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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines
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pratyakşa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyakṣa in the Nandisūtra. In the Nandisūtra the concept of anīndriya pratyakșa (quasi sense) is not mentioned. The Nandisutura mentions about no- indriya pratyakşa, but this term was used to denote transcendental perception. The Mukhya pratyakșa was given a new name as pāramārthika pratyakşa by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as sakala and vikala pratyakşa on the basis of a division found in the Sthānānga sūtra as
kevala and no-kevala. H. The Śvetāmbar logicians are unanimous in accepting the
validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized. Whereas Digambar logicians like Akalanka, Māņikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of the opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramāņa that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable of knowing the all objects. Umāsvāti says that
mind is only an instrument ofśrutajñāna. As stated in the beginning of the article, Jaina philosophers maintained Jaina epistemology on the foundation of description of knowledge found in Jaina canons. A brief survey regarding the development of the division or types of pramāna is as follows:
