700 - 770 CE.) also contributed their mite to the Jaina epistemology to some extent. Ācārya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and the object.
Umāsvāti (or Umāsvāmī) systematized the Jaina epistemological doctrines to some extent. As earlier stated Umasvāti, in his Tattvārthasūtra mentioned two types of pramāņa - pratykșa and parokşa. He accepts the cognition that occurred directly through a soul, without any help of sense organs and quasi sense is perception (pratykşa) and rest of cognition is parokşa. On this basis matijñāna and śrutajñāna were kept into parokșa pramāņa and the other three kinds of knowledge (avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala) into the category of pratyakṣa pramāņa. Pujyapada Devanandin, in his Sarvārthasiddhi has explained the views of Umāsvāmī.
Siddhasena Divākara was a great logician who flourished before Akalanka in the fifth century CE. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as Nyāyāvatāra. It is a systematic work comprising 32 kārikās (stanzas), which presents a brief description of Jaina pramāņa śāstra. S.C.

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Vidyābhuşaņa mentioned Siddhasena Divākara as the father of Jaina Logic and recognized his Nyāyāvatāra as the first work on Jaina logic. (A History of Indian Logic p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddharşiganin, a philosopher of the ninth century wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. Siddhasena Divākara tells about pramāņa-prameya-vyavasthā (systematization regarding organ of valid cognition and knowable objects), that although it is eternal and famous for all its users, it is presented again to remove ignorance about its nature."
"This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even thought it is propounded here."
"Objective of defining these famous valid organs of knowledge, is to remove delusions or illusions of the people of deluded minds."
M.A. Dhaky (1995 : 43-46) is of the view that Siddharşigațin, the commentator of Nyāyāvatāra’ was himself the writer of Nyāyāvatāra, but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddharşigaộin (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned smộti, pratyabhijñāna and tarka as pramāņa because before the advent of Siddharşiganin, Bhaťța Akalanka emphatically established them as pramāņa. Piotr Balcerowicz (2008 : Preface) has assumed that the author of Nyāyāvatāra is Mahamati
'NA verse 32 and 3:
Pramāņādi - vyavastheyamanadinidhanātmikā, Sarva samvyavaharatrnām prasiddhāpi prakirtītā. Prasiddhānām pramāņānām lakṣaṇoktau prayojanam Tadvyāmohanivrtih syād vyāmudha manasāmiha.

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Siddhasena, who lived between circa 710-780 and who is different from Siddhasena Diväkra, the authour of the Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa, a work composed before Dignāga (480-540). According to him Siddhasena Mahamati was probably slightly senior to Akalanka (720-780). Balcerowicz has given arguments to prove his notion. Here it can be said that Nyāyāvatāra was constructed before Akalanka's works, because it does not mention about smrti, pratyabhijñāna and tarka pramāņa; but it was written after Dignaga (480-540) and Dharmakirti (600-660), because Nyāyāvatāra criticizes them.
Śāntisūri of Purṇatalagacchīya wrote a varttika and commentary on Nyāyāvatāra, which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Śantisūri defined perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. indriya pratyakṣa (sensuous perception), anīndriya pratyakṣa (quasi-sensuous perception) and yogaja pratyakṣa (Nyāyāvatāra vārttīka 17). He defined vividness (vaiśada) of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as 'this' (Nyāyāvatāra vārtṭīka,17). This definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his Pramāṇamīmāmsā (1.1.14)
Sanmatitarka-prakarana of Siddhasenasūri is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely - Naya mīmāmsā, Jñānamīmāmsā and Jñeya mīmāmsā. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism.
One of the prominent philosophers, Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa flourished in the fifth century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenents in his famous work

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Dvādaśāra-nayacakra. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Simhasūri's commentary on it is also an authoritative work for understanding Dvādaśāranayacakra.
Like Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish Anekāntavāda or non absolutism, but ocasionally he discussed some concepts of pramāņa śāstra also. His Yuktyanuśāsana, Āptamīmāņsā and Svayambhūstotra are the main works.
Sumati, Pātrasvāmī, Śrīdatta and Kumāranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 74 and 8th centuries, whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Pātrasvāmī were renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician śāntarakṣita (8th century) in his work Tattvasamgraha. Pātrasvāmī's Trilakṣaṇakadarthana was a famous trastise in which the hetulakṣaṇa of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyānanda mentioned in Tattvārthaślokavārttīka about Jalpanirņaya the work of Śrīdatta and in Pramāņa parīkņā, he mentioned Vādanyāya, the work of Kumāranandin.
In the eighth century Haribhadra Sūri (700 - 770), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authored several works. His famous philosophical works are Anekāntajayapatākā, Šāstrāvārtā samuccaya and Saddarśana śamuccaya. Commentary of Gunaratnasūri is famous on Şaddarśana- samuccaya - and commentary of Yaśovijaya (17th century) is also renowned on Šāstrāvārta samuccaya.

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Thus from Umāsvāti down to Haribhadrasūri, the predecessors of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology.
Bhaṭṭa Akalanka's contribution
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The advent of Bhatta Akalanka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jaina logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 CE as is upheld by Pandita Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya in the introduction to his Akalankagranthatrayam. Bhaṭṭa Akalanka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Karṇakagomi and Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He authored two commentaries entitled Tattvärthavārtika and Aṣṭaśatī on Tattvārthasutra of Umāsvāti and Āptamīmāmsā of Samantabhadra respectively. In the Tattvārthavārtika Bhaṭṭa Akalanka has discussed the definition of pramāṇa and accepted that pramāņa (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognizes the object previously cognized. He gave the instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject matter of Tattvārthasūtra is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge, commentator Akalanka discussed the definition of pramāṇa propounded by other Indian systems also. Aṣṭaśatī is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundered anuştubh metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialties of Akalanka's style and they are more distinct in Aṣṭaśatī. Akalanka included some new topics in the commentary and threw light on pramāṇaśastra explaining the Karika No. 101 of

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Aptamimamsā. He seems impressed by the Buddhist definition of pramāņa also, because he used the term avisamvada for defining pramāṇa. He says that pramāņa is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy (visamvāda) and indetermination.
Bhaṭṭa Akalanka wrote four independent works viz. Laghiyastraya along with the vṛtti, Nyāyā-viniścaya along with the vṛtti, Pramāṇa-samgraha and Siddhiviniscaya along with the vṛtti. All these four works mainly deal with epistemology and logic. Laghiyastraya is a composite work having three manuals (prakaraṇas) viz. (i) Pramāņa praveśa (ii) Naya praveśa (iii) pravacana praveśa. Pramāņa praveśa contains four chapters on (i)nature of pramāņa (ii) classification (iii) object, and (iv) resultant. Naya pravesa is mainly devoted to the description of Nayas. Pravacana praveśa, though it begins with the definition of pramāṇa, naya and nikṣepa, mainly deals with śrutajñāna, a kind of parokṣa pramāṇa.
Nyāyaviniścaya, another work of Akalanka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony.
Pramana- samgraha, an important work of Akalanka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. Siddhiviniścaya is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here pramāņa as siddhi. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject matter. Akalanka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy-(Siddhiviniścaya 1.19)
If we summarize the contribution of Akalanka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows:

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1. It was he who for the first time established recollection
(smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna) and inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramāņa. He placed these under the category of parokșa pramāņa. He propounded that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (anadhyavasāya), then these are very much the means of valid cognition. He upholds two types of pratyakșa as sāmvyāvahārika (empirical) and mukhya (transcendental). The types of matijñāna such as avagraha (receiving), īhā (speculation) avāya (perceptual judgement) and dhāraņā (retention) were included by him in Sāņvyāvahārika- pratykșa and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in
canonical literature. 3. He accepted differences between matijñāna and
srutajñāna according to the canonical tradition and placed srutajñāna under the category of parokșa pramāņa.
Śrutajñāna is known in epistemology as āgama pramāņa. 4. He included upamāna pramāņa (comparison) in the
recognition (pratyabhijñāna) of similarity which he conceptualized taking Samjñā of Umāsvāti's,
Tattvārthasūtra (1.13) as its basis. 5. He discussed all the epistemological terms, such as hetu,
(probans) sādhya (probandum), drsțānta, vyāpti etc. 6. He introduced some new hetus such as kāraña (cause)
pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. 7. Akalanka discussed naya and nikṣepa also which have
formed an integral part of epistemology.

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Philosophers after Akalanka
The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhatta Akalanka are : Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya, Māņikyanandin, Vādirāja, Abhayadevasūri, Prabhācandra, Vādidevasūri, Hemacandra, Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa, Guṇaratnasūri, Mallişena, Vimaladāsa and Yasovijaya. Since it is not possible to discuss the contributions of all these logicians, it would be proper to appraise the contributions of the prominent logicians.
Vidyananda (775-840), the first commentator of Akalanka, was a profound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina pramāna śāstra logically. He wrote three commentaties viz. Tattvärthaślokavārttika on the Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti, Aṣṭasahasrī on Aṣṭasati of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka and Yuktyanuśāśanālaṁkāra on Yuktyanuśāsana of Samantabhadra.
In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. Tattvärthaślokavārṭīkā, a commentary on the Tattvārthasutra, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection (smaraṇa), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), reasoning (tarka), inference (anumāna) and testimony (agama). Aṣṭasahāsrī having thousand stanzas expounds Aptamīmāmsā of Samantabhadra and Aṣṭaśatī of Akalanka, but Aṣṭaśahasrī has become a kaṣṭasahasri, having thousands troubles because its comprehension is an uphill task. Yuktyanuśasanālaǹkāra is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general.

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Apart from his commentaries, Vidyānanda wrote six independent works, viz. Vidyānandamahodaya, Aptaparīkṣā, Patraparīkṣā, Satyaśāsana -parīkṣā and Śripurapārśvanāthastotra. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particularly his Pramāṇa-parikṣā is fully devoted to discuss the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyananda defines pramāṇa as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinate cognition. Vidyānanda has also discussed the defintion of probans (hetu) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyāyikas who consider hetu's trairūpya (having three forms) and pañcarūpya (having five forms) respectively as its essential characteristics.
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Pramāṇa-parīkṣā is really the first composite and systematic work which explains the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly.
The second commentator of Akalanka was Anantavirya. There are four Anantavītyas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantvīrya who flourished during A.D. 950 to 990 and wrote commentatries on Pramāṇasamgraha and Siddhiviniscaya of Akalanka. Commentary on Pramāṇasamgraha is known as Pramānasamgrahabhāṣaya and commentary on Siddhiviniścaya is known as Siddhiviniscayatikā. Pramāṇasamgrahabhāṣya is not yet available, but its reference is found in the Siddhiviniścayatīka. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding epistemology.

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Māņikyanandin ( 993 -1053 CE) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled parikṣāmukha which present the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhācandra, a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled Prameyakamala- mārtanda. Laghu Anantavīrya's prameyaratnamālā, Cārukīrti's Prameyaratnālankāra and sāntivarņi's Prameyakanthikā are also famous commentaries on Parikṣāmukha. All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic.
Vādirāja (1025 CE) was also a commentator of Akalanka. He wrote a commentary on Nyāyaviniścaya of Akalanka known as Nyāyaviniscayavivaraņa. This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand anuştubh stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumārila. Prabhākara, Mandanamiśra, Vyomasiva, Bhāsarvajña etc. and refutes them cogently. Another work of Vādirāja on Jaina epistemology is Pramāņanirnaya. It is an independent work on Jaina logic (nyāya). Vādirāja propounds only two types of parokșa pramāna as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference.
Abhayadevasūri, the commentator of Siddhasena's Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa was a disciple of Rājagacchiya Pradyumnasūri. Pandita Sukhalāla Sanghavī and Pandita Becaradāsa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the tenth century and first half of the eleventh century. Mahendra Kumāra Nyāyācārya considers him belonging to the last part of the eleventh century of Vikrama Samvat, but he does not clearly say who was earlier, between Abhayadevasūri and

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Prabhācandra. It seems that Abhayadevasūri's commentary on Sanmatitarka was written earlier than the works of Prabhācandra because the issues raised in the Tattvabodhavidhāyinī (commentary on Sanmatitarka) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhācandra. The commentary of Abhayadeva, explains naya, jñāna and jñeya extensively. Abhayadevasūri was a well versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second part (kānḍa) of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology.
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Prabhācandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled Nyāya-kumudacandra and Prameya-kamalamārtaṇḍa. Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa is a commentary on Parikṣāmukha of Māņikyanandin and Nyāyakumudacandra is a commentary on Laghiyastraya of Akalanka. Pandita Kailasacandra Śastrī places him during 950 to 1020 CE in the introduction to the first part of Nyāya-kumudacandra and Pandita Mahendra Kumar Nyāyacārya has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 CE. Prabhācandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systems and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed prima facie views (pūrvapakṣa) of other works like Tattvārthavṛitti, Śākaṭāyana-nyāsa, Śābdāmbhojabhāskara, Pravacāṇasārasarojabhāskara, Gadyakathākośa, Mahāpurāṇa- țippaṇa, Ratnakaraṇḍatīka, Kriyākalāpaṭīka and Ātmānuśāsanatilaka, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authorship of some of these works.
Although Prameya-kamala-mārtanda comes under the

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category of a commentary, it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhācandra has also discussed all the other Indian systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism.
In his other commentary Nyāyakumudacandra, Prabhācandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of pramāņa in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries.
Like Māņikyanandin, A Digambar Ācārya, Vādidevasūri was the first Śvetāmbar Ācārya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled Pramāņa-nayatattvāloka. Vādidevasuri differs from Māņikyanandin on the topics of kevali-kavalāhāra, emancipation of a woman etc. Vādidevasuri's Pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than Parikṣāmukha, dealing with naya and vada also. Vādidevasuri was the first logician who systematized the rules of vada according to Jaina views. Chapter on naya summarizes the Jaina perspective of naya. A profound philosopher of the seventeenth century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Ācārya Yaśovijaya, has followed his Pramaņa-naya- tattvāloka in his Jaina Tarka Bhāsā. Vādidevasuri himself wrote a valuable commentary on Pramaņa-naya- tattvāloka as Syādvāda-ratnākara. It is a voluminous commentary having eighty-four thousand anuştubh-metres. The title Syādvāda-ratnākara is significant by its subject matter. Vādidevasuri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhācandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. Syādvādaratnākara is of

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paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator among the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects and cogently proved the validity of kāraṇa, pūrvacara, uttaracara, sahacara and vyāpya hetus (Probans) and coined the two new terms tiryak sāmānya and urdhvatā sāmānya in the context of Pratyabhijñāna of prameya.
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Hemacandrasūri, known as Kalikālasarvajña, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā has established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines pramāņa as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any neccesity of inserting 'sva' word in the definition of pramāṇa, because in the opinion of Hemacandra Svanirnaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition.' Prior to Hemcandra pramāņa was defined as svaparavyavasāyi, svaparāvabhāsaka etc. which means pramāņa is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Manikyanandin inserted the word 'apūrva' in the definition of pramāṇa." Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognized does not lack the status of pramāṇa exactly as the cognition which takes
10
'PM 1.1.2 Samyagarthanirnayaḥ pramānam
'PM 1.1.3 Svanirnayaḥ sannapyalakṣaṇam, apramāṇe'pi bhāvāt 10PMk 1.1. Svāpūravārtha-vyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam. "PM 1.4 Grahiṣyamāṇagrāhiņa iva gṛhītagrāhinopi nāprāmāṇyam.

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note of what is to be cognized in future". He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of a previously cognized object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment from the angle of its modes.
Jineśvarasūri's Pramālakṣma (10"-11h centuries CE) Candrasenasūri's Utpādādisiddhi, Abhinavadharmabhūṣaṇa's Nyāyadīpikā, Narendrasena's Pramāņa prameyakalikā are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature.
In the seventeenth century Ācārya Yaśovijaya, who emerged as a prominent philosopher, wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are Jainatarkabhāṣā, Jñānabindu,Aşțasahasrītātparyavivarana and śāstravārtāsamuccayațīkā. Among these works the former two are independent treatises and the latter are the commentaries. Aștasahasrītātparyavivaraṇa is a commentary on Așțasahasrī of Vidyānanda and Šāstravārtāsamuccayațīkā is a commentary on Šāstravārtāsamuccaya of Haribhadrasūri.
To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the second century CE to the seventeenth century CE. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, varttikas, bhāśyas and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Nyāya logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted here:

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A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambar and Śvetāmbar joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jaina philosophers were well versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for the Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponents' views was based on cogent
reasons.
B.
If the works of Sumati, Kumāranandin and Patrakesari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten.
C.
D.
E.
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F.
Umāsvāti was the first philosopher who recognized right knowledge as pramāņa and classified the pramāņa into two types i.e. pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa. After the establishment of right knowledge as pramāņa all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramāṇa.
The division of knowledge as indriya pratyakṣa and no indriya - pratyakṣa as found in the Nandisutra seems a later development.
Although Nyāyāvatāra is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhaṭṭa Akalana more systematized it. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramāņa under the category of paroksa pramāṇa. He introduced kāraṇa, pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans.
The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (sāmvyāvahārika

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pratyakşa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyakṣa in the Nandisūtra. In the Nandisūtra the concept of anīndriya pratyakșa (quasi sense) is not mentioned. The Nandisutura mentions about no- indriya pratyakşa, but this term was used to denote transcendental perception. The Mukhya pratyakșa was given a new name as pāramārthika pratyakşa by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as sakala and vikala pratyakşa on the basis of a division found in the Sthānānga sūtra as
kevala and no-kevala. H. The Śvetāmbar logicians are unanimous in accepting the
validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized. Whereas Digambar logicians like Akalanka, Māņikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of the opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramāņa that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable of knowing the all objects. Umāsvāti says that
mind is only an instrument ofśrutajñāna. As stated in the beginning of the article, Jaina philosophers maintained Jaina epistemology on the foundation of description of knowledge found in Jaina canons. A brief survey regarding the development of the division or types of pramāna is as follows:

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Development Regarding Division of pramāņa
(1) In The Anuyogadvārasūtra
Pratyakşa (Perception)
1. Indriya Pratyakşa
2. No-Indriya pratyakşa
Avadhi
1. Bhavapratyaya
2.Yathoktanimitta
Pratyakşa (Perception)
Manaḥparyaya
1. Rjumati
Anumana (Inference)
2. Vipulamati
Pramǎna
2. Seşavat
3. Drstasǎdharmyavat
Note:- Bhagavatīsūtra (5.3.192) and Sthānāngasūtra (430) also quote above four types of pramāna. The division found in Anuyogadvārasūtra is much identical with that of Nyayasutra of Gotam and the Buddhist text Upayahṛdaya.
(2) In The Tattvärthasūtra of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi (2nd century CE)
1. Pūrvavat 1. Sǎdharmyopanita
Upamāna (Comparison)
Pramāņa
2. Vaidharmyopanita 2. Lokottara
Kevalajñāna
Matijñāna
Parokşa (Indirect)
1. Avagraha
2. Iha
3. Avaya
Agama (Testimony)
1. Laukika
4. Dhāraṇā
Srutajñāna
1. Angabahya
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2. Angapravişta

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(3) In The Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena (5" or 8th Century CE)
Pramāņa
Pratyakşa
Sămvyāvahārika
1. IndriyaPratyakşa
Pratyakşa
2. Ant ndriya pratyakşa
1. Svärtha
2. Parǎrtha
(4) Bhatta Akalanka (8th Century CE)
Mukhya
1. Avadhi
2. Manaḥparyaya
3. Kevalajñāna
Pramāņa
Parokşa
Inference (Anumǎna)
1. Svärtha
2. Parǎrtha
Smrti Pratyabhijñāna
Scripture (Agama)
Parokşa
Tarka
HH
Anumana
1. Svärtha
2. Parǎrtha
Agama (Śruta)
Note :-Almost all the posterior Jaina philosophers maintained above division of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka with minor moderation as below:
1. Vidyananda propounded two types of Pratyabhijñāna : ekatva and sādṛśya. Māņikyanandin added two more types-vailakṣanya and Prātiyaugika.
2. Vādidevasūri used a new word 'Pāramārthika' pratyakṣa in place of 'Mukhya' and provided its two kinds- (1) Sakala

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and (ii) Vikala. Sakala pāramārthika perception is Kevalajñāna and vikala pāramārthika perception is of two types - (i) Avadhijñāna (ii) Manaḥparyāyajñāna.
PART II AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTION TO
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES The fivefold knowledge i.e. matijñāna(sensuous knowledge), śrutajñāna(scriptural or verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (visual intuition), manaḥparyāyajñāna (intuition of mental modes) and kevala-jñāna (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was maintained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold pramāṇas.
Now we should highlight the points on which Jaina logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology and logic regarding pramāņa. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians are as follows: (i) Definition of pramāņa and its nature illuminating the self
and the object. (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as an independent
pramāņa. (iii) Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijñāna) as an
independent pramāņa. (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as an
independent pramāņa. Definition of probans (hetu) as incompatibility with the contradictory (anyathānupapatti).

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(vi) Establishment of new probans such as kāraņa,
pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. (vii) Particular view about the members of syllogism
(parārthānumāna) (viii) Theory of standpoints (nayavāda) and sevenfold
predication. (ix) Nature of prameya (object) is substance-cum-mode
dravyaparyāyātmaka or sāmānyaviseșātmaka.
Now we shall discuss the above and clarify the thoughts ofthe Jaina logicians about these points. (i) Definition of pramāņa:
Regarding the definition of pramāņa Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of pramāņa accepted by them is the nature of illuminating the self and the object. Some definitions given by Jaina logicians are as follows: (i) pramāņam svaparābhāsi jñānam
bādhavivarjitam-Nyāyāvatāra, 1 Pramāņa is a cognition revealing itself and the other object
without any hindrance. (ii) Svaparāvabhāsakam yathā pramāņam bhuvi
buddhilakṣaṇam.-Svayambhūstotra., 63 Pramāņa is a knowledge illuminating itself and the other
object in the world. (iii) Vyavasāyātmakam jñānamātmārthagrāhakam
matam.-Laghīyastraya, 60 - - The knowledge which determinates the self and the other object is pramāņa.

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(iv) Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam
pramānam.-Pramāṇanayataftvāloka, 1.2 The knowledge determining itself and the object is
pramāņa. (v) Samyagarthanirņayaḥ pramāņam.-Pramāņa-mīmāmsā,
1.1.2
Right judgement of an object is pramāņa. (vi) Svāpūrvārthavyavasayātmakam jñānam pramānam. –
Parīkşāmukha, 1.1 Judgemental knowledge ot the self and the other object
hither to unknown, is pramaņa. (vii) Avisamvādakam pramāņam.-Laghīyastryavrtti, 22
Judgemental knowledge (free from wrongness) is pramāņa.
With above definitions, it is clear that Jaina logicians accept pramāna as definitive cognition, which is always savikalpaka. It is illuminating the self and the object.
The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the senseorgan and an object never can be a pramāņa. They say that like another object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a preeminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory." Therefore Jaina thinkers propound that pramāņa is useful for accepting the desired object and rejecting the undesirable one, hence it must be a cognition." They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramāņa does not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is
" LTv 1.3 : sannikarşāderajñānasya prāmānyamanupapannam arthāntaravat. "PMk 1.2 : hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamartham hi pramānam tato jñānameva tat.

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always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object." It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyāyikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and Vijñānavādins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that a knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate, the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyakșa which is devoid of determination due to its nirvikalpatā. (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as pramāņa:
Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad). Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such:- vāsanod-bodha-hetu kā-tadityākārā smrtiḥ (Pramāņa-mīmāmsā. 1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhata Akalanka down to Vādidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhatta Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramāņa, because of its resultant (pramāņa-phala) as recognition (pratyabhijñāna)".
Although Prasastapāda has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidyā (right knowledge)," but he did not accept it as an
** PT 1.16-17 "LTv in AGT p.5: avisamvādasmrteh phałasya hetutvāt pramānam dhāraņā
smrtiḥ samjñāyāh. "He accepts four kinds of vidyā as pratyakşa, Laingika, smrti and arşa in the
pratyaksa prakarana of Praśastapādabhāşya p. 153

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independent pramāņa. Nyāyasūtra mentions it as an attribute of a soul", but none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an independent pramāņa. The Mīmāņsā philosophy does not consider it as pramāņa, because it cognizes the object previously cognized and pramāņa, in their opinion always cognizes the object previously not cognized. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramāņa then intention, repugnance (dveşa) etc. will also be considered as pramāņa and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with the past object. Jaina logicians have refuted all these arguments.
The Jaina logicians Akalanka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vādidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish recollection (smệti) as an independent pramāņa. Some of them are presented here." 1. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an
indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the pseudo-organ of valid cognition. The recollection which is corresponding to an activity(arthakriyā) is an indiscrepant knowledge. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid cognition, because it cognizes the object previously cognized, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognizes partly unknown object from the point of view of time as Māņikyanandin accepts in his
Parīksāmukha. " Nyāyasūtra 3.2.40 "For reference of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 297to 307

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3.
4.
Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately. Vidyānanda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recognition is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception cannot be proved. In this way, in absence of the pramāṇas object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of valid cognition and the knowable things will not exist in the world of reality. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write anything in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our empirical activities. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception.
6.

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7. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is
devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination, so is the
recollection, because it also has the same quality. 8. Without the memory of probans (hetu) and probandum
(sādhya) the invariable relation between them cannot be established. Nyāya-Vaiseșika philosopher Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyāyamañjarī says that recollection is not invalid because of the cognizance of the object previously cognized, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object." The reason of the invalidity of recollection pointed out in the Kārikā by Jayanta Bhațţa is also corresponding to the Buddhist view.Vidyānada replies to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. Prābhacandra replies in a different way that we the Jains do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma obscuring knowledge. Ācārya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition even without its emergence from an object, for example yogijñāna (perception by a yogi) is also a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object.
"Quoted in PM p. 5: na smrter apramāṇatvam grhīta-grāhitā -kstam I
api- tvanartha-janyatvam tad aprāmāṇya-kāraṇam II ZTSv1.13.27 :narthāj janmopapadyeta pratyakşasya smrteriva I
Tadvat sa eva tadbhāvādanyathā na kşaņa-kşayah II

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(iii) Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijñāna) as pramāna:
Another contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition (pratyabhijñāna) as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalanka has used the term samjñā, samjñāna and pratyabhijñāna for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (upamāna-pramāņa) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparison as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyānanda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (ekatvajñāna) and knowledge of similarity (sādrśyajñāna).
When the object previously perceived and recollected now is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity.” He is the same Devadatta (so'yam devadattaḥ) is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the gavaya (go-sadựśo gavayaḥ) is the example of knowledge of similarity.
Māņikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step further and recognizes recognition on its various aspects. He says that the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, itrelates to that." Former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from a cow is the example of tad
"PP p. 42: tadevam ityekatva-nibandhanam tādssam evedam iti. sādrsya-nibandhanam. 22 PMk 3.5 : tadevedam tat-sadrśam, tadvilakṣaṇam, tat-pratiyogīty

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vilakṣaṇatva and 'this is away from that' this is near to that', are the examples of tat pratiyogītva. Acārya Hemcandara corroborates the kinds proposed by Manikyanandin.
112
23
Vādidevasūri, the author of Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka and Syādvādaratnākara used the new terms of tiryak sāmānya and ūrdhvatā-sāmānya relating to the definition of recognition. Tiryak sāmānya means the similarity amongst the objects and ūrdhvatā sāmānya means the identity of the same entity at different stages, for example the gavaya is like cow denotes tiryak sāmānya and he is the same Devadatta denotes ūrdhvatāsāmānya." In Indian philosophy Nyāya, Vaiseṣika, Mīmāmsā, Vedanta and Kaśmīra Saivism also discuss the concept of recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognize it as a separate organ of valid cognition. Jayanta Bhatta a foremost Naiyāyika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (samskāra). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be a pramāņa, because of infinite regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it." For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments. The main arguments are being presented here.25
1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from the both and is possessed of being a new pramāṇa, because it has to cognize a different object which is not cognized by mere perception
23 PT 3.5 and 5.4
"See Jain Dharm Chand, p. 310
25 For origanial references of arguments see Jain, Dharm chand pp. 311 to 318

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and mere recollection. So recognition is an independent
organ of cognition. 2. It is a pramāna, because it is found indiscrepant in
behaviour. Ācārya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent pramāņa (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers from bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to
achieve the joy of freedom.“ 3. Bhatta Akalanka maintains the sequence of recollection,
recognition and inductive reasoning. He says that recognition is the resultant of recollection and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recognition is accepted. Perception is not experienced capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only through
recognition we can do so. 5. Vidyānanda says that without the acceptance of
recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young and adult before and now have become an old man." He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or svalakṣana. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also.
4
2 PM vriti 1.2.4 » TSv, 1.13.46.
-

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7.
1
6. Recognition is different from inference because it
recognizes the probans (hetu)only and inference is a later process. The object of recognition is not cognized by recollection and perception separately, hence it cognizes the object
which is not cognized by any other pramāņa. 8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its
validity.
Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an independent pramāņa. It is to be noted that they include upamāna pramāņa (comparison) the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition. (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramāna:
It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established tarka as an independent pramāņa. They propound that invariable relation(vyāpti) between probans (hetu) and probandum (sādhya) can be known only by tarka pramāņa. Tarka or inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says that inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non observation.28
In the Nyāyasūtra of Gotama tarka (reasoning) has been used for presumptive cognition (Arthāpatti).It is only the Jaina logicians who considered tarka as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalanka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra,
2 PM, 1.2.4

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Vādidevasūri and Hemcandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of tarka as an independent pramāņa.
The main arguments are:1. The object which is cognized by tarka is not cognized by
any other pramāņa. Tark is knowledge of universal concomitance. No other pramāņa can do so, neither perception nor inference. The validity of inference depends on tarka, because it is the knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot
arise. 3. It has a corresponding nature. 4. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to
discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present. If inference is competent to know the necessary concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference.
Thus the Jaina logicians have established tarka as an independent pramāņa by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their innovative thinking about the system of epistemology and logic. ”For references see Jain Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 322 to 330

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(v) Definition of probans (hetu):
One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (hetu). Probans is a necessary means. for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (sādhya) can be known by probans (sādhana, hetu) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But regarding the definitions of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views.
The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans :- its subsistence in the subject(pakşa-dharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapakşa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipakşāsattva)."" These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the Prasastapādabhāsya of Vaiśesika philosophy." But the Nyāya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are : the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abādhitavişayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asatpratipakşatva). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of probans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (anyathānupapatti or avinābhāva) of the one in the absence of the other.”? Probans cannot exist in the absence of probandum. ** Nyāyapraveśa p. 1: hetustrirūpaḥ kim punastrairūpyam? pakṣadharmatvam,
sapakşe sattvam vipakşe căsattvam iti. "see anumāna prakarana of Prasastapādabhāşya : yadanumeyena sambaddham
prasiddham ca tadanvite. tadabhāve ca nāstyeva tallingamanumāpakam. »PT 3.11 : niścitānyathānupapattyekalakşaņo hetuḥ.

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This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a probans cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire.
The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of triple characteristics (trairūpya) and five characteristics (pāñcarūpya) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yaśovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Pātrasvāmin was profound logician who wrote a separate book Trilaksanakadarthana to refute the Buddhist view. Buddhust logician Śantarakṣita has criticized the view of Pātrasvāmin, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows:33
1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid probans. There are some probans (hetus) possessed of three characteristics, but devoid of validity, e.g.he must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyī(a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans," although, here triple characteristics have been used. 'Tatpūtratvāt' propabans remain in maitreyi's son which is subject (pakṣa), other "For references of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 223 to 234 (i) TSn 1369: Sa śyāmās tasyā putratvād dṛstā śyāmā yathetare | Iti tri-lakṣaṇo hetur na niscityai pravartate || (ii) PP p. 45: sa- syāmaḥ tat-putratvād tasyāanyaputravat.
34

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sons are homologue (sapakṣa) and that probans does not go into hetrologue (vipkṣa). But it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyī will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless.
2.
35
There are many probans which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday. Śakața constellation will arise after some time (muhurta), because the krttika constellation has just arisen," are such probans which do not have triple characteristics (Trirūpatā), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of Anyathānupapatti is needed to define a probans. Pātrakesarin says (As quoted in Tattvasangraha (verse 1368) of Buddhist Philosopher Śāntaraksta)
-
118
anyatha-nupapannattvam yatra tatra trayeņa kim. nānyatha-nupapannattvam yatra tatra trayeṇa kim.
Vidyananda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under:"
(i)
It is found in fallacious probans also.
(ii)
It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudo-probans.
"Clavel has discissed in her paper presented at Lumbini Seminar (12-15 March 2013) that this inference may not happen right in some cases. See proceedings as 'Buddhist and Jaina Studies'.
36TSV part 3 p. 273 na ca trairūpyasyāsādhāraṇatā tadhetau tadābhāsepi tasya samudbhavat. tato na tadhetulakṣaṇam yuktam.

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Ācārya Hemacandra says that refutation of triple characteristics (trairūpya) will also serve as a refutation of the five characteristics (pāñca-rūpya). Since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance.
Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians. (vi) Establishment of new probans (such as kāraṇa etc.):
The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely kāraṇa (cause), pūrvacara, (predecessor), uttaracara (successor), sahacara (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these probans as means of inference. “There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds is seen” is an example of kāraṇa hetu. “Sakața constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of krttika would not have been there” is an example of pūrvacara hetu. Here, after the rise of krttikā the rise of the sakața takes place immediately after it, without exception, and therefore, the kṛttikā indicates the rise of the sakața as its predecessor reason. “Bharaṇī rose before, because kịttikā is rising” is an example of uttaracara probans. Here the rise of krttikā which succeeds the rise of Bharani indicates it. These Two pūrvacara and uttaracara are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. “The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste”-is an example of sahacara hetu. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence indicates it. All these probans are valid because of their invariable concomitance with their probandum.

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Ācārya Māņikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of avinābhāva : saha-avinābhāva and krama-avinābhāva. 7 Kāraņa, kārya, pūrvacara and uttaracara hetus are found valid because of their krama-avinābhāva and sahacara hetu is found valid because of its saha-avinābhāva. In this way the concept of vyāpti has also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen.
Right from Akalarka down to Yaśovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new probans (hetus).
Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as hetu, because cause is possible even without its effects, therefore it is not a perfect indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also cooperating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the perfect indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as - milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If a cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid probans, but in the respect of definition of probans as propounded by the Jaina logicians that probans never remains in the absence of effect, contradicts in the case of kāraṇa hetu, because kāraṇa hetu remains even in the absence of effect. In purvacara hetu also the same situation is happened. When a sequence of the incidences is definitive then purvacara and uttaracara probans are useful for a common man. Sahacara probans is also common in our daily SPMK 3.12 sahakramabhāvaniyamo avinābhavaḥ.

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life. For example: back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it.
121
It seems clear that the Jaina logicians have accepted these probans, because of their corresponding nature in behavior. It is also clear that they are very precise in defining the probans (hetu) but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of probans (hetu).
38
Regarding the members of syllogism (parārthānumāna), the Jaina logicians have propounded that pakṣa-vacana (the statement of the thesis) and hetu (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (parārthānumāna), but for the dull minded persons, they have accepted five members including udaharana (illustration with concomitance), upanaya (statement of probans in the place of probandum) and nigamana (conclusion). One more contribution of Jaina logicians is to introduce a concept of antarvyāpti, where invariable concomitance of probans is found in probandum only.
Theroy of standpoints (nayavāda) :
Nayamīmāmsā is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed extensively by Jaina philosophers. Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā and nayamīmāmsā are not absolutely different from jñānamīmāmsā. The Tattvärthasūtra of Umāsvāti propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by pramāṇa and naya". Herein it is also clear that adhigama (knowledge) is a resultant and pramāņa and naya are the means. pramāņa and jñāna are the terms which are
38PT 3.28 and 3.42
"TS 1.6: pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ.

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.
.
122
commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy, but the concept of 'naya' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system to Indian epistemology. Although 'naya' is a part of śrutajñāna, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different standpoints of a knower. It includes the standpoints of a speaker also. There is wide discussion on theory of naya, and its kinds in canonical and other later literature. Saptabhanginaya is related to the standpoints of a speaker. Theory of 'naya' and sevenfold predication are the result of thought of anekāntavāda (nonabsolutism) and syādvāda. For deciding the right meaning of a word Jaina thinkers have given a concept of nikșepa. There are four kinds of nikṣepa as- nāma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhāva. Tīrthankara Mahavīra replies many questions with the view of dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva, which also denotes the epistemic view of Jaina tradition. Conclusion
The view of non-absolutism helped Jain logicians in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: sāmvyavahārika pratyakşa, tiryak sāmānya,ūrdhvatā-sāmānya, saha-avinābhāva, kramaavinābhāva, antarvyāpti, bahirvyāpti etc. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount importance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking of epistemology. The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding pramāņa upholding the canonical views, but they

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have given due significance to the empirical view also.
The Jaina epistemological literature is having importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' view honestly and systematically.
The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to the development of epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows: A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and
Śvetāmbara joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were wellversed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their
refutation of opponent's views is based on cogent reasons. B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and
inductive reasoning as independent pramāņas. C. They are very precise in defining the probans (hetu), but
they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of
probans (hetu). D. They established the nature of pramāṇa illuminating itself
and the object. E. If the works of Sumati, Kumāraṇandin and Pātrakesarī are
found available, then the history of the development of
Jaina epistemology may be rewritten. F. Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmin was the first philosopher who
recognized right knowledge as pramāṇa and classified the pramāņa into two types i.e. pratyakșa (perception) and parokşa. After establishment of right knowledge as

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pramāṇa all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramāṇa. G. Acārya Kundakunda has proved the nature of knowledge as illuminating the self and the object.
H. Although Nyāyāvatāra is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalanka has contributed a lot. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramāṇa under the category of parokṣa pramāṇa. He introduced kāraṇa, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans.
I.
124
J.
The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (sāmvyavahārika pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyakṣa in the Nandisutra.
The Mukhya pratyakṣa was given a new name as pāramārthika pratyakṣa by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as sakala (complete) and vikala (partial) pratyakṣa on the basis of a division found in the Sthānanga-sūtra as kevala and no-kevala.
K. The Svetambara logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized, Whereas Digambara logicans like Akalanka, Māņikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramāṇa that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized.
L. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is an instrument of śrutajñāna.

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Bibliography Primary sources AD Anuyogadvārasūtra of Āryarakṣita. Prakit. With Hindi
translation and annotations, Beawar : Āgama Prakāśana
Samiti, 1987 AGT Akalankagranthatrayam (Nyāyaviniscaya,
Pramāṇasangraha, Laghīyastraya) Mahendra Kumar Nyāyācārya, Ahmedabad-Kolkata: Singhĩ Jain
Granthamālā- 12, 1939 AM Āptamīmāņsā of Samantabhadra, Varanasi : Srī
Ganeshavarṇī Digambar Jain Sansthan, 1975 LT Laghīyastraya with Vịtti of Bhațța Akalanka, found in
Akalaňkagranthatrayam (AGT). NA Nyāyāvatāra of Sidhasenasūri, Bombay : Parama Śruta
Prabhāvaka Mandala, 1950 NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmkārti with tīkā (commentary) of
Dharmmottara, Edited, translated and annotated by
Shrīnivāsa Šāstrī, Meerut: Sāhitya Bhandar, 1975 ND Srī Nandisūtra. Prakrit. Hindi translation by Ācārya
Hastimal, Jaipur : Samyagjñāna Pracharak Mandal, Second
Edition 2009, First Edition 1942 NKC Nyāyakumudacandra (Vol.I) of Prabhācandra. Ed.
Mahendra kumar, Girgaon Bombay : Māņikyacandra
Digambara Jain Granthamālā, Heera baug, 1938 NS Niyamasāra of Kundakunda. Jaipur: Kundakunda Kahān
Digambara Jain Tīrtha Surakṣā Trust, Bapunagar, 1984 Ny Nyāyasūtra of Gotam, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit
Sansthāna, 1970 Praśastapādabhāșya of Prasastapāda. Translated in Hindi by Ācārya Dhundhiraj Šāstrī, Varanasi : Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthāna, 1980
PB

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PM
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Pramāṇamīmāmsā of Hemacandra with own commentary, Ed. Sukhlal Sanghavī, Ahmedabad- Calcutta : Singhi Jaina Granthamālā, 1939 Parīkņāmukha of Māņikyanandin. Translated in Hindi by Mohanlal Jain, Jhāņsī Pramaņaparīkşā of Vidyānanda, Ed. Darbari Lal Kothiā, Varanasi:Veersevā Mandir Trust, 1977 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka of Vādidevasūri. Third Edition, Ahmadanagar : Śrī Tilokaratna Sthānakavāsī Jaina Dhārmika Parīkņā Board, 2000 (First Edition 1980). Suttāgame (part I) (Bhagvatīsūtra, Sthānangāsūtra) Prakrit. (ed.) Muni Pupphabhikkhu, Gurgaon chavani : Gurgaon sūtrāgama prakashan samiti, 1953 Tarkbhāṣā of Mokşākargupta, Baroda : Oriental Institute, 1942 Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti. Hindi commentary by Sukhlāl Sanghavī, Third Edition, Varanasi : Pārsvanātha Vidyāpītha, 1985. Tattvasangraha (2Vols.) of Śantarakṣita with Pañjikā commentary of Kamalaśīla, Varanasi : Bauddha Bhāratī, 1981-82 Tattvārthaślokavārtika of Vidyānanda. (ed.) Māņikyacandra Kaundeya. Solāpur : Shri Ācārya Kunthusāgar Granthmālā, 1951-53 Tattvārthavārtika of Bhatta Akalanka, (ed.) Mahendra kumar Nyāyācārya, Kāshi : Bhāratiya Jñānapitha, 1953 Upāyahrdaya, see Tucci Giuseppe in modern sources Višeșāvaśyakabhāsya of Jinabhadragani, Parkrit. Mumbai : Diyya Darśana Trust, V.S 2039
TS
TSn
TSV
TV
UH
VB

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Modern sources
Balcerowicz, Piotr, 2008. Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Vol. I) Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Private Ltd.
Clavel Anne, 2013. Can The Rise of Rohini be Inferred from The Rise of Krttika? A Buddhist- Jaina controversy, proceedings of Lumbini seminar Buddhist and Jaina studies. Lumbini International Research Institute, Nepal, 2014
Jain, Dharm Chand, Jodhpur 1995, Bauddha Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā Kī Jaina Drsti Se Samīkṣā (Hindi), Varanasi : Pārshvanatha Vidyāpīṭha, 1995
Mālavaniyā Paṇḍita Dalsukha, 1966, Agama Yuga Ka Jaina Darśana, Āgarā : Shri Sanmati jñānpīṭha. Reprinted by Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur, 1990
Shah, Nagin J. 1967. Akalanka's Criticism Of Dharmakirti's Philosophy: A Study, Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology
Tatia, Nathmal, 1951. Studies In Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi : P.V. Research Institute
Upadhye, A.N. 1971. Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and other works, Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikās Mandal
Vidyabhuṣaṇa, Satish Chandra, 1978, A History of Indian Logic, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
Tucci, Giuseppe 1929. Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources (Upayahṛdaya etc). Baroda Gaikwad Oriental Series
Dhaky M.A., 1995. The Date and Authourrship of Nyāyāvatāra, Published in Nirgrantha Vol. I, Ahmedabad: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre.

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The Concept of Nirvikalpatā in Buddist Logic and the
Indian Tradition
Nirvikalpatā is a concept that is discussed in the context of pratyakşa-pramāņa (perception as a means of valid cognition) and samādhi (intense meditation). The Buddhist philosohers Dignāga (470-530 CE) and Dharmakīrti (620-690 CE) are the pioneer stalwarts who consider kalpanāpohatā or nirvikalpatā (absence of verbal designation) as an essential property of pratyakşa (perception). Philosophers of the Nyāya and Mīmāmsā schools also accept nirvikalpaka pratyakșa (perception without verbal designation) but they propound a kind of savikalpaka-pratyakşa (perception with verbal designation) also. It is noteworthy that these schools entered into the discussion about defining nirvikalpatā after Dignāga's time. Jaina philosophers do not accept nirvikalpatā in pratyakşa-pramāņa. They have the notion of darśana or darśanopayoga which is always nirākāra and nirvikalpaka, but it is not included in the category of pramāņa. This paper aims to discuss the concept of nirvikalpatā and its development in the Indian tradition with reference to specific texts in order to bring out the remarkable contribution of Buddhist philosophers to the panorama of Indian epistemology and logic. Jaina views will also be considered wherever appropriate.

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In the Indian tradition Buddhist logicians seem to have been the first to have discussed the concept of nirvikalpata in the context of pratyakṣa-pramāņa (perception as a means of valid cognition) There after it is mentioned in the epistemology of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā schools as well. Jaina thinkers consider it as a characteristic of darśana or darśanopayoga which occurs before determinate knowledge i.e. jñānopayoga and they do not accept as a pramāṇa. In the Yogasūtra the term nirvikalpată can be regarded as being a characteristic of nirvitarka and nirvicāra samādhi (see Yogasūtra 1.4344). In this way nirvikalpatā has been discussed widely in the Indian tradition.
Dignaga's contribution.
In the field of Indian logic and epistemology, the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (470-530 CE), the pioneer stalwart and founder of Buddhist logic, is considered to be the thinker who introduced the concept of nirvikalpatā as an essential property of perception. He propounds two types of valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) namely perception and inference and two types of their respective objects as unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and general character (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). In his Pramāṇasamuccaya he defines perception as a means of valid cognition which is devoid of verbal designation (Kalpanapohatā).' Dignāga defines kalpana as a construction or an arrangement of name (nama) genus (jāti), quality (guna), function (kriyā) and
Pratyakşam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyadi samyutam.-Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1.3

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appurtenances (dravya) to the direct cognition. For example, if we perceive a thing with our eyes, without any name etc., then it comes in the category of perception, and if we give it a name, then that is a kalpana or a construction of verbal designation. Naming a perceived thing is not a part of perception. It is a result of our previous experience and a retention or memory of if.
130
,,3
Dignaga mentions examples of kalpana as follows"namnă visito'rtha ucyate diṭṭha iti. jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaurīti gunaśabdeṣu gunena śukla iti, kriyā sabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravya- sabdeșu dravyeṇa dandi viṣāṇīti. 'this is diṭṭha is nāma Kalpana, this is a patch of white colour is guna kalpana, this is a cow is jāti kalpana, this is a cook is kriyā kalpana, this is a staff bearer is dravya kalpanā. All these are the examples of verbal designation to the cognition of an object. It is not the characteristic of perception. Stcherbatsky in his Buddhist Logic says:
This can be called the epistemological form of judgment and every judgment reduces to this form, since it is a known fact, admitted now in European Logic, that in every real judgment a reference to some reality is always understood, cp. Sigwart Logik3, p.67. It can be also viewed as construction, a division, a bifurcation, an imagination (vikalpa) etc., since every such judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e.g. blue and not-blue, cow and not-cow etc. Cp. about vikalpa Madhy. vṛitti, p. 350.12" (vol.2, p.21 fn.)
"Atha keyam kalpanā. nāma jätyädiyojanā. Dignaga's vṛtti before 1.3 'Dignaga's vṛtti to 1.3, Dignaga, on Perception, p.12

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An object of perception in Buddhism is a unique particular or thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). The unique particular is momentary and it does not proceed to a different place nor exists in another moment, nor it is in fact expressible by words. It is the real entity i.e. paramārthasat.
The concept of nirvikalpatā as an essential property of pratyaksa pramāna is a brilliant contribution of Dignāga to Indian philosophy. He might have developed the notion on the basis of the old texts of Buddhism. Two statements to this effect are found in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā : (1) cakṣurvijñāna-samangī nīlam vijānāti no tu nīlamīti. (2) arthe'arthasamjñī natvarthe dharmasañjīti.* These two statements reflect that when a person cognizes nīlārha (blue matter) with his eyes and does not think that “it is nīla', then it is devoid of mental construction or kalpanā, but knowledge in the form 'it is nīla' is considered to be a kalpanā. When a real thing is known without any attribute and verbal designation, then it is considered as nirvikalpatā. Influence on Kumārila Bhatta
The Mīmāmsaka philosopher Kumārila Bhatta (6th7th century) entering in the field of dialogue, has refuted various notions of Dignāga, but he accepts two types of perception as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. While accepting the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyakşa, he seems influenced by Dignagā. He defines nirvikalpatā in the following wordsHattori, Dignāga, on perception, Pramāṇasamuccayavrtti, Da, a-2, Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, p.64,22-23; Dvādaśāram Nayacakram, vol.I, pp. 60-61

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132
asti hyālocanājñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam 1 bālamūkādi vijñānasaděśam śuddha-vastujam 11
-Ślokavārtika, pratyakșa sūtra, 112 He says that after a sense-object contact, first of all indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is experienced which is bare perception, similar to the perception of a baby and a dumb person. This is the perception produced by the object and it is devoid of verbal designation. This definition of nirvikalpatā has affinity with that of Dignāga.
Kumārila explains the adjective śuddha- vastujam as follows:
na viśeşo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate. / tayor ādhārabhūtā tu, vyaktir evāvasīyate. Il
-Slokavārtika, pratyakșa sūtra, 113 “The cognition per se that arises through the object can not differentiate and generalise that particular object. There is a mere cognition of an object, of something, which then becomes the basis of generality and particularity.”
In his critique of Indian realism D.N. Shastri 1976 (P 437-438)says that a clear-cut distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception was introduced for the first time in Indian philosophy by Dignāga. Kumārila Bhatta seems to have been influenced by Dignāga when he defines nirvikalpaka as suddhavastujam. (produced from pure form of reality)
In Kumārila's view, after an indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka), a determinate perception also occurs which is also a valid cognition. Here it is to be noted that according to Dignāga determinate perception is not a

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valid cognition, Where as accoding to Kumārila determinate perception is also a valid perception. Dharmakīrti's view
Dharmakirti (620-690 CE), a profound commentator of Dignāga, is of view that sometimes a direct perception (nirvikalpaka) might be illusive due to disease or deformation in the sense organs, hence a perception must be devoid both of construction and of illusion. He goes a step further and defines kalpanā as“abhilāpasamsargayogyā- pratibhāsā pratīțiḥ kalpanā (Nyāyabindu 1.5)
Stcherbatsky explains this aphorism of Nyāyabindu as “construction (or judgment) implies a distinct cognition (Pratīti) of a mental reflex (pratibhāsa) which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation.” (Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19)
Dharmottara (700CE), a commentator of Dharmakīrti explains the statement : -
“abhilapyate aneneti abhilāpaḥ vācakaḥ śabdaḥ, abhilāpena samsargaḥ ekasmin jñāne abhidheyākārasy ābhidhānānākāreņa saha grāhayākāratayā milanam. tato yadaikasmin jñāne abhidheyābhidhānākārau sannivistau bhavatas tadā samssste abhidhanābhidheye bhavataḥ
Stcherbatsky translates explanation of Dharmottara in this way.
Tatra Kalpanāpodhamabhrantam. pratyakşam - Nyāyabindu, 1.4 ; (2) Avikalpakam ekam ca pratyaksābham. - Pramānavārtika, 2.288

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"A verbal designation is a word of speech through which something is denoted. To coalesce with a word means (such a condition when) the denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are mixed up in its apprehended aspect. Thus, when denoted fact and the word denoting it have entered in to one act of cognition, then the word and object have coalesced." (Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19)
Dharmottara's view
134
Dharmottara explains the importance of the word 'abhilāpa-sāmsarga-yogya' and says that there are two types of cognition: (1) one is associated with a word, as in the case of ghaṭa-jñāna (knowledge of a pot) of a person having conventional knowledge of ghata (pot), (2) another cognition which is not yet associated with a word, but seems capable of being associated with it, as in the case of a baby, who is unaware of conventional knowledge. Both of these cognitions come under the category of kalpana'. Here the word 'yogya' (capable) includes the second category of a cognition above which forms the definition of kalpana. Although a new-born baby has no verbal association with a cognition of mother's breast, but if capable of giving a name to that, then that also may be considered as kalpanā.
Here a question arises how is the capability for verbal designation is decided? Dharmottara answers this question by saying that the verbal designation is not produced by the object actually apprehended and, therefore, it is not a restricted mental reflex, since the factor corresponding to it does not exist; it is created by the 'Nyayabindutikā, p.44

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135
synthesis of productive imagination. According to Buddhist logic the perceived object is the real cause of restricted mental reflex (niyata pratibhāsa) but verbal designation or the capability of it is not caused by object and so it can not be a restricted mental reflex.
8
Dharmottara explains that vikalpa does not require an object for its manifestation. If a vikalpa arises after a nirvikalpakā cognition due to recalling a previously cognised object, then also it is aniyata pratibhāsa. Niyata pratibhasa is the deciding factor of nirvikalpatā according to Dharmottara, and that occurs in the presence of an object only.
The definition of kalpanā as given by Dharmakirti and Dharmottara refutes the definition of nirvikalpatā given by kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In his Ślokavārtika Kumārila considers the cognition of a baby and dumb person as belonging to the category of nirvikalpatā, but Dharmakītri says that a cognition of a baby and a dumb person would come under the category of kalpana, if that cogniton would have the capability of coalescing with a verbal designation."
Dharmakirti and Dharmottara prove the fact that concept of nirvikalpatā as an essential property of perception is found not only in indriya pratyakṣa, but also in the other kinds of perception as in manasa-pratyakṣa, svasamvedana and yogi-pratyakṣa. Dharmottara says
'Asaty-abhilāpa-samsarge kuto yogyatāvasitir iti cet,
Aniyatapratibhasatvāt.- Nyāyabindutīkā 1.5, p.45 Arthasannidhi-nirapekṣatvät. Nyāyabindu tīkā, 1.5, p. 46 'See, Nyāyabindutīkā, 1.5, pp. 44-46

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regarding yogi-pratyakșa that it is nirvikalpaka because of its vividness (sphutābhatā)" Dharmakīrti also thought :na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphutārthāvabhāsitā (Pramāṇāvārtika, 2.283). If we add nothing to pure knowledge, then it is called nirvikalpakatā. In the case of perception through the ears (Śrotra vijñāna), if a conventional meaning is not understood, then that perception can also be nirvikalpaka. Prajñākaragupta (8th century) defines kalpanā in a different way:
"vićeșaņādi-sambandha-vastu pratibhāsāpratītiḥ kalpanā (Pramāņavārtikabhāsya, p. 245) “If an object is known with its atributes or quality then that cognition is called kalpanā.”
This definition has been adopted by the Navya Naiyākas when they say :- saprakārakam jñānam savikalpakam or in other words when they say vaišiștyāvagāhi jñānam savikalpakam. Śántarakṣita and Kamalaśīla
The Buddhist logicians śāntarakṣita (705-764 CE) and Kamalasila (8th century) supported the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Šāntarakṣita defines kalpanā asabhilāpinī pratītīḥ kalpanā (Tattvasamgraha, 1213)
This definition includes the ones given by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The Word abhilapini includes verbal association and the mental reflex having capability for verbal designation."
Sphutābhatvādeva ca nirvikalpakam - Nyāyabindutikā, 1.11, p. 66 "Sabdārtha-ghatana yogyā vrksa ity-adirüpataḥ 1 yā vācām aprayogepi sābhilāpeva jāyate. Il - Tattvasamgraha, 1214

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śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila suggested a modification in the definition of kalpanā given by Dignāga. Kamalasila says :- tatra heyā jatyadiyojanā paraprasiddhā kalpanā. (Tattvasamgrahapañjikā, 1220, p- 451). He accepts that all verbal associations are included in śabadayojanā, hence there is no need to accept jātyādi yojanā which is accepted by other philosophers. He stresses the word ‘ucyate' when he says- śabdayojanayā sarvā yojanā vyāptal Tattva samgrhapañjikā, p. 455) Nirvikalpatā in Nyāya - Vaišesika School
The Nyāya-Vaiśesika school has also discussed the concept of nirvikalpatā on the basis of word ‘avyapadeśya (unnamable) used in the definition of perception given by Gotama (150 CE) in the Nyāyasūtra."? Vācaspati Miśra (9th century) and Jayanta Bhatta (9th Century) have developed the notion of nirvikalpatā in Nyāya-Vaiseșika school. Vācaspati Miśra propounds two types of perception as indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) on the basis of the words ‘avyapadeśya’and ‘vyavasāyātmaka' used in the Nyāyasūtra by Gotama. Jayanta Bhatta is also of this view. They consider nirvikalpaka perception to be without a verbal element and so have an affinity with Kumārila.
In the Vaiśesika school Prasastapāda, prior to Dignāga uses the term 'Svarūpālocana-mātra'"' which means a mere apprehesnion of a reality is a perception, but
"Artha-sannikarşotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam
pratyakşam-Nyāyasútra, 1.4 "Prasastapādabhasyam, p.443

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the development of this concept into nirvikalapaka and savikalpaka percetion was made by the commentators of Prasastapādabhāṣya. Śrīdhara in his Nyāyakandalī says that in indeterminate perception, particular and universal dharmas are not apprehended, while in determinate perception these dharmas are apprehended." This view has an affinity with the theory of Dignaga, and also with that of Kumārila. Udayana (10th century) says in his Kiranavali that only the individual or the substratum of universal is apprehended at the nirvikalpaka stage. Gangesa in his Tattvacintamani has made a clear distinction between nirivalpaka and savikalpaka perception. According to him, savikalpaka perception is differentiated and qualified knowledge (saprakārakam jñānam) and nirvikalpaka perception, on the other hand, is devoid of the relation between a substance and its attribute.15
Jaina View
Jaina philosophers accpet nirvikalpaka cognition in the form of darśana, but they do not consider it as pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. They have refuted the validity of nirvikalpaka pratykṣa, because it is not useful in daily life (vyavahāra). Bhaṭṭa Akalanka, Vidyānanda, Anantavirya, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra, Hemacandra did not accept the validity of nirvikalpaka perception for practical life or empirical behavior, because a determinate or savikalpaka knowledge would be a means to decide what is acceptable,
"Ibid. p. 446-447
15 Tatra nāma jaty-ādiyojanā-rahitam vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi niṣprakārakam nirvikalpakam. -Tattvacintamani, p. 809
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not acceptable and what are the objects which should be disregarded."
Here it is to be noted that Buddhist philosophers were also aware of this fact, hence, Śantarakṣita in Tattvasamgrah says:
avikalpakamapi jñānam vikalpotpattiśaktimat | niśćeșa-vyavahārāngam taddvāreņa bhavatyataḥ. Il
- Tattvasamgraha, 1305 Nirvikalpaka perception can produce a vikalpa, and that vikalpa becomes a part of every vyavahāra. Kamalaśīla explains that the perception has a capacity to produce a determinate knowledge and that is considered as practicable in our life. Nirvikalpatā in Samādhi
Before Dignāga, Patañjali had defined samādhi as “tadevārtha-mātra-nir-bhāsam svarūpa-śūnayam iva samādņi (Yogasūtra, 3.3). Only a reality is apprehended in samādhi without any verbal designation or a bifurcation of the object and the meditator. Vacaspati Miśra in his commentary Tattva-vaiśāradī has clearly mentioned that apprehension of pure form of reality is devoid of kalpanā." Conclusion
It is clear that concept of nirvikalpatā is well defined in the Indian tradition and it can also be announced loudly that Buddhist logicians with their philosophical acumen have contributed significantly in defining perception very
"See e.g. Vādidevasűri : abhimatānabhimata-vastu-svikära-tiraskāra-kşamam
hi pramānam ato jñānam eva tat. -Pramananayatattvāloka, 1.3 "Tattvava-vaiśāradi on Yogasútra, 2.3

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minutely. Deliberations held with Buddhist logicians by other systems created a path to the development of this concept, as with many other philosophical tenets in the panorama of Indian Philosophy.
By establishing the concept of nirvikalpatā Buddhist logicians inspired other philosophers to think about and accept the notion in their philosophical deliberations. The Mīmāņsaka and Nyāya-Vaisişika philosophers were obviously influenced by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but Jaina philosophers do not seem to have been influenced in any significant respect, most probably because of their notion of darśana which is defined as nirākāra and nirvikalpaka.'' Although the seeds of the notion of . nirvikalpatā were available in the Yogasūrta, Jaina canons,
Nyāyasūtra and Praśastapādabhāşya, the evolution making a clear-cut distinction between determinate and indeterminate knowledge was pioneered by Buddhist logicians.
Bibliography Primary sources Dravyānuyoga (vol.I) Prakrit-Hindi. Compiled from the Svetāmbara canons by Upadhyāya Kanhaiyālāl Kamal, Ahmedabad : Āgam Anuyoga Trust, 1994 Dvādaśaram nayacakram of Ācārya Śri Mallavādi Kșa māśramaņa (vol. 1, with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusārini of Simhasūri), ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavanagar (Gujarat) : Ātmānanda Sabhā, 1966
Goyamā! Sāgare se pare bhavai, anāgāre se daņsane bhavai. (paņņavaņa, chapter 30, Dravyānuyoga, vol.I, p. 568).

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Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana, edited and translated in to Hindi by Gaurināth Sāstrī, Varanasi : Sampurṇānanda Sanskrit University, 1980
Nyāyabindutīkā of Dharmottara (a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyāyabindu) edited and annotated by Śrinīvāsa Sāstrī, Meratha: Sahitya Bhaṇḍāra, 1975
Nyayamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, edited by Pt. Surya Narayaṇa Śukla, Banaras: The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1936
Nyāyavārtika-Tātparyatīkā of Vacaspatimiśra, ed by Pt. Rajeśvara Śastrī Drāviḍa, Varanasi Chaukhambha Sanskrit
Sansthan, reprint 1990.
Pātañjalayogadarśanam (Yogasūtra with Vyasabhāṣya, Tattva-vaisāradi and Yogavārtika), ed. Śrīnārāyaṇa Miśra, Varanasi : Bhāratīya Vidya Prakashana, 1998
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvaloka of Vadidevasūri, translated and annotated by Pt. Sobhācandra Bhārilla. Ahmednagar: Śri Tilokaratna Sthānakavāsi Jaina Dharmika Parīkṣā Board, 3rd reprint 2000.
Pramāṇasamuccaya (with vṛtti) of Dignaga, ed. H.R. Rangasvāmi Iyengar, Mysore: Mysore University, 1930
Pramāṇavārtika of Acārya Dharmakirti (with the commentary 'vṛtti' of Acārya Manorathanandin), Varanasi : Bauddha Bhārati, 2nd ed., 1984.
Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālankāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta, deciphered and edited by Rahula Sänkṛityāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute,
1953

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Prasastapādabhāṣya (with Nyāyakandali of Śridhara Bhaṭṭa), edited by Pt. Durgadhara Jha, Varansi: Sampurṇananda Sanskrit Viśvavidyalaya, 1977
142
Ślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Parthasarathi Miśra), edited and revised by Svāmi Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978. Tattvacintamani by Gangeśa (Pratyakṣa-khanda). Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1884.
Yogasūtra: see Pātañjalayogadarśanam.
Secondary Sources
Hattori, Massaki, Dignaga, on Perception, Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1968
Jain, Dharm Chand, 1995: Bauddha Pramāṇa- Mīmāmsā Kī Jaina Dṛṣṭi se Samīkṣā (In Hindi), Varanasi : Pārsvanath Vidya pitha.
Shastri, D.N., 1976: The Philosophy of Nyaya - Vaiśesika and its conflict with The Buddhist Dignaga School (Critique of Indian Realsim), Delhi: Bhāratīya Vidya Prakashan.
Sigwart, Christoph, 1895: Logic. Tr. from the German by Helen Dendy. London, etc.: Swan Sonnenschein.
Soni, Jayendra (ed), 2012: Jaina Studies (Proceedings of the Dot 2010 Panel in Marburg, Germany) New Delhi Aditya Prakashan,
Stcherbatsky, Theodore 1962: Buddhist Logic (Volume II), New York: Dover Publications.
Tatia, Nathmal, 1951: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi : P.V. Research Institute,

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Anekāntavāda, Syādvāda and Nayavāda
Nayavāda is an epistemological tenet, Anekāntavāda is a metaphysical theory and Syādvāda is a method of faultless statements. According to Jainism real entity is multi-faceted. It has multi-characteristics. Modes of a real entity are infinite. To accept a real entity with multi-faceted characteristic attributes and modes is called 'anekāntavāda'. A real entity having two or more attributes is called as anekadharmātmaka (multi-faceted or multi-attributed) substance.
In Jainism, a real entity sat is defined as - “Which bears origniation (utpāda) cessation (vyaya) and persistence (dhrauvya) is a real entity (sat)'.” In a real entity these three characteristics are found simultaneously - a new mode is originated, present mode becomes past and the substance remains persistent (dhruva). Origination and cessation of modes approve non-eternity and persistence shows eternity of that reality. This characteristic of reality (sat) is also mentioned as a nature of substance-cum-mode. Substance is eternal and modes are non-eternal or impermanent. Hence, sat is eternalcum-non-eternal. Substance is considered as generic and modes are considered as particular, hence a reality can be mentioned as generic-cum-particular.
Knowing of a reality needs the different standpoints and those standpoints are called 'naya' in Jainism. From the
'utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktam sat. - Tattvārthasūtra 5.29

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standpoint of substance a reality is persistent and from the viewpoint of modes that reality is changing or non-eternal. In this way in the process of knowing and also in describing a reality view points (nayas) are needed. These view-points have importance in proper understanding and describing the truth.
Syādvāda is an indefective method of describing or mentioning the truth using word 'syāť' or 'syāď. Here ‘syať' word is an indeclinable which denotes a meaning of a certain view-point. In this way a statement using word 'syať' is a statement in some perspective. In the Jaina canon Vyakhyāprajñapti Sūtra Lord Mahavīra has used this word often in answering with different view points of substance (dravya), space (kṣetra), time (kāla) and modes (bhāva). Hence it can be said that syādvāda is a theory of explaining the reality in an indefective way. If 'syat' word is not used in a sentence then it may be defective in a sense to deny the existing other facts, but word 'syāť' keeps other facts in a view neglected or latent at that moment.
Syādvāda, anekāntavāda and nayavāda are mutually interlinked. Anekāntavāda is understandable through nayavāda and expressed through syādvāda. Expressing power is in syadvāda which also expects nayavāda for its proper expression. Nayavāda has two aspects- 1. Knowing and 2. Expression. What is the intention of a speaker is naya and what is intended by a knower is also naya. Nayas are also expressed using word 'syat'. Hence 'syadvada' is used in expression of nayas also. Thus 'syat' word is a relative term which depicts a certain viewpoint.

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Pramāņa and Naya:
The concept of naya is as important as the concept of pramāṇa in Jainism. Both of these are the means of knowledge. As Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthasūtra clearly mentions "Valid means of knowledge (pramana) and the standpoints (naya) are the instruments for understanding the real elements." Thus naya is also a means to know the reality. Generally naya is understood as a part of pramāṇa and related to verbal testimony (āgamapramāṇa) as Vādidevasūri defines naya:- "After knowing a reality with śrutajñāna, a characteristic or a mode of that reality is known by a knower becoming indifferent to other characteristics and modes of that reality is called naya"". Hence
(i) naya is a part of pramāņa due to knowing point of view. (ii) naya is a kind of śrutajñāna.
(iii) a characteristic or a mode is known with a naya of a reality. Somewhere more characteristics and modes are also known with a particular view point (naya).
Naya is a part of pramāņa as- Pujyapāda Devanandi quotes in his Sarvārthasiddhi, "Naya is that which grasps a part of the content comprehended by Pramāṇa." When pramāņa is contrasted with naya, then 'pramāṇa' means complete knowledge or holistic knowledge and naya means partial knowledge. Naya is not a false cognition or erroneous cognition. So it is said that naya is neither pramāņa (which
'Tattvärthasutra 1.6: Pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ.
'Niyate yena śrutākhyapramāṇa-viṣyīkṛtasyāmśastaditarāmśaudāsīnyantaḥ sa pratipatturabhiprāya-viseṣo nayaḥ. - Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 7.1 "Sarvārthasiddhi on 1.6 p.24: Sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhīno vikalādeśo nayādhīnaḥ.

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means complete knowledge) nor apramāna (which means erroneous or false cognition), but it is pramāņāmśa (partial knowledge). Yaśovijaya says “A part of an ocean is neither an ocean, nor not-orean, similarly a naya is neither pramāņa nor apramāņa”.' Being partial knowledge, naya represents a particular stand-point or a particular perspective through which one understands an object. While doing so it does not deny that there are other stand-points or other perspectives. Naya and pramāņa are different because of their objects. An object of pramāṇa is anekānta and the object of naya is ekānta.'Bhatta Akalanka has propounded that right anekānta is pramāna and right ekānta is naya.” Definition of naya
The definition of naya as given by Prabhācandra explains its nature:
“Naya is the intention of the knower which cognises a part of the reality without negating the contrary view-points.”
In another words “Anaya can be defined as a particular opinion or viewpoint which does not rule out other different view points and is thereby, expressive of a partial truth about an object.” (Padmarajiah, 1963:310)
(i) Yathāhi samudraikadeśo na samudro nāpyasamudrastathā nayā api na pramāṇam, na vā apramāṇamiti. Jainatarkabhāṣā, nayapariecheda, (ii) nāpramāņam vā, nayo jñānātmako mataḥ, syātpramānaikadeśastu sarvāthāpyavirodhataḥ - Tattvārthaílokavārttika, nayavivarana, verse 16 *Kim ca na pramāņam nayaḥ, tasyānekānta vişayatvāt. na nayaḥ pramānam tasyaikāntavişayatvāt- Virasena, Dhavalā commentary, Jainendra siddhānta kośa, Vol. 2, p.516 *Tattvārthavārtika, 1.6 : Samyagekānto naya ityucyate. samyaganekāntaḥ
pramāņam. Wanirakrtapratipakṣo, vastvamsagrāhi jñāturabhiprāyo nayah.”Prameyakamalamārtaņda, Vol.3 p.657

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Yaśovijaya says in Jainatarkabhāṣā:
“Nayas are the specific determinate cognitions which grasp a single aspect of the reality, without denying other aspects, the reality consisting of infinite characteristics which is known through pramaņa.”
Naya expresses a particular partial or relative standpoint and does not deny others. But it does not recognise other standpoints either. It is said to be indifferent (udāsīna) about other standpoints. This is how it can be distinguished from pramāņa. Pramāņa recognises the existence of many standpoints from which a thing having infinite characteristics can be understood. When for example one who has understood the nature of soul in its totality says “From a view point soul is eternal”, (“Syāt jivaḥ nityaḥ”), he is not only expressing a standpoint, namely substantial standpoint from which soul is permanent, but also indicating that it is not the only standpoint, but there are other standpoints from which soul is non-eternal and so on.
In fact three ways of approaching the reality are available to us. One has a holistic and non-absolutist approach in which one expresses a standpoint while acknowledging the existence of other standpoints. Second one expresses a standpoint without denying other standpoints but by being indifferent to them. Third one has an absolutist approach in which he expresses a standpoint as if it is the only correct standpoint and others are wrong. The first approach can be called pramāņa which is
pramānaparicchannasya anantadharmātmakasya vastuna ekadeśagrāhinah taditarāmiśā- pratikşepiņo'dhyavasāyavićeşā nayāḥ"-Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā, Nayapariccheda 16...itaramsaudāsinyatah....", Pramānanayatattvāloka, 7.1

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expressed through syādvāda, the second one can be called the approach of naya. The third approach is called a bad naya or pseudo-naya (durnaya or nayābhāsa).Hemacandra in Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā expresses the three approaches lucidly as:
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"A thing is cognized in three ways: through a perverse view-point (durnaya) as "It is real only", through a partial viewpoint (naya) as "It is real" and through right knowledge (pramāṇa) as "In a way, it is real"."
Classifications of Naya
As we have seen above, naya is regarded as a part of śrutajñāna. Hence naya is not only a way of knowing, it is also a way of describing. Siddhasena-Divākara says: "There are as many view-points (nayas) as there are ways of speaking.'
,12
Since things have innumerable characteristics, there can be innumerable view-points and consequently innumerable descriptions of things. However the Jaina texts classify nayas in different ways. One broad classification is into dravyārthikanaya and paryāyārthikanaya. Dravyarthikanayas are those which focus on enduring characteristics of objects; and paryāyārthikanayas are those which focus on the changing characteristics of objects. This gives us a notion of reality as a synthesis of permanent and impermanent characteristics. In fact the reality according to Jainas is the synthesis of many binaries - one and many, identity and difference, particular and universal,
""sadeva, sat, syat saditi tridhartho, miyeta durnitinayapramāṇaiḥ/ yatharthadarsi tu nayapramāṇapathena durnītipatham tvamasthaḥ// "Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā, verse. 28 "Javaiyavayaṇapahā tāvaiyā ceva hunti nayavāyāl, Sanmatitarka, 3.47

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permanence and impermanence. Out of the two poles of a binary, a naya focuses on one of the two poles and neglects the other.
The seven-fold classification of nayas is most commonly accepted in different texts. Anuyogadvāra clearly mentions seven nayas: naigama, sangraha, vyavahāra, rjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūdha and evambhūta." In Svetāmbara version of Tattvārthasūtra (1.34) only first five are counted as the kinds of naya. But then sabdanaya is subdivided into three kinds: sabda, samabhirūdha and evambhūta. The reading of Tattvārthasūtra accepted in Digambara tradition mentions all the seven nayas." Siddhasenasūri in Sanmatitarka (1.4-25) mentions six nayas excluding naigamanaya. He subdivides naigama into two kinds: universalistic and particularistic. He reduces the former to sangrahanaya and the latter to vyavahāranaya. A fifth century Jaina thinker Mallavādī Kşmāśramaņa wrote Dvādaśāranayacakra in which he introduced the wheel of twelve nayas. He explains this twelvefold classification in terms of the two-fold classification into dravya and paryāya and also the well-known sevenfold classification.
The other broad classification is arthanaya and śabdanaya. Arthanaya is about the thing's own characteristics. śabdanaya is about the characteristics caused by the association of the thing with language. Through the broad category of śabdanaya Jainas indicate the fact that many a time our
"Satta mūlanayā pannattā, tamjahā - negame, sangahe, vavahāre, ujjusue, sadde, samabhirudhe evambhūte. - Anuyogadvārasūtra, sūtra 606 "Naigama-sangrah a -vyavahārarjusūtra -sabda -samabhirūdhaivambhūtā nayāḥ Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.33

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understanding of things is coloured by the linguistic categories imposed on them.
Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra introduces another classification namely niścaya-naya (true view-point) and vyavahāra-naya (conventional view-point)." Kundakunda used this classification in his theorisation of spiritual view point as niścaya naya and empirical view point as vyavahāra naya. This classification is comparable to the Buddhist classification of truths between paramārthasat and lokasamvști-sat and the Vedānta classification between pāramārthika-sattā and vyāvahārika-sattā. Sevenfold Classification:
Sevenfold classification is quite old in Jaina literature, as it is found in the Anuyogadvāra sūtra. Among these seven nayas naigama, sangraha and vyavahāra nayas are the expansion of dravyārthika naya and the rest four nayas - rjusūtra, śabda, sambhirādha and evambhuta nayas are the part of paryāyārthikanaya. Here a brief introduction to the seven nayas is presented:i)Naigamanaya (Goal-oriented viewpoint or pluralistic
view-point): The term naigama is derived in two ways and accordingly naigama-naya is interpreted in two ways.(1) naigama is derived from nigama which means intention (sankalpa) for achieving an aim or goal. When someone is performing an action with some aim or goal, the action can be described as actualisation of that goal. For example a person is going to jungle with an axe in hand in order to cut wood and
"See, Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra, śataka 18, uddeśaka 6

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produce a wooden measuring pot called prasthaka. When asked what he is doing, he may simply answer, “I am making a prasthaka.” This answer shows an intention of that person." When a student intends to go to college and at the time of wearing clothes his father asks him - 'What are you doing?' He answers - "I am going to college.” The student's goal is to go to college and wearing clothes is a part of that goal, hence student's statement is right according to naigamanaya.(2) The term naigama is derived as “naika-gamo (not one understanding) naigamaḥ.”Accordingly Naigama means considering a thing in plural or diverse ways. Naigama involves focusing on different general and specific characteristics of things by treating one of the characteristics as main and the other as subordinate. ii)Sangrahanaya (Collective view-point): When something is described in terms of its general characteristic shared by other things, having a collective view-point is called sangrahanaya. It is concerned with the general or common attributes of a class or group of identical objects. For example word 'dravya' includes all six categories of dravya in it with sangraha naya. Sangrahanaya is of two kinds: parasangraha (comprehensively collective view-point) and aparasangraha, (Non-comprehensively collective viewpoint) Comprehensively collective view-point says that all the things in the world share a common characteristic namely that they are real. Non-comprehensively collective view-point describes things in terms of lower universals such as
substance-ness, quality-ness etc. "The example of prasthaka is found in Anuyogadvārasūtra. On the basis of this example ĀcāryaPūjyapāda gives this interpretation of Naigamanaya in his Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.33, p. 100: anabhinirvíttārtha - sankalpamātragrāhī- naigamaḥ.

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iii) Vyavahāranaya (Particularist or differential view-point): Whereas sangrahanaya emphasises unity and commoness, vyavahāranaya is the view-point which emphasises particularity and diversity. It cognises things as having many kinds. For example when it talks about a soul, it immediately classifies souls into liberated ones and transmigrating ones. The transmigrating souls are again classified into mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara) ones, or those into onesensed, two-sensed etc. up to five-sensed and also mind possessing souls and so on. iv)Rjusūtranaya (Immediate view-point): Rjusūtranaya focuses on an immediate present mode of object. It ignores enduring or substantial aspects of things and concentrates on their momentary and immediately available aspects. Under this naya we do not consider, though we do not deny that the same object had some modes in the past and would have some modes in future. We may describe such an object by using the expressions as 'this is red' or 'here now yellow' or 'here is now the feeling of pleasure''?. v)Sabdanaya (Syntactical view-point): One who is using śabdanaya is focusing on the influence of the grammatical form of words on the meaning of the description. Tense of the sentence, the case-endings of the words, the genders of the nouns, singularity or plurality and suffixes of the word-forms are the factors which are responsible for the difference in meaning of a sentence. One who is applying sabdanaya emphasises these factors for example “Rāma was a king of Ayodhyā” this sentence gives its meaning that Ram was a king in the past, not in the present. This reflects ‘sabdanaya'.
"" sukhavivartah sampratyasti", Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, 7.29

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vi)Samabhirūdhanaya (Etymological view-point): One who is using samabhirūdhanaya emphasises that the meaning or the shade of the meaning of a word changes according to the etymology of the word. For instance the three Sanskrit synonyms Indra, Sakra and Purandara denote the same mythological person namely the king of gods. But the connotations of these words change according to their etymologies. So 'Indra''8 means prosperous, 'Sakra” means powerful and 'Purandara” means destroyer of the cities. Still use of these words for the same person can be regarded as a case of samabhirūụhanaya. vii)Evambhūtanaya (Functionalist view-point): Evambhūta literally means “(which) exists in this way”. According to this view-point a word is applied to a thing when the thing is performing the function indicated by the word. This viewpoint is also concerned with etymology, but here the focus is on whether the present function of the object tallies with the etymology of the word used for referring to it. For example one may prefer to call a person a lecturer only at the time when he or she is lecturing. Expansion of Naya theory in daily life
In the beginning naya theory was limited to grasp the suitable meaning of canonical sentences. Hence, it was put in the category of śrutajñāna or śrutapramāņa. Later on, its sphere developed to understand the real meaning of sentences spoken by a scholar and a layman. Nayas are very much helpful in understanding the reality consisting of multi attributes
"Derived from the root Vind=to prosper "Derived from the root vsak = to be able to Derived from the pur ( = city) + root vdr ( = to destroy)

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(aneka-dharmātmaka vastu). It is very much useful to understand the truth with various aspects. Nayas are used in daily life now in understanding the others' views and expressing our own views. Theory of naya is helpful in synthesizing the philosophical ideas applying view points in them. This theory is also a solution to the problems of obstination and harshness in behaviour. It develops an art of speaking with avoiding confrontations and also understanding the things in a way to solve the problems which generate confrontations. Hence naya theory is very much useful in our daily life.
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The doctrine of Nayābhāsa:
When a view point excludes and rules out another view points, then it is called as 'nayābhāsa'. Nayābhāsa can be defined as absolutistic fallacy which consists in treating a relative truth as absolute truth. Since different philosophical systems understand and describe reality in different ways, different nayas can be correlated to different philosophical systems. The doctrine of naya in this way is a metaphilosophical doctrine. In the history of Jainism Siddhasenasūri (5th century) compared Indian philosophical systems with nayas. Afterwards Akalankabhatta (8th century) described those systems as the cases of nayābhāsa. The idea was that though different systems of philosophy understand and describe reality from a partial view-point, they regard their understanding and description as absolute and complete truth. As a result their view-point becomes a pseudo-view-point (nayābhāsa) or a defective view-point (durnaya). Vādidevasūri (12th century) has given examples of different doctrines of various Indian philosophies as nayābhāsa, due to their

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absolustic view. Mallişeņasuri (15th centuy) clearly categorises the Indian philosophies in different nayābhāsas. Upādhyāya, Yaśovijaya (17“ century) has supported him. Which Indian system comes under the category of which nayābhāsa is shown below: Nayābhāsa
Philosophical system Naigamābhāsa
Nyāya-Vaiseșika Para-sangrahābhāsa
Advaita-Vedānta Apara-sangrahābhāsa
Sānkhya Vyavahārābhāsa
Cārvāka Rjusūtrabhāsa
Buddhism Sabdanayābhāsa
Vyākaraņa Samabhirūdhābhāsa
Vyākaraņa Evambhūtābhāsa
Vyākarana This classfication of nayābhāsa was discussed by Mallişeņasūri in his syādvādamañjart' and by Yaśovijaya in his Adhyātmasāra.? Explanation Regarding Nayābhāsas:
In our language there are different words for substances, qualities, motions and relations. Naigamanaya consists in describing them as different. But Nyaya-Vaiseśikaş accept different categories (padārthas) as absolutely distinct from each other like substance, quality, action, univarsal etc. Hence the Jainas accuse the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseșikas for committing the fallacy called naigamābhāsa (Pseudo-pluralistic view).
Corresponding to each type of sangrahanaya, Jainas conceived of the corresponding sangrahabhasa. For example
Syadvādamañjarī, p.248 "Adhyātmasāra, verse 879.

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Parasanigraha consists in understanding and describing everything as real. But Jainas observed that Advaita-Vedāntin treats this understanding and description as absolute and says that everything is real and real alone, and all the other properties are delusory. This comprehensive reductionism of Vedāntins amounts to the fallacy called parasangrahābhāsa (Pseudocomprehensively-collective view). On the other hand, Jainas observed, Samkhyas do not reduce everything to 'real', but they divide the world to two basic categories, prakṛti and puruşa and describe all objects of the world as manifestations of prakṛti. This non-comprehensive reductionism of Sāmkhyas can be called apara-sangrahābhāsa.
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Generally Cārvākas are accused of committing vyvahārābhāsa. But the reason is not clear. A possible reason is that whereas Cārvākas accept empirical reality (Vyāvahārikasatta) they do not accept the so-called ultimate reality (Pāramārthika-sattā) beyond that. This is an absolutist or exclusivist approach to vyavahāra which Jainas seem to be interpreting as the fallacious view-point called vyavahārābhāsa (Pseudo-empirical view-point). In fact Jainas interpret vyavahāranaya as particularist view-point. In that case treating particularity as absolutely real and universal features as unreal will be the pseudo-particularist view-point which can be called vyavahārābhāsa. Jainas could have attributed it to the Buddhists who accept only unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) as real and universals (sāmānya) as unreal.
The Jainas claim that the Buddhists treat this immediate view-point as absolute. They regard only immediate momentary experiences as real and others as illusory. Therefore

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Buddhism according to them exemplifies the fallacious viewpoint called rjusūtrābhāsa.
Śabdanaya emphasises the role of words in determining the nature of reality. Vyakaraṇa school overemphasizes this role and gives the word the status of Brahman. Jainas call this absolutist approach to word as Sabdanayābhāsa (Pseudosyntactical view-point).
If we consider sabdanaya as a broad category, then samabhiruḍhanaya and evambhūtanaya can be taken to be the special cases of Sabdanaya. Hence fallacies of these nayas can be treated as special cases of Śabdanayābhāsa. Samabhiruḍhanaya stands for emphasis on etymological meanings of words. Hence overemphasis on etymological meaning of words would amount to Samabhirūḍhābhāsa (Pseudo-etymological view). So if someone insists that a person can be named as 'Indra' only if he is prosperous, as 'Śakra' only if he is powerful and as 'Purandara' only if he is destroyer of the cities then the claimant is committing the fallacy called Samabhiruḍhābhāsa. Evambhutanaya emphasises application of a word to a thing only at the time when the object performs the function indicated by the word. Now overemphasis on functionalist meaning of a word would be a case of evabhūtābhāsa (Pseudo-functional view). For example if one insists that someone can be called a teacher only at the time when he or she is teaching, and that he or she ceases to be a teacher when he/she comes out of the class, then one is committing the fallacy called evabhūtābhāsa.
Pradeep Gokhale (1989) has accepted the application of nayābhāsa in western Phhilosophical field also. He says "The

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doctrine of nayābhāsa has wider applicability which goes beyond the domain of Indian philosophical systems. It can be applied to absolute dogmatic views held by some western philosophers as well. For example Platonism which holds only universal ideas as real and empirical objects as appearances would amount to aparasangrahābhāsa. Phenomenalism which accepts only immediately given sense datum as real would amount to rjusūtrābhāsa. Cartesian view of absolute distinction between mind and matter would be a case of naigamābhāsa.”
Jaina Doctrine of Nayābhāsa in this way can be appreciated as an important contribution to non-formal logical thinking in Indian philosophy. Saptabhangi-naya
Theory of Sabtabhanginaya is an expansion of naya theory. Predications about any thing can be seven in nature. If we say about existence of a soul then the statements may be made as follows:1. Relatively Rāma exists (syādasti Rāmaḥ) This relativity refers to present substance, space, time and mode about Rāma. 2. Relatively Rāma does not exists (syād nāsti Ramaḥ) - This also refers to some relative term that ancient Rāma, son of Daśaratha does not exist. 3. Relatively Rāma exists and does not exist (syād asti, syad nāsti Rāmaḥ) (if statement is made in a certain order then both the facts may be said in this way) 4. Relatively it is in-expressible (syād avaktavyaḥ) - if we say simutaneously about Rāma's existence and inexistence, then it is in-expressible.

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5. Relatively from the view point of present Ram, he exists and simultaneous view point it is in-expressible. (syād asti avaktavyaḥ). 6. From the present viewpoint past Rāma does not exist and from the simultaneous point of view it is in-expressible (syād nāsti avaktavyaḥ). 7. From the point of view of present Rāma, he exists, from the point of view of past Rāma he does not exist and if we say simultaneously, then it is in-expressible (syādasti nāsti avaktavyaḥ). In this way seven kinds of predications are made. The basic kinds are three - Exists (asti), does not exists (nāsti) and inexpressible (avaktavyaḥ). By permutation of these three, seven kinds of predications come out in to existence. Nikșepa
Nikṣepa is a technical term for a method by which proper meaning of a word in the relevant context is grasped. There is a minor difference between naya and nikșepa. Naya deals with a sentence and nikṣepa deals with a word. Naya conveys the proper meaning of a sentence and nikṣepa conveys suitable meaning of word in the context. There are four types of nikṣepa - 1.Nāma (name) 2.Sthāpanā (symbol) 3.Dravya (potentiality) and 4.Bhāva (actuality). 1. Nāma Nikṣepa - A word used to name some person, thing etc. is nāma nikșepa, This name does not require its etymological meaning, for example a name Mahāvīra is used for a person who is coward by nāma nikṣepa. A blind person may be Jyotiprakash (enlightened) by his name. Arihanta may be a name for a new born baby or for a building by nāma nikṣepa.

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2. Sthāpanā Nikșepa - When a word is used for an artificial identity of a person, thing etc. representing its original identity then it is called “Sthāpanā nikṣepa’. Through this nikṣepa a real character is understood in its image, picture, role etc. For example Rāma was a son of king Dasharatha, but through Sthāpanā niksepa Rāma word can be used for his statue or for a dramatist playing a role of Rāma. By this nikṣepa a child understands a picture of peacock as a real peacock. An idol of Mahāvīra is treated as Tīrthankara Mahāvīra by this nikṣepa. 3. Dravya nikṣepa - In dravya nikṣepaa word is used for a person, thing etc. on the basis of its past and future state. For example a student studying in a medical college may be called doctor on the basis of his future position. A patavārī (a person serving in a village for farms measurement etc.) even after his retirement called as patavārī on the basis of his past position. 4. Bhāva nikṣepa - when an activity is also performed according to the use of a word then that is called bhāva nikṣepa. for example when a person is engaged in teaching, then the use of teacher word is proper in the light of bhāva nikṣepa. Thus use of word dancer is quite proper at the time of a person's dancing activity
The concept of niksepa is useful for finding a proper meaning of a canonical word, but it is also useful in our daily life as well. Conclusion
Theory of naya is ancient, unique and an original contribution of Jaina thinkers to the Indian tradition. It is clearly found in Anuyogadvāra sūtra and Tattvārthasūtra. Application of drayārthika naya and paryāyārthika naya is very much

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available in Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra when lord Mahāvīra replies to the various questions of inquisitive persons. For example in Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra a question was arose - Are souls eternal or non-eternal? Mahavīra replied that from the point of view of substance the souls are eternal. They are never generated, but from the point of view of modes they are noneternal, because souls get different modes of living beings of the hell, the heaven and on the earth as animals, birds, insects, human beings, etc. This type of answering was prevalent in the canonical literature.
Concept of nikṣepa is also an original contribution of Jainism to Indian tradition. It gives a view to investigate the proper suitable meaning of a word in the prevailing context.
Bibliography Primary Sources:
Adhyātmasāra of Yaśovijaya, with Hindi Translation and commentary by Sādhvi Prītidarśanaśrī, Ahmedabada: Śrī Rajarajendendra Prakāśana Trust, 2009.
Anyayogavyvacchedadvātrimśikā of Hemacandra as in Syādvādamañjarī of Mallişeņa. (see Syādvādamañjarī)
Anuyogadvārasūtra, Beawar: Āgama Prakashana samiti, 1987.
Dvādaśaranayacakra, (ed) Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavanagar : Ātmānand Jain Sabhā, 1966.
Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā, Translated with Notes by Dayānanda Bhārgava, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973
Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa (Vol.2), Delhi : Bhartīya-Jñānapītha
Pramāṇanayatattvāloka of Vādidevasūri, With Hindi Translation by Pt. Shobha Chandra Bharilla, Ahmedanagar: Shri Tiloka Ratna Sthānakavāsi Jain Dhārmika Parīkņā Board, 2000

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Prameyakamalamārtaņņa (Vol. 3) by Prabhācandrasūri, Hindi translation by Āryikā Jinamati, Hastināpur: Digambara Jaina Triloka śodha samsthān.
Sanmati- tarka by Siddhasenadivākara, English translation by A.S. Gopani, Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1939/2000.
Sarvārthasiddhi by Ācārya-Pūjyapāda, Delhi : Bhāratīya Jñānapītha, 154 edition 2009.
Syādvādamañjarī of Mallişenasūri, A commentary on Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimsikā of Hemacandra, Agās: Param śruta prabhāvaka mandala. 1992.
Tattvārthaślokavārtika, nayavivarana, published in Māilladhavala's Nayacakra (ed.) Kailasachandra śāstrī, Delhi : Bharatīya Jñānapītha, 1971.
Tattvārthasūtra, Translation with Hindi commentary by Pt. Sukhalāl Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parshvanāth vidýāpitha, 5th edition 2001.
Tattvārtha-vārttika of Bhatta Akalarka, Delhi : Bhāratīya Jñānapitha, 8h edition 2008.
Vyākhyā prajñptisūtra, Beawar:āgama prakaśana samiti Modern Sources Gokhale, Pradeep: “The Jaina Doctrine of Nayābhāsa”, Sambhaşā, (Journal of the Department of Indian philosophy, University of Nagoya, Japan), Vol. 11, 1989. Jain, Dharm chand, “Naya evaṁ Nikṣepa” (Hindi), Jaina Dharmadarśana : eka Anuśīlana, Jaipur: Prakrit Bhārati Academy, 2015 Jain, Sāgarmal: Jaina Philosophy of Language (English Translation by Prof. Surendra Verma), Varanasi: Parshvanāth Vidyāpitha, 2006 Padmarajiah, Y.J. (1963): A comparative study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and knowledge, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.

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Philosophy is the root cause of origination and development of science, because philosophy gives ideas for inventions and experiments. But there is a basic difference between science and philosophy; science has made its field of experiments on matter (pudgala) only, whereas philosophy has much wider field of knowledge and formless entities like soul. If we think about the concept of Consciousness according to the various branches of science, then consciousness can be defined as the activity of sense-organs, mind, brain and the cells, on one hand and when consciousness is defined according to Jaina philosophy then it is an attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments on the other hand. Consciousness and soul
The word 'consciousness' is used mainly in two meanings – 1. Alertness (awareness) 2. Feeling of livingness (cetanā). In Jainism 'apramāda' word is used in the sense of alertness and 'upayoga', 'prāņa', 'sañjňā' for the feeling of livingness. In Jainism, a soul is considered as the ultimate source of consciousness. Consciousness is the very nature of a soul with or without body. If the soul departs from the body, sense organs and brain do not work; the body is called dead. So it is a question for the scientists that how the consciousness arises and how it vanishes. Where does it come from and where does it go? Except the Cārvāka thinkers, all the branches of Indian philosophy accept a concept of soul which is the source

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of consciousness. Nyāya and Vaiseșika philosophers mention soul as omnipresent, but they accept its consciousness limited to body. Vedānta philosophers propound omnipresent brahma and living beings as its part (caitnayāmía). Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as eternal entity. They accept a flow of consciousness which is called vijñāna or citta.
Jain philosophy is specific in this regard. It stresses that the soul of living beings resides within the body. Every living being is having a different or independent soul. A soul is a knower; sense organs, mind and brain are the instruments for knowing the objects. This soul has a nature of consciousness which serves consciousness in different parts of the body including brain, nervous system and every cell.
It is difficult to define a soul, but consciousness is the very nature of a soul. According to Uttarādhyayanasūtra knowledge (jñāna) intuition or observation (darśana), conduct (cāritra), penance (tapa), internal power (vīrya) and cognitive application (upayoga) are the nature of a soul'. We can know a soul through its attributes or activities. Knowledge (jñāna) and observation (darśana) are the main characteristics of a soul. In Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, it is stated that soul is knowledge (right or perverted) and knowledge is soul. Soul is darśana and darśana is soul?. In this way the nature of a soul can be defined as knowledge (jñāna) and observation or intuition (darśana). Application of these two is called as upayoga. This upayoga is consciousness.
Nānam ca damsaņam ceva carittam ca tavo tahā. vīriyam uvaogo ya eyam jīvassa lakkhanam - Uttarādhyayanasūtra, 28.3 Goyamā āyā siya nāne, siya annāne, nāne puna niyamam āyā Goyama āyā niyamam damsane, damsane vi niyamam āyā. -Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, Šataka 12, Uddeśaka 10, Sūtra 10-18

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There are eight types of soul - 1. A soul as a substance (dravyātmā) 2. A soul with passions (kaṣāyatmā) 3. A soul with activities of mind, speech and body (yogātmā) 4. A soul with cognitive activity (upayogātmā) 5. A soul with attribute of knowledge (jñānātmā) 6. A soul with attribute of intuition (darśanātmā) 7. A soul with conduct (cāritrātmā) and 8. A soul with attribute of internal power (vīryātmā)3. Basically a soul is a substance, but when it exhibits any of the above characteristics or it enjoins passions etc. then it is addressed by respective names.
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Consciousness and its various levels
Consciousness can be technically termed as 'upayoga' in Jainism. Upayoga is an application of cognitive and intuitive ability of a soul. Consciousness includes an attitude, vision and conduct of a living being. Cognition of happiness and sorrow also denote consciousness. There are many levels of consciousness; we can put them in the following categories:
1) Consciousness as apramattatā or alertness.
2) Consciousness as upayoga or knowing activity.
3) Consciousness as prāṇa (active ability of sense organs, mind, speech, body, respiration and life-span).
4) Consciousness in mind
5) Consciousness in body
6) Consciousness as sañjñā (eagerness to eat, feeling fear,
sexual desire, desire of possessiveness).
7) Consciousness as vedanā
3
8) Consciousness expressed in virya or enthusiasm.
Vyakhyāprajñaptisūtra, Śataka 12, Uddeśaka 10, Sūtra 1

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In this way, there are many levels or kinds of consciousness experienced by a living being. A pure and complete consciousness is found in the liberated souls (having destroyed the eight karmas“) and in pious souls having destroyed the four ghāti karmas (namely jñānāvaraṇa, darśanāvaraņa, mohaniya and antarāya). Variations in Consciousness and apramattatā
Mostly living beings on the earth are having karmic bondage, hence the consciousness is not fully manifested in them. There are six categories of the living beings on the basis of variation in manifestation of the consciousness. The living beings having only one tactile sense organ are the lowest in manifestation of their consciousness. Two sensed beings can manifest more consciousness than one sensed, three sensed beings more than the two sensed beings; In this way five sensed beings are able to manifest more consciousness. The being having mind with the five sense organs are quite more able in expressing consciousness. The human beings possessing a right view can express more consciousness. The degree of consciousness increases in experience of pious conduct and character. In Jainism a holy monk with five mahāvratas ((i)abstinence from violence (ii) abstinence from falsehood (iii) abstinence from theft (iv) abstinence from sexual desire (v) abstinence from possessiveness), five samitis or vigilances (in movement, speaking, eating, handling things and evacuation) and three guptis (as control of mind, speech and body) bears more vividness in consciousness. A monk having alertness in
Eight karmas are - jñānāvarana, darśanāvarana, vedanīya, mohanīya, āyusya, nāma, gotra and antarāya.

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every activity expresses more consciousness. In this way living with alertness shows high level of consciousness. A laity man having five small vows is also on the path to live with better consciousness than a lay man, if he is alert in doing activity with
awareness.
Consciousness as upayoga
'Upayoga' denotes the cognitive function of a living being. It includes knowing through sense organs, mind and directly through a soul. • Upayoga is of two kinds i) Knowing in a constructive or articulate form i.e. (jñāna) ii) Knowing in nirvikalpaka or in-articulate form i.e. darśana.
Jñāna and darśana are the key factors of upayoga or cognitive function. In Nandisūtra and other texts of Jain philosophy five types of knowledge are mentioned as matijñāna (sensuous knowledge), śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (visual intuition), manaḥparyāya jñāna (intuition of mental modes) and kevaljñāna (pure and perfect knowledge). Among these knowledges matijñāna appears in a soul through sense-organs, or mind or by both. Sense organs and mind are the instruments; consciousness comes in these organs from the soul. Matijñāna or ābhinibodhika jñāna includes recognition, thinking, reasoning, intellect and inference in it. Knowledge of former birth (jāti smaraņa jñāna) is also a phenomenon of matijñāna. Four types of intellect (autpāttikī, vainayikī, karmajā and pāriņāmikī) are also the part of matijñāna. All intellectual activities of a person denote consciousness. Śrutajňāna appears

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in a living being as verbal knowledge or as discriminative knowledge (vivekajñāna). Discriminative knowledge is a significant nature of consciousness. Avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna appear directly in a soul. Through avadhijñāna material world can be known without the use of sense organs and mind. manaḥparyāyajñāna is also direct knowledge, by which mental modes of others are known by a conscious monk. Kevalajñāna is a pure and perfect knowledge with which everything and its every mode is perceived lucidly.
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Knowledge illuminates itself as well as the object. In Niyamasāra Acārya Kundakunda propounds the selfluminosity of knowledge. He says -
"Knowledge is not without a soul and soul is not without knowledge. It is doubtless, hence, knowledge is self and object illuminating. Darśana is also self and object illuminating like knowledge."
Darśana is also a significant term in Jain scriptures to denote consciousness. It is an in-articulate cognition, which is succeeded by articulate-cognition i.e. knowledge. There are four types of darśana- (a) cakṣu-darśana (in-articulate cognition through eyes) (b) Acakṣu-darśana ( in-articulate cognition through mind and sense organs other than eyes) (c) Avadhi-darśana (in-articulate cognition directly by soul succeeded by avadhi-jñāna) (d) Kevala-darśana (in-articulate cognition or intuition directly by a soul succeeded by Kevalajñāna).
appāņam viņu nāṇam, nāṇam viņu appago na samdeho
tamhā saparapayasam nāṇam taha damsanam hodi II - Niyamasara, 171

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Every soul has an essential attribute of in-articulate cognition and articulate cognition. Both of these cognitive attributes are manifested as consciousness in a sequence of inarticulate and articulate manner. The scientists have explored the system of knowing through sense organs and their link with the nervous system and brain, but they do not have reached up to the source of consciousness.
There are four stages of knowing the material objects through sense organs i.e. avagraha, Tha, avāya and dhāraņā. Avagraha is a primary knowledge in which an object is known without its specific properties. Īha is a knowledge having inclination to know the object with its property, and the ascertaining knowledge about the object is called avāya. When that avāya knowledge goes into retention, then it is named as dhāraņā knowledge. These four stages are very important in learning process. Why children do not learn the lesson properly? Its answer is lying in the Jaina principle of learning through stages of matijñāna. This principle is useful in the educational psychology. This is a psychological science of learning that if a learning process is up to retention, then memory takes place. Without retention memory cannot take place. Consciousness as Prāņa
Prāņa (vitality) is another technical term in Jaina scriptures which shows consciousness in a living being. This 'prāņa' word has a different meaning from the meaning which is referred in Yoga philosophy. In Yoga philosophy prāņa word has been used for vital airs which are of five kinds- prāņa (air inhaled and exhaled), apāna (air goes out through anus), vyāna

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(air pervaded in the whole body), udāna (air in the throat), samāna (air in the stomach). In Jainism prāņas are of 10 types 1. Auditory sense 2. Visual sense 3.Olfactory sense 4. Gustatory sense 5. Tactile sense 6. Mental force 7. Power of speech 8. Power of body 9. Respiration and 10. Karma related to life span (āyuşya karma). The Prāņaş depict the living power of the five sense organs, body, speech, mind, respiration and āyușya karma. Every sense organ has power to work. If that sense organ is damaged or harmed then that does not work as knowing instrument. A person can live life even in the non-working position of some sense organs, but the working power of sense organs denotes consciousness. I hear a word. I see a bird, I smell a flower, I taste a candy. I touch a chair- all these knowing activities show consciousness of sense organs and also of a knower. A knower remains the same in knowing process with the help of different sense organs. We feel consciousness in the functioning of mind and speech. We feel consciousness in the whole body also. In the violence these prāņas are affected and at the time of death these prāņas are destroyed. According to Jainism sense organs, body, mind, speech are made of pudgala or material contents, but these are having consciousness due to association with the conscious soul. Consciousness in Mind
In Jainism, mind is made of matter (pudgala), but it has a quality of thinking and desire, hence mind also bears consciousness. A conscious mind is very useful for the real development of a human being. If it is controlled or restrained, then it is useful for spiritual development, if it is uncontrolled or wanton, it is a big cause for fall of a person. Neurologists talk about brain and accept that mind is a product of brain.

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According to Svetāmbara Jain texts this mind is a separate entity and pervaded in the whole body, whereas Digamber texts, accept its shape as eight feathered lotus flower and its residence is in the heart only. But mind is used in every knowing activity of sense organs and its own. In Vyakhyāprajñapti sūtra a question has been raised that a mind is conscious (sacitta) or unconscious (acitta)? Answer has been given that mind is not conscious, it is unconscious'. Here it is to be clarified that mind is different from a soul and it is made of matter or pudgala", hence it is not conscious, but it is found only in living beings' and formed at the time of thinking only.
A sense organ is associated with an object, mind is associated with that sense organ and the soul is associated with the mind. This is the procedure of knowing the objects through sense organs. Somewhere a soul can know the objects directly through the mind. Sorrow and happiness can be known in this manner. Psychologists accept mind as a separate entity and Freud mentions three types of mind as-conscious, unconscious and sub-conscious. We are aware of the conscious mind. A big part of our mind remains unconscious, which has a store of imprints of our unfulfilled wants and samskāras. Sub-conscious mind has a function to get some feelings or desires from conscious mind to unconscious mind and from unconscious mind to conscious mind.
Sacitte bhante! mane? Goyama! No sacitte maņe, acitte mane. - Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, Šataka 13 Uddeśaka 7, Sūtra 11(2) Aya bhante! Mane? Anne mane? Goyamā! No āyā mane, anne mane -Ibid, sūtra 10 Rūvi bhante! mane arūvi mane? Goyamā rūvi mane, no arūvi mane - Ibid, sūtra 11(1) Jīvānam bhante mane, ajīvānam maņe? Goyamā! jīvānam maņe no ajīvānam mane - Ibid sūtra 11(4) Puvvim bhante mane, mannijjamāne mane? Mana-samaya-vīikkante mane? Goyamā! No puvvim mane, mannijjamāṇe mane no maņa-samaya-viikkante maņe-Ibid, sūtra 12

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Consciousness in body
Jaina scriptures enumerate five types of bodies as {1} Gross body (audārika) {2}Protean body(vaikriya) {3}Translocational body(āhāraka) {4}Luminious body (taijasa śarīra) {5}Karmic body (kārmaņaśarīra). In these five types of body, we are aware of the gross body only. All human beings, animals, birds, insects, plants etc. are having gross or audārika body. This body is made of gross material. Vaikriya body is found in heavenly bodies (devas) and hell bodies (nārakas) by birth. In human beings this body may enjoin the gross body after some required spiritual achievement. This body can have different modes on the will of its owner. Ahāraka or translocational body is a subtle body which is used by a monk having a vast knowledge of 14 purvas. This body is used to get answers from a Tīrthankara residing in a distant place like Mahāvideha. This subtle body comes out from the gross body and after getting answer, it enters again at its place. This body may be a mystery for the biologists. Taijasa and Karmic bodies are more subtle and these are not obstructed by any obstacle. These two bodies are found in every non-liberated soul. Karmic body is a store house of Karma- bondage, and Luminous or Taijasa body maintains a level of energy and it is helpful in the procedure of digestion etc. These two subtle bodies live with a soul even in the way of getting a new birth.
Biologists have done experiments on gross body, but they do not know about vaikriya, āhārak, taijasa and karmic bodies. In present human beings vaikriya and āhāraka bodies are often unavailable, but taijasa and Karmic bodies are liable for investigation. If something is known after experiments that might be a pace in the biological science, knowing the mystery of life.

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Consciousness as Sañjňā
An instinct desire or sañjňā also indicate consciousness in a living being. There are four famous sañjñās - 1. Eagerness for food (āhāra sañjñā) 2. Feeling of fear (bhaya sañjñā) 3.Sexual desire (maithuna sanjñā) 4. Desire of possessiveness (parigraha sañjñā). These four sañjñās are experienced in every living being including in the plants. Every living being feels hunger and wants to take food. It makes an effort for gaining food. The feeling of fear is also a characteristic of worldly living beings. All living beings fear from death, harm etc. This fear is found only in the worldly soul. Sexual desire is also a phenomenon of consciousness. This desire may have three forms - 1. Desire of intercourse of a male with female. 2. Desire of intercourse of a female with male. 3. Sexual desire of hermaphrodite. This is a desire of reproduction. Possessiveness is also found in conscious beings. Human beings, insects and even plants bear this phenomenon. The non-living things do not bear these four sañjñās. Consciousness as Vedanā
Vedanā is another technical term of Jainism, which denotes an experience of happiness and sorrow, coldness and hotness etc. by a living being. This 'vedanā' is felt on the level of mind and body. It may be a result of the karma-bondage. Pleasure or comfort may be felt through five sense organs and mind. Consciousness as Vīrya
Enthusiasm (vīrya) is also a significant nature of consciousness. A living being feels enthusiasm with in him to

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do something. Where does from this enthusiasm come? Generally it is accepted that enthusiasm comes from the food which we eat. Vaidic statement 'annam vai prāṇāḥ' proves it. It is true that without food body cannot run for a long time. Food is the source of energy to work through body. Body is made of matter (pudgal), so materialistic (paudgalika) food is required to sustain it. Soul has its own enthusiasm or power which is expressed in mental power and in emotional balance. Soul gives consciousness to body, but it has to leave the body, if that is not capable to sustain with consciousness. If the body is decayed and prānas are arrested then soul leaves that body and goes to take birth in a new body with two subtle bodies namely taijas and kārmaṇa.
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Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes and it has proved that cells of the body are changing every moment. Body cells are renewed in a certain time interval; hence food is needed for this activity of change. This gross body cannot survive without food. According to Jainism, animation in gross body, brain, genes etc. is found due to consciousness of the soul. In the presence of a soul all of these work consciously.
Science has done experiments on the matter or pudgala having eight touch qualities". Gross body, blood, brain, genes are the matter of eight touch qualities. Jaina scriptures propound a matter of four touch quality and two touch quality also. Kārmaṇa and Taijas bodies are the example of four touch
11
Eight types of touch are - cold, hot, smooth (positive charge), rough (negative charge), light, heavy, soft and hard.

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quality matter. These should be taken up for an experiment by the scientists. Paramaņu or atom in Jainism has been propounded with a quality of two touches of smooth (positive charge) or rough (negative charge) and hotness or coldness. Matter can be the part of experiment by instrument, but the real consciousness of soul is difficult to come under the purview of experiments. Its approval has three sources according to Jaina philosophers
1. Self-perception or self-realization 2. Inference- There are many logical arguments by which
an entity of soul is approved. In Rājapraśniyasūtra Keśīśramana has given so many arguments to king Pradeshi for establishment of a soul which is different from a body. Sense organs, mind are the instruments; someone should be the user of these instruments and
that user is a soul. 3. Canonical literature- The enlightened souls have told
about the independent existence of a soul, by which consciousness is felt in a body.
It is interesting to know that violence of prāņas, falsehood, theft, sexual copulation, possessiveness, anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc. 18 sins appear in a soul", but these are having a characteristic of subtle pudgal having five colours, two odours, five tastes and four touches (cold, hot, smooth and hard). Scientists have done experiments on subtle matter, but still they have to do experiments on the intensity of anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc.
12 Vyākhyāprajňapti Sūtra, Śataka 20, Uddeśaka 3, Sūtra 1

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These experiments will help a human being in understanding the intensity of these passions and disorder. Knowing the intensity a person will be aware enough to reduce these sinful emotions and activities. At present the examination of blood, sonography, MRI, CT scan are quiet helpful in the physical health. The examination of anger etc. will be quiet helpful for mental and spiritual health.
Bibliography Niyamasāra of Kundakunda, Jaipur : Kundakunda Kahāna Trust, Todarmal, Smāraka, Uttarādhyayanasūtra (Part 3), Prakrit with Hindi translation and commentary, Jaipur: Samyagjñāna Pracāraka Mandala, 1987 Vyākhyā prajñaptisūtra, Beawar, Agama prakaśana samiti.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism
Today, we have conflicts in our life regarding mutual relations and behavior. Conflicts arise due to our wrong beliefs and misunderstandings. We adhere to our thoughts and opinions but discard others thoughts and opinions because of narrow mindedness and prejudices. Although the religions in the world have a motto to unite the people of the world in brotherhood and love, but due to mal-intentions of the leaders and staunchness of the followers, some conflicts prevail among the religions. The humanity suffers from mutual aversion of the followers towards other religions. Conflict is not bad, if it gives rise to the development of human values, philosophy and the nation, but it is shocking when it converts into fundamentalism and intolerance. It is well known from the history that countless wars have been fought in the name of the religions. Many staunch followers do not understand the real essence of the religion and they consider themselves better than other religious followers. Hence, they hate others. This tendency is prevalent everywhere, among the family members, society and between the nations.
Future of the human world depends on education, which a person gets at home and through various courses and
*Somewhere conflict inspires and motivates a person to become better in thoughts and deeds. He makes efforts to surpass his competence by increasing qualities within him. Hence sanskrit poet Bhäravi says-Conflict with great pure-hearted persons is good: (varam virodhopi samam mahātmabhiḥ, Kirātärjuniyam, 1.8)

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curriculum taught at various institutes. Education has a very significant role in developing and building the mental understanding of a human being. If a person is lacking spiritual and moral values in education, then, conflicts among the people arise more frequently. For maintaining peace, harmony and mutual cooperation with positive attitude towards all human beings and the other living beings of the world, spiritual and moral values must be included in the world education. A person faces conflicts in his own life due his mismanagement of thought process and misunderstanding about the reality and priority order of the works to be done. In this respect, proper education with spiritual and moral values can help.
to
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Jain religion and philosophy has many tenets for development of right understanding and deciding the right conduct to avoid conflicts in the minds of the people. A few of them are- non-absolutism, non-violence, tolerance, forgiveness, truthfulness, honesty, celibacy, limiting the possessions, theory of karma etc. All of these provide vision and can change the mentality of a person to remove the conflict. These can also help in bringing peace, harmony and solutions to many man-made problems.
Vision of Anekāntavāda And Nayavāda
Jaina philosophy has given us a thought of nonabsolutism i.e. anekāntavāda which establishes unity in diversities and harmony among the people of different ideologies. It gives an idea to honour others ideology. In the world, reality is one and the same, but the philosophers view it from different visions and mention the truth in different

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ways. We can't say that the views of one philosopher are right while others are wrong. They may be true from their angle, hence the harmony towards the persons of different ideas should be maintained. We can have an example of the photographs of a building taken from different angles. Every photograph is true from an angle, but we can't say that photograph taken by me is only true and other photographs are wrong. Here, all the photographs depict a photo of the same object from the different angles; hence all the photographs may be correct from different points of view. We have to examine the truth or true value of all the photographs. Similarly all the religious and philosophical thoughts have some truth or true value, but we have to examine and then accept them. This is the message of anekāntavāda of Jain philosophy.
Anekāntavāda suggests us that the thoughts of different individuals may have some component of truth, hence we should try to understand and respect others point of view. It will help us avoiding many possible conflicts and resolving them in a harmonious atmosphere.
Tirthankara Mahāvīra has propounded many views to know and to examine the objects. In Jaina canonical text vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, a question was raised about the universe (loka) - Is the loka endless or has an end? Mahāvīra replied this question from four points of views from the point of view of substance (dravya) the universe is finite. From the point of view of space also it is finite. From the point of view of time it is endless and from the view of modes
-

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(paryāya) also it is infinite.' This technique of understanding and explaining the things is found in Jain canonical literature. Many questions have been replied from the different views. A question was raised as to whether the worldly souls are eternal or non-eternal? Mahāvīra replied that from the substantial point of view souls are eternal but from the view of modes (or change) they are non-eternal. This method of answering has been accepted widely in Jain canonical literature. So in the case of conflicts we have to look at the problem from different viewpoints.
Non-absolutism of Jaina philosophy prevents an individual to be dogmatic and one sided in approach. It pleads for a broader outlook and an open mindedness which can resolve the conflicts that emerge from differences in ideologies and faiths. A renowned Jaina philosopher Siddhasen Divakara (5th Century) has rightly said
"All schools of thought (nayas) are valid when they are understood from their own standpoints and as far as they do not discard the truth or true value of others"."
3
180
Jainism has developed frameworks of nayas to observe the object in Anekāntavād. A naya can be defined as a standpoint to know the object. It does not rule out other different view-points and expresses a partial truth about an object. These nayas or standpoints may be many in number, but Jaina philosophers have discussed mainly two nayas as 1. 'Vyakhyāprajñapti-sūtra (vol. 1) Śataka 2, Uddeśaka 1, Sūtra 24 'Ibid, Vol. 2, Śataka 7, Uddeśaka 2, Sūtra 36 'Sanmatitarka, 1.28:
niyaya vayaṇijjasaccā savvanayā paraviyālaṇe mohā. te una na ditṭhasamao vibhayai sacce va alie vā. *Laghiyastraya, verse 52: nayo jñāturabhiprāyo.

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Substance stand point (dravyārthika naya), 2. Mode view point (paryāyārthika naya). These two nayas solve the problems of eternity and non-eternity of reality, which are propounded respectively by Vendāntists and Buddhists. Both these schools have confrontation about defining the reality. Vedanta philosophy propounds reality as eternal and Buddhism explains it as non-eternal. Jaina philosophy solves this problem by giving theory of standpoints. According to Jainism, reality is eternal from the viewpoint of substance and it is non-eternal from the viewpoint of modes. This naya theory weaves together the two opposite philosophical tenets and accepts that every substance of the world can be thought to have two opposite characters. From the view point of substance everything is permanent, but from the viewpoint of modes everything is changing every moment. In Jaina view, every entity of the world has multiple characters and we do not perceive all the characters at the moment. Hence, logically it will be wrong to deny the existence of characteristics that we do not perceive. The real entity is the same for all the viewers but there is a difference due to their own perspective. In other words we can say that unity and diversity are the two facets of the same reality. Reality itself is unity in diversity. From the generic point of view, unity is perceived and from the specific point of view diversity is observed.
'Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 7.5: samāsatastu dvibhedo dravyarthikaḥ
paryāyārthikaśca.
'Syādvādamañjarī, p.10.16 (on verse 5) sarve hi bhāvā dravyarthikanayāpekṣaya nityāḥ, paryāyārthikanayādeśāt punaranityāḥ.

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Jainism also propounds two standpoints in a different way niscaya naya (spiritual viewpoint) and vyavahāra naya (empirical viewpoint). Niścaya naya leads a person to the spiritual truth, whereas vyavhāra naya puts him forward for a good conduct. These two viewpoints are complementary to each other. If a person stresses only on niscaya naya then he may sideline the code of conduct and proper behavior. And if he stresses on vyavahāra naya then he may derail from his ultimate goal. Hence there is a need of both the nayas for real progress towards the ultimate goal.
182
Jaina Philosophers also propounded seven standpoints naigama naya, samgrahanaya, vyavahāranaya, ṛjusūtranaya, sabdanaya, samabhirūḍhanaya and evambhūtanaya.' Out of these seven standpoints first three are substance viewpoints and next four depict the viewpoint of modes. In another classification first four of these are considered as artha naya and rest three are classified as sabda naya.' These nayas help in understanding the motif of a speaker. Apart from these seven nayas, theory of sevenfold predication also exists. In these predications a word 'syat' is used in a determinate perspective as syād asti, syad nāsti, syād asti-nāsti, syad avaktavya, syad asti avaktavya, syad nästi avaktaya, syād asti-nāsti avaktavya.
as
'Anuyogadvarasutra: 606, p. 467: se kim tam nae? satta mulaṇayā paṇṇattā. tam jahā negame samgahe vavahare ujjusue sadde samabhirūḍhe evambhute. 'Pramāṇanayatattväloka 7.6 and 27: adyo naigama-samgrahavyavahārabhedat tredha. paryāyārthikaścaturdhā ṛjusūtraḥ śabdaḥ samabhirūḍḥa evambhūtasca. 'Laghiyastraya, verse 72:
catvāro-arthanaya hyete jīvādyarthavyapāśrayāt. trayaḥ śabdanayaḥ satyapadavidyām samāśritāḥ.

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Here it is to be quotable that Jaina philosopher Mallișeņa (13"century)and Yaśovijaya (17th century) have categorically mentioned that Nyāya-Vaiśesika philosophers represent naigama naya, Sāmkhya and Vedānta philosophers represent samgrahanaya, Cārvāka view point represents vyavahāranaya, Buddhist philosophy represents rjusūtranaya and the philosophers of grammar may represent sabda naya." In this way Jaina philosophers perceive the various Indian philosophies from the different points of views and give regard to them to establish harmony. A person should leave the attitude of obstinacy that he is only true and rest of the people are wrong. If a view point denies other viewpoints then that is counted as fallacious. Yaśovijaya says: -
“A true non-absolutism does not disdain any faith but treats all the salvation oriented faiths equally as a father behaves to his sons.
11
(1) Syādvāda-manjarī of Mallisena, p. 248: tatha hi naigamanayadarśanānusärinau Naiyāyika-Vaiseșikau. sangrābhiprāyapravsttāḥ sarvepyadaivatavādā samkhya-darśamca. vyavahāranayānupāti prāyaścārvāka-darśanam. rjusūtrākūta - pravsttabuddhayas-tāthāgatāḥ.
śabdādinayāvalambino vaiyakaraņādayaḥ. (2) Yaśovijaya says in Adhyātamasāra : verse 879: bauddhānāmsjūstrato matamabhūd vedāntinām samgrahāt sāmkhyānām tata eva naigamanayad yogāśca vaišesikāḥ 11 śabdabrahmavido'pi śabdanayataḥ sarvairnayairgumphita | Jaini drstiritiha sāratarată pratyaksamudviksyate II Adhyātmopanişad, verse 69-70: ---- yasya sarvatra samatā nayeșu tanyeşviva. tasyānekāntavādasya kva nyünādhikaśemukhi. tena syādvādamālambya sarvadarśana-tulyatām. moksoddesävišeşeņa yah pasyati sa śāstravit.

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Jaina philosophers have assimilated Anekāntavāda in their thinking, hence they regard other thinkers with equal respect. Ācārya Haribhadrasūri says :
“I possess no bias for Mahāvīra and no aversion against Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted”.
Haribhadra says again :-“I venerate all those who are free from all vices and filled with virtues, be they Brahmā, Vişnu, Siva or Jina.”.
Ācārya Hemcandra proclaims :
'I worship him who have destroyed attachment and aversion, the seeds of birth, be he Brahmā, Vişnu, Śiva or
Jina”:14
This is the liberal attitude of Jaina philosophers towards other religions or sects. They give stress on perfection which denotes the eradication of attachment and aversion. Jaina worship the merit of a person. In the sacred namaskāramantra of Jainas, veneration is paid to the spiritual posts such as arhat, siddha, ācārya, upādhyāya and sādhu.'
15
"Lokatattvanirnaya, verse 38 : pakşapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ, Kapilādiņu
Yuktimad vacanam yasya, tasya kāryaḥ parigrahah. "Lokatattvanirnaya, verse 40 yasya nikhilaścă doșā na santi sarve guņāśca vidyante.
brahmā vā vişnur vā haro jino vā namastasmai. "Śrī Mahādeva-stora, 44 bhavabījānkurajananā rāgādyā kşayamupāgatā yasya. brahmā vā vişnur vă haro jino vā namastasmai. Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, Vol. 1.1.1 : Namo arahamtānam, namo siddhānam, namo āyariyānam, namo uvajjhāyāṇam, namo loye savva sāhunam.

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Jain philosophers have consistently shown reverence to other ideologies and faiths. Sutrakstānga- the second earliest Jaina work, mentions that those who praise their own faith and views and disregard those of their opponents, possess, malice against them and hence remain confined to cycle of birth and death." A famous Jaina old text the Isibhāsiyaim comprises the teaching of 45 saints of śramaņa and Brāhmaṇa traditions such as Nārada, Bhāradvāja, Maņkhali Gosal and many others have been presented with due regards of Arhat Rsi.' Vision of Non-Violence
Non-violence (Ahimsā) is another tenet of Jainism which bears universal value and has a capacity to resolve conflicts. The concept of non-violence is accepted by almost all religions of the world, but Jainism observes it minutely. Jainism prohibits not only killing of human beings and animals but of the vegetable kingdom as well." Harming the plants, polluting water and air are also the acts of violence. Jainism has favoured non-violence for co-existence of all living beings. It cares not only the life of human beings, but it also cares for the life of animals, birds, insects, serpents, plants, aquatic kingdom etc. Mahāvīra suggested that no
"Sūtrakstāñiga 1.1.2.23 :
Sayam sayam pasamsamtā garahamtā paramvayam,
je u tattha viussamti, samsāram te viussiyā. "'Devanāradena arhatā isiņā buiyam- Isibhāsiyāim, 1.1 and in other chapters also refer it. Jainism accepts six categories of worldly souls as- earth bodied (prthvīkāyika), water bodied (apkāyika), fire bodied (tejaskäyika), air bodied (vāyukāyika), vegetables (vanaspatikāyika) and mobile beings having two sense organs to five sense organs and mind (one word for all these is trasakāyika).

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living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless." All these are considered as violence in the view of Jainism. Hence violence is not just killing a living being but any form of torture, exploitation, mental or physical harm is also violence. Violence may occur through our mind, speech and actions. Not only this, but to motivate or support others for violence is also considered as violence. In this way non-violence has a much broader connotation. It provides directive ways to think, speak and behave in such a manner that doesn't hurt anyone. First of all, violence generates in our mind, and then it comes to our speech and actions giving rise to conflicts. Hence, non-violence can act as an important instrument in conflict removal. Firstly, it will avoid many possible conflicts, and in case of remaining conflicts the broader form of non-violence can guide us to the best remedy for conflict removal.
Ahimsā is not merely non-violence, it has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (maitrī) to all living beings. Amitagati in Sāmāyika pātha says:
“Friendliness towards all beings, delightedness on the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever."
"Acārāngasūtra 1.4.1: savve pānā savve bhūtā savve jīvā savve sattā na hamtavvā, ņa ajjāvetavvā, ņa parighetavvā, na paritāveyavvā, na
uddaveyavvā. * Paramātma-dvātrinsikā 1: sattveșu maitrim guņișu pramodam, klișteșu jīveșu krpāparatvam; mādhyasthabhāvam viparītavșttau, sadā mamātmā vidadhātu deva.

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Acārānga sūtra establishes an importance of other's life. It mentions:
'All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they all want to live. Life is dear to all beings."
,,21
187
This statement gives a message to understand and protect others life and their right to live. Every living being wants to live, nobody wants to be killed. We should honour their right to live and we should adopt our lifestyle without killing or lesser killing. This lifestyle will help us in removing mutual conflicts among the people and the living beings. Today, a person wants to increase his power by adopting violent attitude and behaviour. He forgets the value of others life and emotions. Jaina canonical literature describes the concept of six categories of worldly souls (ṣaḍnikāya) and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own emotions, passions and virtues.
22
Sutrakṛtānga sūtra tries to make a man sensitive towards all beings of the world. It says:
21
This kind of preaching of non-violence (ahimsā) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the beings of the world. In Acārānga and Sūtrakṛtānga non-violence
"Ācārāngasūtra 1.2.3: savve pānā piyāuyā suhasāyā dukkhapadikulā appiyavaha piyajivino, jiviukāmā savvesim jiviyam piyam
22Mentioned in the footnote 18
Sūtrakṛtānga 2.1.19
"As you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way"."
23
23

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has a social aspect that motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness.Violent behaviour is enemy for the society, but non-violence is a friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society, nonviolent and friendly behaviour is essential. It applies for all the beings - be it mobile (trasa) or the immobile (sthāvara). In this way by developing empathy for other living beings, non-violence can play a big role in removal of conflict.
There is a misconception in our minds that violence and wars are the instruments for bringing peace in our life, but it is notable that violence can never bring peace in our minds and hearts. This thinking generates conflicts in our minds many times with other human beings, but a spot of blood on a cloth never can be washed by blood. Only nonviolence is helpful in establishing internal equanimity and peace. Actually impure thought injures the real nature of a soul by disturbing its equanimity. This is called sva-hiņsā i.e. violence of the self. This violence is more harmful, because it harms one own self and the others too. External violence occurs after internal violence. Hence, first we have to control the violence on internal level. Weapons and wars are not actual instruments for establishing peace. Ācārānga
Ācāranga and Sūtrakstānga sutras stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as ācāranga (1.4.2) says- savvesim pāņānam savvesim bhutanam savvesim sattānam asāyam apariņivväņam mahābhayam dukkham ti, tti bemi. Acārāngasūtra : 1.1.2 : tam se ahităya tam se abodhiye. **Praśnavyākarana 2.1.3: esā sa bhagavai ahimsä ja så bhiyānam viva
saranam, pakkhinam viva gamanam tisiyānam viva salilam tasa-thāvarasavva-bhūya-khemarikari.

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sūtra explains that weapons may be superior to each other, but nothing is superior to non-violence."
27
189
Although complete non-violence is difficult for a householder, but he can avoid killing as much as possible. Dr Sagarmal Jain has rightly said:
"According to Jaina point of view, all the beings have equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable, yet it cannot be the directive principle of our living, because it goes against the judgments of our faculty of reasoning. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life, on the same ground I have no right to take another's life". 28
He further says:
"Though in our worldly life complete non-violence is not possible, yet our motto should be-'Lesser violence is better living"
,,29
Right Attitude, Right Knowledge And Right Conduct
Jainism is a religion and philosophy of salvation from sorrows. Fallacious view, nescience (wrong knowledge) and misconduct are the causes of suffering. Fallacious view is the cause of wrong knowledge and wrong knowledge is the cause of misconduct which includes passions (emotions) of anger, pride, deceit and greed. All these passions put a person into sorrows. Such a person remains tensed and creates tension for others. It generates confrontation with other people. This confrontation may be avoided by developing right view, which is helpful in
27
"Acārānga Sūtra 1.3.4: Atthi sattham parena param, natthi asattham
parena param.
Peace, Religious Harmony and Solution of World Problems from Jaina perspective, p.57 "Ibid, p.57

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understanding the nature of the world and reality.
Jainism underscores the value of right world-view (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna) and right conduct (samyakcāritra) for the attainment of salvation and removal of conflicts forever. This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. Samyag darśana bears an essential characteristic of kindness (anukampā)." Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (karuņā) one may not have samyagdarśana and in the absence of samyagdarśana eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism." Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for ultimate liberation and liberation from conflicts.
Right knower (Samyagjñānin), a person having samyagjñāna changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (cāritra), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (krodha) changes into forgiveness (kşamā), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment." His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love
** Tattvārthasūtra 1.1: samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāņi mokşamārgaḥ. ”Tattvärthādhigamabhāsya 1.2: tadevam praśama-amveganirvedānukampastikyābhivyaktilaksanam tattvārthasraddhānam samyagdarśanam. Utträdhyayanasūtra 28.30: nādamsaņissa nāṇam, nāņeņa viņā na hunti caranagunā. agunissa natthi mokkho natthi amokkhassa nivvānam. Daśavaikälikasūtra 8.39: uvasamena hane koham mānam maddavayā jine;
māyam cajjavabhāvena lobham samtosao jine.

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others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of samyagjñāna. It controls the behaviour of a person towards himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been expressed in Bșhatkalpabhāsya (4584):
“What you desire for yourself, desire for others too; and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire for others at all- this is the essence of preaching of Jina".
This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also - "A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself”.*
As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in Acārānga cūrņi in some different words- “As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them.”
Brhatkalpa bhāsya 4584 : jam icchasi appanatto, jam ca na icchasi appanatto;
tam iccha parassa vi, ettiyagam jinasāsaņas. atmanaḥ pratikülāni pareşām na samācaret.(a renowned verse). * Ācārāngacūrņi 1.1.6: "Jahā me itthānithe suhāsuhe tahā savvajīvānam"

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This thinking can protect us from indulging in conflicts with the people we deal with. Conduct of Five Aņuvratas
Five vows of partial renunciation (aņuvratas) are also helpful in removal of conflicts and preparing good citizens of any country. Five aņuvratas are mentioned as abstinence from killing a life (prāņātipātaviramaņa), abstinence from falsehood (mộşāvāda-viramaņa), abstinence from stealing (adattādāna-viramaņa), satisfaction with own spouse only (svadāra or svapatisantoșa parimāņa) and limiting the possession (parigraha parimāņa) or limiting the desires (icchāvidhiparimāņa vrata)." These aņuvratas have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these aṇuvratas cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. The main benefits of these partial vows can be summarised as below.. 1. Compassion and equality towards other living beings
be observed in this manner that their equal right to
live is safe. 2. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might
cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to
others." 3. Refraining from theft shows respect for other's
property and rights. This aņuvrata has a power to
"See, Uvāsagasasao, chapter 1 Tattvārthādhigamabhāsya 7.9: himsāpāruşyapaiśunyädiyuktam vacaḥ satyamapi garhitamanrtameva bhavatiti.

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4.
5.
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restrict bribery and deceptive practices in the economic world.
Control over sexual practices can increase mental and spiritual power, can overcome sexual corruption and can overcome diseases like AIDS.
Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. The fifth vow puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression or bodily diseases, then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals.
Vision with Theory Of Karma
In the view of Jaina Karma theory, a person gets result of his own deeds. The concepts of pleasure giving (sātāvedaniya) karma and grief or pain giving (asātā vedaniya) karma instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad consequences to you. The causes of these sātā and asātā vedanīya karmas have been mentioned in Tattvärtha Sutra as follows:
"If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, cry, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts asātāvedaniya or pain karma, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of sātāvedaniya or pleasure karma."9
39
Tattvärthasutra 6.12-13:
dukhaḥ-śoka-tāpākrandana-vadha-paridevanānyātma-parobhayāsthānyasad-vedyasya. bhūtavratanukampādānam sarāgasamyamädiyogaḥ kṣāntiḥ śaucamiti sadvedyasya. *

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Forbearance is also a cause of sātāvedaniya. The Tattvärtha Sūtra explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behavior results in pain or asātā. This is not just a theory of karma, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also.
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Although regarding ontology or metaphysics sāmkhya, Vedānta, Buddhism and Jainism are different, but all of these guide a person to be detached from worldly allurements and have to control over the sense organs, mind and the thought process tilting towards wrong doing. All of these thoughts may be different in their approaches in defining the reality, but these preach to achieve the same goal of emancipation from sorrows forever. Thus goal is same but methods to achieve the goal are different. They may be different, but still there are similarities that all of these instruct a path to remove attachment from the worldly attractions. Hence, according to Jainism, we should find out the path which leads us to achieve the goal of eternal happiness, peace and harmony towards all the beings of the world.
Conclusion
Thus Jainism has propounded non-absolution (anekānta-vāda), non-violence (ahimsa), conduct of aṇuvratas including the tenet of limiting the possession, concepts of triratna, theory of karman etc. to remove conflicts of our minds which are by product of our

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misunderstanding or ignorance. Right view and right knowledge are the guiding factors of our right attitude and conduct; we have to understand the limits of knowledge which occurs through sense organs, mind and intellect. A real knowledge comes out directly from the soul after a radical change in our internal views. We have to make our mind pure with positive change in thought process, we should develop a vast understanding of the reality and evolve the education system incorporating the spiritual and moral values through learning the anekānta-vāda, nayavāda, non-violence, theory of karma etc. in resolving the conflicts and live a peaceful and progressive life with co-existence of all the diversities of all beings in the world.
Bibliography Ācārāngacūrņi of Jindāsagani, Surat : Shri Jainānanda Pustakālaya, 1941 Ācārāngasūtra, Beawar : Sri Āgam Prakashan Samiti, 1989 Adhyātmasāra of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Hindi Translation and Commentary by Sādhvi Prītidarśana śri, Shajapur (M.P) : Prāchya Vidyāpitha, 2009 Adhyātmopanişad of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Ahmedabad : Divya Darśana Trust. Anuyogadvarasūtra, Prakrit, Beawar : Śrī Āgama Prakashana samiti, 1987 Bịhatkalpabhāsya, (ed). Muni Punyavijaya and chaturavijaya, Bhāvanagar : Shri Jain Ātmānanda sabhā, 2002 Daśavaikālika Sūtra. Prakrit, Jaipur: Samyag Jñāna Prachārak Mandala, 1983 Isibhāsiyāim (ed.) walther schubring; Ahmedabad : L.D. Institute of Indology, 1974

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Jain Sagar Mal, 2002: Peace, Religious Harmony and Solution of World Problems from Jaina Perspective, Varanasi : Parsvanātha Vidyāpitha, 2002
Laghiyastraya of Bhatta Akalanka, published in Akalankāgranthatraya, (ed.) Mahendra Kumar Lokatattvanirņaya of Haribhadrasūri, Bhāvanagar : Śrī Jaina Dharma Pracharaka Sabha. Paramātma-dvātrimsikā of Amitgati, Published in Nirgrantha Bhajanavali, Jaipur : Samyag Jñāna Prachārak Mandala, Sixth edition, 1997 Pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka of Vādideva sūri, Ahmedanagar : Sri Tilokaratna Sthānakavāsī Jain Dhārmika Parīkņā Board, 3rd reprint, 2000 Sanmatiitarka of Siddhasenasūri, Pandit Sukhalalji Series 5 Ahmedabad. L.D.Institute of Indology, First revised printed edition 2000 (English) Śri Mahādevastotra of Hemacandra sūri, Sirohi : Ācārya Śrī Sushila sūri Jaina Jñāna mandira, V.S. 2041 Sutrakstāngasūtra- Praksit, Beawer: Sri Agama Prakāshan Samiti, second edition 1991 Syādvādamañjari (Commentary by Mallisena on Anyayogavyavacheda- dvātrimśikā) Agāsa : Śrī Parama Shruta Prabhāvaka Mandala, 4" reprint, 1979 Tattvārthādhigamabhāșya of Umāsvāti, Hindi translation by Pandita Khoobchandra Shastrī, Agāsa Parama śruta Prabhanvaka mandala, 1992 Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti, Hindi Commentary by Pt. Sukha Lal Sanghavī, Varanasi : Pārsvanath Vidyāpītha, 1985. Uttrādhyayanasūtra (3 vols.) Prakrit, Hindi translation and annotations by Acharya Hastimal and Pt.Shashikānta Jhā, Jaipur : Samyag Jñāna Prachāraka Mandal, between 1983-1989 Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra, Prakrit (vol. 1) Beawar : Śri Āgam Prakāshan Samiti, second edition, 1991

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ABOUT THE AUTHOUR Dr. Dharm Chand Jain is a professor of Sanskrit in Jai Narain Vyas university, Jodhpur and has served as Head, Department of Sanskrit and as founder Director, Buddhist Studies Centre in the university. Indian Philosophy (especially Jainism and Buddhism), Sanskrit and Prakrit Language and literature are the subjects of his interest. He has written five books (1. Bauddha Pramana-mimamsa ki Jaina Dssti se Samikna, 2. Bauddha Pramana-mimamsa, 3. Chintana Ke Ayama, 4. Jaina Dharma - darsana : Eka Anusilana etc.) and edited more than 25 books (including on Smsti-sastra, Buddhism and Jainism). He has presented research papers in national and international seminars in India and abroad and also chaired some sessions of them. His numerous research articles have been published in reputed journals and proceedings. He is associated with various academic bodies of universities and educational institutes and has visited Hongkong (1995), London (2006 and 2013), Nepal (2013) and New York (2015) for academic purposes. Rajasthan Sanskrit Academy has awarded him with Abmbikadatta Vyasa award (1991) for Sanskrit prose writing and Darsana Sammana (2014-2015) for philosophical writing. He has been honoured with following awards for his scholarly writing and social services:Yuva-pratibha-sodha-sammana (1994), Champalal Sanda Smoti-purskara (1997), Acarya Hasti-smsti-sammana (2001), Karuna-writer-speaker-propagator-award (2014), Ramratan Kochar-smsti-sammana (2015), Hemachandracharya Sahitya sammana (2015) and Jaina seva-ratna-sammana (2016). प्राकृत भारती अकादमी, जयपुर 135, 14716 TRI, Hiddla Tr, , sta : 0141-2524827, 2520230 E-mail : prabharati@gmail.com Web-Site : prakritbharati.net With the support of CSR Activities ele बैंक ऑफ महाराष्ट्र Bank of Maharashtra भारत सरकार का उद्यम एक परिवार एक बैंक 978-93-81571-71-2 250.00